The Holocaust in Greece, 1941-1944 (Part 2)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Carl Savich

In his latest series on the Holocaust in the Balkans, Serbian-American historian Carl Savich sets the murder of almost 60,000 Greek Jews in the context of both the events of the Second World War and the wider context of the long and colorful history of Judaism in northern Greece. Yesterday’s first part covered the history of Judaism in Greece up through the arrival of the Nazis in 1941. Today’s second installment provides a city-by-city recounting of the Holocaust in several parts of Greece, and concludes with a short treatment of the resistance against the Nazis and the liberation.

Salonika

The first deportations of Jews occurred in Macedonia and Thrace, in the Bulgarian zone of occupation. German official Theodor Dannecker proposed that 20,000 Jews from the Bulgarian zone be deported to Germany. In February 1943, Peter Gabrovski, the internal affairs minister of Bulgaria, agreed to this number proposed by Dannecker. The deportations were organized by Yaroslav Kalitsin, head of the administrative section of the Bulgarian Commissariat for Jewish Affairs or the Komisarstvo za Evreiskite Vuprosi. The Jewish victims were assembled at Gorna Dzhumaya, and Radomir. The deportations began at 4:00 a.m. on March 4, 1943. The Jews of Thrace, Macedonia, and eastern Serbia under Bulgarian occupation were arrested and assembled at transit camps which consisted of former tobacco warehouses. About 200 Jews survived by being drafted into forced labor battalions or by escaping to the Italian zone.

The main group, however, was taken to Bulgaria proper from where 4,100 Jews were sent by train and boats to Vienna; from there they were transported to Treblinka and the gas chambers. There was widespread popular opposition to the Final Solution in Bulgaria, and there remains considerable debate as to how much responsibility Bulgarian officials bore for the genocide. The initiative and implementation of this deportation order was made by German officials, particularly Danneker. Moreover, it was restricted to areas not part of Bulgaria before the war, i.e., Macedonia, Thrace, and eastern Serbia.

In the Italian zone, the Final Solution was not enforced.

In the German zone of occupation, anti-Jewish measures were enforced immediately. The deportations to the death camps began in spring 1943, and saw a gradual and incremental buildup to the Nazis’ program for the Final Solution.

In 1941, Salonika or Thessalonika, part of the German occupation zone, had a population of 56,000 Jews, making it the largest Sephardic community in the world. In June of that year, the Jewish Affairs Commission (Judenangelegenbeiten) or Einsatzstab Rosenberg/Rosenberg Commando arrived in Salonika and seized and confiscated the Jewish libraries and archives in Salonika and Athens. Private libraries, manuscripts, liturgical art, rabbinical and Beth Din libraries were seized. These materials were then sent to the Institute for Jewish Studies in Frankfurt.

The city was part of the German zone of occupation where the Final Solution was enforced. Dieter Wisliceny and Alois Brunner were put in charge of the deportations in Greece. The deportations were organized with the assistance of the Jedenrat or Jewish Council headed by Chief Rabbi Zvi Koretz, who appointed the president of the council in December, 1942.

In the summer of 1942, persecutions of Jews began to be accelerated. On July 11, 1943, all Jewish men between the ages of 18 and 45, some 9,000 altogether, were conscripted into forced labor with the Organization Todt labor battalions. They were assembled in Liberty Square for hours in the heat and humiliated by being forced to perform exercises on command. Many died from exhaustion. The Salonika Jewish community sought to ransom them but was unsuccessful. What also resulted was that the Jewish cemetery in Salonika was destroyed. Jews were also forced to wear the infamous “Yellow Star.”

In February, 1942, the Nuremberg Race Laws were applied to the German zone in Greece through the efforts of Maximilian Merton, the adviser to the German military occupation administration. The Jewish population of Salonika was concentrated in three districts: 1) the 151 quarter, 2) the Hagia Paraskevi district, and, 3) the Baron de Hirsch transit camp.

On March 15, 1943, the deportations began. In March and April, Salonika Jews were transported from the Hirsch camp to Auschwitz by rail. The first transport consisted of 2,500 Jews loaded onto 40 freight cars. Every three days, railroad cars containing 2,000 Salonika Jews would be transported to Auschwitz. There were transports or convoys on March 17, 19, 23, and 27. In April, convoys left on April 3, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 20, 22 and 28. Two transports left on May 3 and May 9. A total of 48,000 Jews would be deported to the concentration camps, of whom 37,000 were sent to the gas chambers upon arrival while 11,000 were selected for forced labor. In Salonika, 96 percent of the Jewish population would be killed. Today, 1,200 Jews live in the city.

From April 30 to May 8, 1943, the German forces arrested the Jews of Orestias, Florina, Veroia, Souflion and Didimotikon. Some were then transported by ship to Salonika from where they were sent to Auschwitz on May 9. Most of them were sent to the gas chambers when they arrived. They were part of the 17th shipment from Salonika.

The last Jews to be deported from Salonika were sent to Bergen-Belsen in August, 1943. This transport included members of the Jewish Council or Judenrat, consisting of 74 members. The trains used in the transports were supplied by the German Army or Wehrmacht. The military jurisdiction fell to Army Group E under the command of General Alexander Lohr.

Athens

There had been Jewish settlement in Athens since the 3rd century B.C., and the pre-war Jewish population was 3,500. The city was located in the Italian occupation zone where the Final Solution was not enforced. As a consequence, Jewish refugees from Salonika settled in the city. On March 25, 1944, German forces arrested 1,690 Jews who were sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau. In Athens, 66 percent of the Jews survived. The Greek police chief of the city, Angelos Evert, and the Orthodox Archbishop, Damaskenos, issued false baptismal records and false ID cards to Jews in Athens and Piraeus. Many Jews were hidden in Christian homes. There are 3,000 Jews in Athens today.

Ioannina

There had been a Jewish presence in Ioannina or Yannina, the capital of Epiros province, since 70 A.D. In the 15 and 16th centuries, Sephardic Jews settled in the city. Under Italian occupation, the Jews were not threatened. But when the German forces took control of Ioannina, they arrested the president of the Jewish community of the city, Moses Koffinas. On March 25, 1944, the entire Jewish population of 1,860 was deported to Auschwitz.

Kastoria, a fur trading town located in southwestern Macedonia, had a pre-war Jewish population of 900, primarily Sephardic Jews. There is a record of Jewish settlement in the city even before the 15th century. The city was a major fur and leather processing center on a trading route much frequented during the Ottoman Empire period, in the mountains between Ioannina and Salonika. Jews too played an important role in the fur and leather trade of Kastoria.

On March 25, 1944, 763 Jews were rounded up and held at a school building awaiting deportation. They were without food and water. German soldiers are alleged to have raped Jewish schoolgirls held there. This group was then transported to Salonika and then to Auschwitz. Only 35 Jews survived. Today, it is believed that one Jewish family remains in Kastoria.

Corfu

The island of Corfu in the Ionian Sea had a diverse population of 2,000 Jews before the war, consisting of Romaniotes, Sephardim, and Italian-speaking Jews. It hosted the Kahal Shalom synagogue and a Jewish ghetto created when the island was ruled by Venice in the 14th century. Corfu and the other Ionian islands never fell under Ottoman control, remaining dependencies of Venice.

German forces assumed control of the island after the surrender of Italy in 1943. The Germans began the implementation of the Final Solution on the island. The Jewish population of the island was rounded up by German Wehrmacht, police, and SS units and on June 10, 1944, 1,800 Jews were deported to Auschwitz, 200 Jews having been hidden in Christian homes. When they arrived at Auschwitz in July, 1944, 435 of the men chosen for the Special Detachment (Sonderkommando) opted to be killed immediately rather than help the Germans in the extermination process. Today, 80 Jews live on Corfu.

Rhodes

The history of Judaism on the southeastern island of Rhodes goes back to 300 B.C. In the 16th century, the Dodecanese island became a predominantly Sephardic community. The Kalal synagogue was built in 1675 and there was a Jewish quarter known as “Juderia.”
Rhodes was part of Italy in World War II, when some 2,000 Jews lived on the island. Under Italian control, they were not harmed. But when German forces occupied the island in 1943, the Final Solution was enforced.

On July 20, 1944, 1,700 Jews on the island of Rhodes were sent by boat to the far-off Greek mainland. Because there was no food or water, 23 died during the trip. They were then held at the Haidary transit camp from where they were transported to Auschwitz the Greek port city of Piraeus. At the Polish death camp, 1,000 were killed and 700 selected for forced labor. There were only 151 survivors. Today, 35 Jews live on the island.

Volos

Volos is a port city on the Aegean Sea, near Larisa and roughly halfway between Thessaloniki and Athens. There had been Jewish settlements there since the 14th century, and before the war, there were 882 Jews living there.

On March 25, 1944, German forces sought to deport the Jewish population. Efforts by the EAM resistance group, Orthodox archbishop Ioakim, and Rabbi Pessah prevented the deportations. Because of their actions, only 130 Jews were deported to Auschwitz.

Other Islands

On May 21, 1944, 260 Jews from Crete were arrested and subsequently deported from the northern port town of Rethymno. They all died when the boat sank under mysterious circumstances. On the Dodecanese island of Kos, where there exist a Jewish cemetery and tombstone dating from the 17th century, all of the 90 Jewish inhabitants were killed by German forces. On the Ionian island of Zakynthos, however, all 275 Jews were saved through the intervention of Orthodox Bishop Chrysostomos and the Mayor, Loukas Carrer.

Greek Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau

Based on data from the Birkenau-Auschwitz camp, a total of 54,533 Greek Jews were deported to the infamous death camp during the war, of whom 41,775 were sent to the gas chambers. Another 12,757 people, consisting of 8,025 men and 4,732 women, were assigned various duties in the camp. These duties included forced labor, the camp orchestra, the crematoria in 1943-44, medical experimentation on sterilization and experiments with twins. Some were assigned duty with the Sonderkommando, or Special Detachment.

In August, 1943, 300 Salonika Jews were sent to the Warsaw Ghetto as part of a labor battalion. In October, a second group consisting of Salonika Jews was sent. By July, most of the Salonika Jews had been transported to the Dachau concentration camp, though others remained in Poland.

On August 2, 1944, there were 292 Greek Jews at the Auschwitz I main camp, 929 at the Auschwitz II or Birkenau camp, and 517 at Auschwitz III or the Buna-Monowitz camp. There were 731 Jewish women from Greece at Auschwitz. Most of the Salonika Jews selected for forced labor died from typhus, dysentery, the extreme cold temperature, suicide, or from starvation. Those that survived were part of the death marches that began on January 17, 1945 to Bergen-Belsen, Stutthof, and Mauthausen. Of the 54,000 Greek Jews deported to the concentration camps, less than 2,000 survived the war.

However, there were tragic examples of resistance by Greek Jews at Auschwitz. In 1944, a group of 400 Salonika Jews refused their assignment in the Sonderkommando or Special Detachment because it would entail killing Hungarian Jews. They were sent to the gas chambers as punishment. In the summer of 1944, Albert Errera from Larisa, Greece, wounded a guard and escaped across the Vistula River. He was subsequently caught and then tortured until he died. On October 5-7, 1944, 135 Greek Jews who had been former Greek Army officers launched a camp uprising. Greek Jews also claimed that they blew up Crematorium III at Auschwitz; according to some accounts, they died singing the Greek national anthem.

In September, 1943, Jurgen Stroop, who had put down the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, was appointed Higher SS and Political leader of Greece and promoted to SS Gruppenfuehrer. Stroop assisted Wisliceny in rounding up 800 Athenian Jews who were arrested and then transported to Auschwitz. On March 24 and 25, 1944, Jews from all over Greece were arrested in large numbers: 352 from Arta, 90 from Chalkis, 272 from Preveza, 130 from Volos, 225 from Larisa, 763 from Kastoria, 1,860 from Ioannina, 50 from Trikkala, as well as 12 families from Patras.
Incidentally, the notorious Kurt Waldheim was an intelligence officer in the German Army at the time and saw service in Greece. He was photographed in 1943 with a group of 15 German officers at the famous Hotel Grande Bretagne in Athens.

Resistance and Rescue

Italian officials in the Italian consulate in Salonika helped Jews flee to the Italian zone of occupation. The Italian consul Guelfo Zamboni, voice-consul Cavalliere Rosenberg, Mark Mosseri, and Valerie Torres issued fake consular documents to Salonika Jews which allowed them to settle in Athens. Orthodox Archbishop Damaskenos, Salonika lawyers, Orthodox religious leaders and educators all made appeals and efforts to stop the deportations. The Ioannis Rallis government protested German orders, as did Professor Nikolaos Louvaris, the education minister, who resisted the deportations. Constantine Logothetopoulos, the head of the government in 1943, wrote a letter of protest over the genocide to the German plenipotentiary in Athens, Gunther Altenberg, on March 23.

Over 600 Greek Orthodox priests and clergy were arrested, and they themselves were deported because of their brave efforts to protect Greek Jews. The Greek Orthodox Church, under the metropolitan of Athens, Archbishop Damaskenos, launched a resistance campaign that consisted of formal protests, encyclicals that called upon Orthodox clergy to protect Jews, as well as the issuance of fake baptismal certificates to Jews. Over 250 Jewish children were hidden by Orthodox clergy. As has been said, the Athens police also resisted the deportations by issuing fake ID documents to Jews.

Of course, there was also a guerrilla resistance movement in Greece. Active military resistance did not begin until 1942, led by the non-Communist, royalist partisan forces, known as the National Republican Greek League (Ellenikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Stratos, or EDES) led by Napoleon Zervas. A second group was the National and Social Liberation Movement (Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeletherosis, or EKKA) led by Colonel Dimitrios Psarros.

On the other side of the ideological spectrum was the nationalist, communist guerrillas known as the National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeletherotikon Metopon, or EAM), formed in September, 1941. Its military wing was the Popular Greek Liberation Army (Ellenikos Laikos Apelethorotikos Stratos or ELAS), established 2 months later and led by Athanasios Klaras, known as ‘Aris Velouchiotis.’ The Greek Communist leader, Nikos Zakhariadis, was imprisoned at the Dachau concentration camp by German occupation forces.

Conclusion

The pre-war Jewish population of Greece and the island of Rhodes, then part of Italy, was 77,178. During the Holocaust, approximately 61% percent of the Jewish population of Greece was killed. Salonika had the largest Sephardic community in the word with a population of 56,000, 96 percent of whom were killed during the Holocaust. From Salonika, only 2,000 Jews survived; 1,000 returned after the war, while another 1,000 emigrated. The majority of the Jewish populations in Thessaly, consisting of Volos, Larissa, and Trikkala, survived the Holocaust. By contrast, there were no Greek survivors from Bulgarian-controlled Thrace.
Today, Greece has a population of 5,000 Jews, most of who live in Athens, the capital, and in Salonika. Both cities have museums that document the long history, sometimes triumphant, sometimes tortured, of the Jews in Greece.

Bibliography

Benbassa, Esther, and Aron Rodrigue. Sephardi Jewry: A History of the Judeo-Spanish Community, 14th to 20th Centuries (Jewish Communities in the Modern World). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (2000).

Bowman, Steven B, and Isaac Benmayor. The Holocaust in Salonika: Eyewitness Account (The Sephardi and Greek Holocaust Library, 1). NY: Sephardic House (2002).

Dwork, Deborah, and Robert Jan Van Pelt. Holocaust: A History. NY: W.W. Norton (2003).

Fromer, Rebecca. The House by the Sea: A Portrait of the Holocaust in Greece. San Francisco: Mercury House (1998).

Ibid, The Holocaust Odyssey of Daniel Bennahmias, Sonderkommando. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press (1993).

Gutman, Israel, ed. Encyclopedia of the Holocaust. NY: Macmillan, 1990.

Mazower, Mark. Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44. New Haven: Yale University Press (2001).

See also Mark Mazower’s recent work, Salonica: City of Ghosts.

The Holocaust in Greece, 1941-1944 (Part 1)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Carl Savich

In his latest series on the Holocaust in the Balkans, Serbian-American historian Carl Savich sets the murder of almost 60,000 Greek Jews in the context of both the events of the Second World War and the wider context of the long and colorful history of Judaism in northern Greece. Today’s first part covers the history of Judaism in Greece up through the arrival of the Nazis in 1941. Part two tomorrow provides a city-by-city recounting of the Holocaust in several parts of Greece, and concludes with a short treatment of the resistance against the Nazis and the liberation.

Introduction

In Greece, there were 59,185 Jewish victims during the Holocaust; 81 percent of Greek Jews were killed, while 8,000-10,000 survived. From 1941-1945, 60,000-70,000 Greek Jews were killed, most at the Birkenau-Auschwitz concentration camp. About 5,000 Jews live in Greece today, in Salonika (or Thessaloniki) and Athens.

Salonika, called “La Madre de Israel,” the Mother of Israel, had a pre-war Jewish population of 56,000, the largest settlement of Sephardic Jews, over 96 percent of which were killed during the Holocaust.

Jewish Settlement in Greece: A Brief History

The Greek Jewish community is one of the oldest in Europe and dates back to the early Hellenistic period, when Greek-speaking Jews resided in Rhodes, Corinth, Athens, Thebes, Salonika, Veria, Sparta, Crete, and Delos.

During the Roman and Byzantine periods, these Greek Jews were called Romaniot or Romaniote and were mostly urban. In the 12th through 14th centuries, the Romaniot settled in Ioannina, known as the “capital” of Romaniote Jewry, Corfu, Patra, Lirissa, Zakynthos, and Halkidha. Following the expulsion of the Jewish populations from Spain and Portugal, Beyazit II allowed them to settle in the Balkans. There was a large influx of Sephardim into Greece, particularly in Salonika, Rhodes, Kos, and Veria. Rhodes was known as “La Piccola Gerusalemi,” or the Little Jerusalem and contained the Juderia neighborhood. In Kastoria, there were Jewish fur traders. In Corfu there was a Jewish ghetto and the Kahal Shalom synagogue.

After two centuries, the Sephardic Jews outnumbered the Greek-speaking Romaniot Jews. The Sephardic Jews brought the Iberian Jewish culture of Spain and Portugal, Ladinismo, to Greece. They also spoke Ladino, a Spanish-Judeo language that incorporated Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew, Arabic, and Turkish. Ladino became the official language of the Balkan/Greek Jewish community. The Greek-speaking Romaniots also differed in their religious customs with the Sephardim to the extent that they had separate synagogues and did not intermarry.

The Muslim Ottoman Turks sent administrators and officials into the occupied Balkan regions of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece. These Turkish administrators and officials from Anatolia brought their families and established Muslim communities where they were set up. After the Ottoman Turks conquered Salonika in 1430, Turkish Muslim settlements were established there to fill the houses of Greeks who were either killed, deported, or forced to flee.

Later, Sephardic Jewish families expelled from Spain were also brought in by the Turks to settle areas that were formerly Greek. A policy of the Ottoman Turks was to appoint Jews as civil servants and tax collectors in the Ottoman Empire. The Turks appointed Joseph Nasi, who was a Jew, as governor of the Cyclades in 1566. But because there was hostility to his appointment, he governed in absentia through a representative. The Sephardim Jews brought over by Beyazit II were identified with the Muslim Turks. This identification led to endemic anti-Jewish
stirrings within the indigenous Greek Orthodox population. At the start of the Greek War of Independence, in 1821, there were massacres of Jews in the Jewish quarters of Athens, Tripoli, and Patra, along with massacres of Muslims. The remaining Jews fled with the Ottoman Turkish forces north to territory held by Turkish troops.

In the 1830s, Ashkenazi Jews settled in Athens, who came with the German King Otto. There were repeated outbreaks of anti-Jewish riots in the later 19th century when Jew were accused of murdering Christian children to use their blood in Jewish religious rituals. Following the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, the Jewish communities in Greece partly migrated out with the Ottoman Turkish forces.

Still, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Salonika contained one of the largest Jewish communities in the world. Jews made up approximately half of the population and dominated the shipping, sailing, and chandlery trades; the harbor was closed on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, but open on Sunday.

Interestingly enough, there was also a population of Jews who had converted to Islam known as Donme (Turkish for “renegades”) or Ma’min. These were Jewish followers of Sabbatai Zvi, a “false messiah” of the 1670s, who had converted to Islam, but had maintained certain Jewish practices in secret.

The Holocaust in Greece

On October 28, 1940 Italy invaded Albania and gave an ultimatum to Greece. Ioannis Metaxas rejected it with an “ochi” or no. The Italian Army, along with Albanian forces, then invaded Greece but were driven back and forced to retreat. Germany invaded Greece on April 6, 1941, in an offensive known as Operation Marita. German troops took Athens on April 21. The strategic island of Crete, vital for Hitler’s plans to take North Africa, was taken by an airborne assault by the end of May when German troops were parachuted on the British-held island, despite very fierce local resistance.

The Nazis established three occupation zones, in Greece- German, Italian, and Bulgarian. The three zones of Axis occupation were as follows: the Italian Zone consisted of Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands, the Ionian Islands, as well as mainland Greek territory from the Platona line south to the Peloponnese, and the capital Athens as well. The German Zone consisted of western and Central Macedonia, a strip of land on the eastern edge of Greek Thrace along Turkish border, including Didimotikon, Souflion, and Orestias, as well as Crete, the major Aegean Islands and Thessaloniki. The Bulgarian Zone consisted of Thrace and eastern Macedonia.

The German army took Salonika on April 8. The Jewish population was targeted from the beginning. The first implementation of the Final Solution was in Salonika, known as the Malkhah Israel, “the Queen of Israel.” The German occupation forces revived anti-Jewish publications and encouraged anti-Jewish activities. On April 15, the Council of the Jewish Community was arrested, including the Chief Rabbi Zvi Koretz. The Germans constituted a new Council with the president Saby Saltiel.

Following the Axis occupation of Greece, a famine resulted in 1941 and 1942 because of a British naval blockade and due to the seizure of crops by German forces. Thousands died during the famine.

General George Tsolakoglu was subsequently made Prime Minister. In March 1943, Jewish deportments from Bulgarian-occupied Macedonia and Thrace began. From March through May 1943, Jews were deported from German-occupied Salonika and adjacent territories. The deportations from the Italian Zone began after its surrender in September, 1943, and subsequent occupied by German forces. They executed the Jewish deportments starting in March 1944, a process that lasted throughout the summer.

The Hellenic Merchant Maritime Sector: A Historical and Business Overview

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


by Ioannis Michaletos

This fascinating synopsis by Greek consultant Ioannis Michaletos, prepared exclusively for Balkanalysis.com, gives an overview of Greek sea power and shipping from ancient to modern times, and also includes vital statistics on the modern Greek merchant marine fleet, as well as predictions for future activity in the sector. The study grew out of an oral presentation made in March 2005 before the European Network of Technology Brokers, an independent consultancy based in Athens.

Since around 1000 B.C, the Hellenic world - then composed of numerous city-states, small kingdoms and tiny principalities – was united by a common tendency to invest in the merchant navy, and thus expand its commercial activities through the navy. From that period and onwards many structural, historically-determined changes have occurred; nevertheless the importance of Hellenic naval power has remained. Today as in ancient times, the Greek fleet is the largest in the world.

A Reliance on the Sea: Historical and Geographic Factors

There are fundamental reasons for the specialization and staying power of the Hellenes in terms of maritime activities. First of all, consider the geographical composition of their country. Punctuated by high mountains, small plains and thousands of islands and islets, shipping has always been of paramount importance. It acknowledges the importance of reliance on the sea for communication, import and export of necessary material, and finally as a means of bringing together hundreds of disparate territories, which at many times in history represented different political units. It is well known that the most cost-effective way of transporting large amounts of goods has always been by the sea; this also gives a very big incentive for anyone to rely on sea transportation lines.

Another important historical factor was the emergence of large empires – the Persian, Egyptian, Roman etc – on the borders of the Hellenic world. These empires tended to rely heavily on infantry power and centralized power structures. The only defensive advantage enjoyed by the Hellenic world was a superb navy that could offset the disadvantages of a small and geographically scattered population. The ancient Greeks could best project military force into the opponent’s territory through sea power.

Indeed, the famous Athenian democracy builds its power upon its navy. With a population of only 40,000 “free citizens,” it commanded some 300 triremes and 200 auxiliary ships, an armada that gave them full control of the Aegean Sea and a large influence in the eastern and central stretches of the Mediterranean Sea. All the fine monuments that were constructed in that era, such as the Parthenon, were in fact financed by capital imported from the merchant navy’s activities.

The value of naval power was never more aptly illustrated than by Pericles’ words in his Epitaphios speech to his fellow citizens: “we are therefore strong because of ships,” he stated. “We are like a well fortressed island and we can expand in our will, whilst remaining completely unapproachable from our enemies, who don’t have this advantage.”

During the long centuries of the Byzantine era, the naval advantage was temporally lost for the Hellenic world, because it was absorbed within the administration of a vast empire. Under the Byzantines, who kept an eye to both Anatolia and the Balkans, the navy was not seen as important as it was before in the more compact sea-oriented ancient Greece.

The unfortunate effects of this oversight become glaring in the 11th-13th centuries, when Venetian and Genoese fleets gradually took over large sectors of the economy. Successive Byzantine emperors following Alexios I Komnenos in the late 11th century began to offer more and more trade incentives to the Italians, who were busily expanding their maritime commercial empires across the Adriatic, Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Seas. The ensuing reliance on importing finished goods from Italy led to a huge trade imbalance which weakened the Byzantine economic position. By the time of the Fourth Crusade of 1203, in which the Venetian Doge Dandolo masterminded the take-over and dismemberment of the Byzantine Empire with the help of its Western allies, Byzantium had no appreciable naval force with which to defend itself.

Although the empire was restored to some extent in 1261, when the Latins were driven out of Constantinople, key Greek islands and strategic points of shipping such as Crete, Rhodes and Monemvasia in the southern Peloponnese remained under foreign control. By the fifteenth century, when the danger of an Ottoman Turkish conquest of Constantinople was very real, weak Byzantine rulers had to depend on Venetian ships for their foreign transportation needs. The reliance on Venetian and Genoese naval defense in the final siege of Constantinople in 1453 proved that Byzantium had grown too weak to protect itself. So while the Turks might have destroyed the Byzantine Empire in the end, in the bigger picture the real culprits were the crafty Venetian merchants whose gradual transformation from a commercial to a military superpower led the once-great Byzantine Empire into servitude.

Fortunately for the Greeks, the Ottoman Empire was not particularly interested in sea power. The Turks had come from Central Asia, far from the sea, and were not experienced in maritime affairs. To guarantee westward expansion they thus had to give many privileges to their Christian subjects, especially the seafaring Greeks, in order to get involved with the shipping sector and benefit from the capital inflow this meant for the Sultans treasury. When the empire expanded to the west, and the Ottomans had to become a sea power, it was largely due to Greek technology and expertise that they were able to do so.

Because of the Ottoman reliance on Greek naval abilities and shipbuilding skill, an indigenous industry was cultivated – making Greek ship barons very rich in the process – on islands like Chios, across the straits from Smyrna (modern-day Izmir). In fact, the Istanbul neighbourhood of the Fener (Phanari in Greek) lying on the south-western shores of the Golden Horn became well known as a fashionable place of residence for Greek maritime merchants during Ottoman times.

Moreover the people involved in the shipping sector had the advantage of feeling free from the Empire’s restraints to some degree, and were easily drawn into absorbing foreign influences and thus later came into the position of being agents of political change.

During the Greek Revolution of 1821 the navy - at the time, the merchant and military fleets were all but the same - was capable of taking control of the Aegean Sea and thus secured the birth of the modern Greek state. The Greeks got a big boost, though, from the Battle of Navarino in 1827, in which a combined force of British, French and Russian warships decimated an Egyptian-led Ottoman armada. This battle brought about the near total destruction of Ottoman sea power.

During most of the 19th century, the only state capable of expanding its naval sector in the Eastern Mediterranean sea was Greek. The Ottoman Empire was crumbling and the Balkan states, having neither the relevant traditions nor access to the sea, remained largely uninvolved.
However, Greece gradually came under almost total British influence, and thus benefited greatly from the unrivalled expertise of the then superpower of the sea. The young state gained a lot of benefits from this British “cooperation.” British and Greek commercial relations were also cemented during this time, which helped Greek ship owners establish a presence in the United Kingdom.

During the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, Greece played a pivotal role in securing control of the Aegean Sea and thus preventing the Ottomans from reinforcing their troops in Macedonia, when the Greeks blocked the sea routes from Egypt. In the brief but very significant wars, Greece gained back some of the Turkish-occupied islands of the eastern Aegean and dramatically extended its northern borders.

With sea control secured, subsequently came the expansion of Greece’s status as the primary naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following World War I and the disastrous Anatolian campaign of 1922, Hellenic ship owners like Stavros Livanos and Gouladris Eugenides managed to build a strong base for their businesses in London with the help of small shipping empires. They also got involved with parallel shipping activities like chartering, factoring and other pursuits.

The Second World War was a catastrophe for the Hellenic merchant fleet, which lost around 70 percent of its vessels. In the aftermath of the war, Greece was given 100 Liberty type ships from the new naval superpower, the USA. Replenishing the Greek fleet was of strategic interest to the Americans; according to NATO sources from the Cold War era, the Greek fleet was viewed as a “fifth weapon” to be used in case of a third world war, for transportation of troops and materials around the world. The other four NATO weapons were the armies, navies, air forces and nuclear weapons of its respective members.

In the direct aftermath of the war, those who could cash in on insurance claims, like the legendary Stavros Niarchos flourished, while others fell by the wayside. The post-war period was a new era that saw an emerging breed of aggressive and flamboyant businessman such as Niarchos, Aristotle Onassis and John Latsis, entrepreneurs who were known for their conspicuous consumption and who were able to create very large and well-organized shipping fleets, especially in the area of oil transport. Their dynasties continue to this day and have now become sophisticated and diverse, branching out into numerous other economic sectors.

The profits of their activities truly benefited Greece, which was at the time making the transition from a rural, agriculture-based country to a top tourism destination. These shipping magnates invested in tourism and industrial development, and contributed to what can almost be called the “Hellenic economic miracle” of 1953-1974.

Afterwards and through the mid 1980’s most of the old ships were taken out of circulation and the fleet was replenished with new ships, built mostly in Japanese shipyards. At the same time a large number of foreign workers, mainly from the Philippines, India and Egypt were put to work in the fleet, thus helping to reduce operational costs. The great upward direction of international trade in the 1990’s that continues today, owing not a little to the ever-expanding volume of trade with China trade, has given a further boost to a shipping sector that is today the largest in the world.

Reach and Diversity of Shipping Interests in the Greek Economy and Society

Large parts of Greece depend on a strong shipping industry for sustenance and growth. The Aegean and Ionian seas, dotted with over 2,000 islands and islets (and around 8,000 dangerous rocks!), could not be sustained and developed without the existence of a well organized and developed merchant navy and ferry service.

The tourism, banking and real estate sectors of the Greek economy rely heavily on merchant marine capital. A lot of the actual owners of companies of these sectors are ship owners. Further, a large percentage of Hellenic cultural institutions, scholarship programs and relevant activities are being financed by the shipping sector. Influential media groups in Greece are also partially financed by shipping capital, and this is one of the ways shipping barons have of exercising political clout.

A recent trend of Greek shipping companies has been to finance their activities through the stock market. During the period 2000-2005, around $6 billion have being extracted from stock markets around the world, including the ones in Oslo, London, Amsterdam, Geneva and New York. The third biggest proprietors of Swiss sales, and amongst the largest depositors in Swiss banks, especially UBS and Lombard Odier, are Hellenic ship owners and their companies.
The investment trend for shipping companies in the past few years has seen increased investment in the neighboring Balkan states. In Romania and Bulgaria, both located on the Black Sea, the real estate and banking sectors have especially been developed. There is also notable investment in China in shipping-related activities.

Did You Know? 9 Facts about the Greek Merchant Fleet Today

1.) In 2004, 13.5 billion Euros were absorbed by Greece from the merchant fleet.

2.) Approximately 23.5 percent of the world’s oil tankers of 73.8 mil. Tn. Dwt belong to Greek ship owners. This is as large as the US and Japanese fleets combined.

3.) Some 20 percent of the world’s ships in gross tonnage over 1000 tn. Dwt belong to Hellenic ship owners. This is around 60 percent of EU 25 combined fleets.

4.) The largest Hellenic shipping conglomerate nowadays, that of the Tsakos family, has a fleet of around 8 million tn. Dwt. This is two times larger than the entire French fleet.

5.) Greek ships transport 70 percent of Chinese imported oil and natural gas.

6.) Around 50,000 professionals work for Hellenic shipping companies in the City of London.

7.) Around $20 billion were spent in Japanese shipyards for the construction of new ships for Greek shipowners, only for the period 2001-2005.

8.) Around 450,000 employees and their family members depend on the merchant navy and related activities in Greece nowadays.

9.) The port of Piraeus is the third largest in the world in terms of passenger transportation. In 2004, some 15 million passengers were transported to the islands via Greek ferries.

Forecast: Trends in Greek Shipping in the Near Future

For the Greek merchant fleet in the year 2006, the major trend will be selling off ships that have been in service for over 10 years old, which will result in a great number of sales. Look to shipping interests to invest their new capital in non-shipping related activities, as well as in repaying loans made in the booming 90's era. It is widely assumed that the "righteous circle" of shipping will end around 2010 and the main interest of those involved will be to divert their profits soon enough in other sectors, while discarding older ships that accrue maintenance costs and can contribute to a future surplus.

The maritime sector in Greece is the first truly globalized part of the economy and one of the few that operates more or less according to a laissez faire model of supply and demand. The assumption that the cycle will be completed in a few years means literally that the analysts have predicted a slowdown of world trade. By closely monitoring the shipping industry, very illuminating highlights can be made regarding wider economic and political affairs.

Two of the many successful Greek shipping interests to watch in the future can be noted for their superb business structures and shipping influence: the Martinos brothers, owning Thenamaris, Eastern Mediterranean Maritime and Minerva Marine, and Diamandis Diamandisis, of Marmaras Navigation.

The former manage maritime companies boasting assets of around 6 million tn. Dwt, and are constantly investing in maritime technology, as well as in new managerial practices in respect to the international trends. They are from the ‘old school,’ meaning that they have kept their main assets at sea, and not diverted into unrelated industries. It can thus be said, from the shipping point of view, that the Martinos Brothers have sailed into the 21st century on a strong wind.

Basically the same can be said for Diamandis Diamandidis who is also a pioneer in Greece in applying state-of-the-art business practices at the managerial and office level. In gross terms, after 2010 the main players in the Greek maritime industry will remain pretty much the same in the upper echelons especially. Yet it is certain that a lot of smaller established ship owners will partially or fully withdraw from the industry, leaving space for new blood to keep Greece’s most important industry vital and capable of handling the new challenges of the 21st century.

Recommended Links

Some of the material in this survey, as well as much more interesting and not widely known information, can be found on various websites.

For historical background you may want to read the article, The History of Greek Shipping and visit the website of the International Maritime Economic History Association. Industry-oriented groups include the Hellenic Shipbroker’s Association and the European Community Shipowners’ Association, while industry news and statistics can be found at the Greek Shipping website and on the aggregator site, Infomarine.

………………………..……………..

The author, Ioannis Michaletos, is a Human Resources consultant and project collaborator on issues concerning sustainable development and knowledge management in the Greek NGO sector. He lives in Athens and has a BA in Political Science, an MSc in Human Resource Management, and speaks four languages. Readers can contact him at: ianos24@lycos.com.

UPI Plagiarizes Balkanalysis.com, Prints Tepid Apology

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


On Nov. 15, 2005, United Press International (UPI) printed a devious, half-hearted apology to Balkanalysis.com, in the form of a re-written original story with an inconspicuous addendum. This unfortunate decision raises serious concerns about the news giant’s journalistic integrity, arrogance and damage-control-at-all-costs instinct.

In concluding the above-linked article on testimony given in late January 2005 by FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds for the Turkish newspaper Vatan, UPI stated:

“…the above story first appeared in UPI's Intelligence Watch feature on February 4, 2005. It drew extensively on text from a story by Chris Deliso on the balkanalysis.com website, but failed to give attribution to that source. Since this has now been brought to our notice we want to acknowledge Mr. Deliso and balkanalysis.com as the source of the story and apologize for our earlier oversight.”

This reliance on euphemisms, such as “failed to give attribution” and “earlier oversight,” is not just pathetic. It is also a lie.What UPI did was not simply “misuse” an original story from another news body; they did a crude cut-and-copy job that clearly amounted to crass plagiarism, in which whole chunks of text were re-appropriated from a Balkanalysis.com story that had appeared a day earlier, on February 3, 2005.

However, UPI refused to comment all throughout a lengthy, three-month email correspondence on the plagiarism charge. And the fact that they did not provide links to either story shows that they were arrogantly ensuring that no one would be able to discover the real dimensions of their content theft.

The Facts- Judge for Yourself

Since we here at Balkanalysis.com believe strongly in always providing proper attribution to our sources, no matter how obscure - and especially, hyperlinks wherever possible - we thought we would allow readers the chance to make up their own minds: so here are the links to the original texts. (Note that we have kept offline copies in the case they try to do something foolish like removing or modifying their original text).

“Sibel Edmonds: FBI's Compromised Security Damages Turkey's Security, Too”
(Balkanalysis.com; February 3, 2005, 8:05 EST)

Word count: 535

Links to other sources: 5

“UPI Intelligence Watch”

(John C.K. Daly, UPI Intelligence Correspondent, UPI; February 4, 2005)

Word count: 314

Links to other sources: 0

A quick comparison of both texts indicates that in 5 places, entire passages of the former text have been cut-and-pasted into the body of the latter. Other sentences, while not directly stolen, are clearly directly modeled on the structure of the original Balkanalysis.com piece.
Apparently for UPI, one of the alleged leaders in the field of world media, this does not constitute plagiarism. It was, you see, just an “oversight.”

However, the University of California-Davis’ “Avoiding Plagiarism” fact sheet would seem to disagree:
“…if you repeat another's exact words, you MUST use quotation marks and cite the source.”

Chronology of Events

The decision to hush up the illegal and unethical re-appropriation of Balkanalysis.com material was reached after long discussion between UPI’s highest editorial staff, over a three-month period, after which it was apparently decided that they could get away with the “oversight” claim, being a media Goliath vs. a journalistic David. Of course, this is just conjecture, but we believe that readers who have read the above-linked stories and compared them with the following timeline of correspondence will come to the same conclusion.

August 10, 2005: After a routine search brings up the two articles in question, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso emails the UPI general staff and asks them to confirm that their article does not in fact amount to plagiarism; threatens lawsuit.

August 10, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall quickly responds: “thank you for bringing this matter to our notice. Be assured that we take the charge of plagiarism very seriously and will look into the matter thoroughly. This may take a few days as the writer concerned is on vacation this week. As soon as we have asked all the necessary questions we will get back to you with a fuller response.”

August 10, 2005: Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso response to Mr. Marshall, thanking him for his reply and saying he will wait for UPI to reach a decision.

August 28, 2005: Having not received the response promised by UPI, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso points out that “almost three weeks have passed since you promised to look into this plagiarism matter,” and asks for an update on the situation.

August 30, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall finally responds, apologizing “for the delay in this matter;” relays that “we are meeting about it today and I hope to have a response for you tomorrow.”

September 1, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall replies as promised to Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso, laying out the terms of UPI’s future offer. Mr. Marshall admits that: “having looked into the matter you raised with us it’s clear we made a mistake. Our reporter did have independent knowledge of this story, reads Turkish, and knows Ms. Edmonds. However, under deadline pressure, he relied too heavily on your story without giving proper attribution. I apologize for that oversight. If you would like we can publish an item pointing out that this story originated on your site and giving you the proper attribution. Once again, I regret that you were not given the proper credit for your story.”

September 1, 2005: Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso asks, first of all, for further clarification of the terms laid out in the previous email: specifically, whether UPI’s correction will appear on the page where the story was originally found, or as a new news item, or in some other place on the UPI website.

Mr. Deliso secondly asks whether UPI is prepared to say that it plagiarized the Feb. 3 piece, “or simply 'relied too heavily' on it.” He thirdly asks whether the current UPI editorial staff has a “policy” of deliberately not citing Balkanalysis.com articles, and if so, why?

Finally, Mr. Deliso notes that at the foot of the offending UPI story in question, readers are invited to purchase it (and presumably other articles) for a certain reprinting fee. He expresses a wish to have clarified whether anyone has indeed purchased reprint rights for the piece in question, which allegedly “drew to heavily” on the Feb. 3 Balkanalysis.com article. He asks whether any moneys received through such an activity would rightfully have to be transferred from UPI to Balkanalysis.com.

September 2, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall replies that the proposed correction “would go out as a new item as a part of our ‘Intelligence Watch’ feature, and refer back to the original story. It would go out on the same channels as the original story.”

However, Mr. Marshall dodges the second question, ignoring the issue of a plagiarism admission, instead proposing to write that “we should have acknowledged you and your site as a major source of our original story and failed to do so, which we regret and are now correcting, or words to that effect.”

In regards to the third question, the UPI Editor-in-Chief states that “I can assure you that no editor here was aware of the connection between the story we published and your site until you brought it to our notice,” which addresses the specific article but does not really answer the question of was there a policy.

However, Editor-in-Chief Marshall does let slip the intriguing statement that “our policy now is that all ‘briefs’ must be sourced.”

Finally, Mr. Marshall promises to look into whether or not the article in question has “been independently licensed by any client,” by asking the UPI marketing department.

These replies will prove extremely important later, as readers will discover.

September 6, 2005: Having not received a reply, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso writes again to clarify whether or not the UPI article in question has in fact been purchased by any reader.

September 11, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall finally responds, stating that “in response to your query of September 6, our marketing department tell (sic) me their records show no indiidual (sic) licensing of the story in question.” He adds that he will be out of the office from September 12-14.

September 19, 2005: Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso writes to UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall to inform him that a temporary absence will require putting off further negotiations for approximately 3 weeks.

September 21, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall responds to express his agreement with this course of action.

October 17, 2005: Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso announces his desire to resume discussions in an email and again asks whether UPI plans “to print this apology that you had mentioned previously” and, more crucially, whether the media giant will state that they did indeed plagiarize Balkanalysis.com in the Feb. 4 ‘intelligence brief’ piece.

October 26, 2005: Having once again failed to receive a timely response, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso again writes to UPI Editor-in-Chief Marshall; suggests that in the absence of further action Balkanalysis.com will be forced to go ahead with its “own measures based on our previous written correspondence.”

October 31, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall finally responds, apologizing for the delay once again, explaining he had briefly been out sick. He proposes “to publish a correction along the lines described in our earlier exchanges. Please let me know if you have any further questions about this course of action, on which I believe we had agreed in principle.”

November 1, 2005: Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso writes back to apologize for Mr. Marshall’s illness and wishes him a speedy recovery. He states that the two parties are “in principle” agreed, and adds, generously, that no lawsuit will be filed.

Mr. Deliso then goes on to point out one major concern, being that, “the term ‘misused’ in [reference] to my article sounds rather euphemistic a la ‘collateral damage.’” He then draws attention to a “quite instructive” educational link (the above-cited UC Davis “Avoiding Plagiarism” article). He urges UPI editors to reflect on said article, and ask themselves whether “in fact [their] ‘misuse’ could more technically be termed ‘plagiarism’ and, if so, if there is any reason why you would not choose to use that word.”

November 10, 2005: Having waited patiently yet again for another 9 days and receiving no reply, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso writes to UPI Editor-in-Chief Marshall to express his concern about not having received a response to his previous email and the questions raised therein: “please advise as soon as you are able.”

November 14, 2005: Having still received no reply from anyone at United Press International, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso writes again to Editor-in-Chief Marshall and the General Staff to announce that the moment for final clarification is imminent, and that a response should be made ideally within 3 days.

November 15, 2005: UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall responds: “technical issues permitting, I plan to post a correction of the February article today, with the proper attribution and acknowledging that in February we failed to give that attribution. I believe this will meet your concerns.” Announces hasty departure for Thanksgiving vacation.

November 16, 2005: A UPI staffer sends a new link to Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso, which points to the Nov. 15 text with its ‘correction’ of the original Feb. 4, 2004 UPI ‘Intelligence Watch’ piece. This is the link referred to above.

Implications

There are several serious implications that arise from UPI’s inventive use of the Feb. 3 Balkanalysis.com piece, both in itself and especially when set in the context of the three-month written negotiation period, that has ended - to our great satisfaction – rather unfairly for us. Let’s go through them point by point.

1.) The official “apology” did not meet even the low standards decreed by the UPI editorial staff in the email of Sept. 2, 2005, on 3 counts.

First, it was not published “as a new item”- rather, it was a halfhearted, rehashed version of the Feb. 3 article, with a postscript expressing UPI’s apologies for the “oversight” of Feb. 4. So instead of the “new item” being the story of how UPI plagiarized another piece of work, their embarrassed apology was merely tacked on to another piece, an addendum to a rehashed bit of reporting that was never theirs to begin with. This Kafkaesque result only adds insult to injury and exposes UPI as an arrogant, disaffected bunch of media hacks.

Second, the “new item” was not published, as had been promised, in the news service’s “Intelligence Watch” feature; it was published on the general “Security and Terrorism” section page, but apparently did not merit its own listing under the “Intelligence Watch” sub-section. In other words, readers who might be in the habit of checking out the “Intelligence Watch” specifically may never have been aware of the correction. In our view, the story here was supposed to be their error; instead, what we got was the original story with a small apology at the end. Because they chose to weasel out of their obligations, we have been forced to make the story of their mistake into a seven-page report. As Lewis Libby now knows (in a different context), it could have all been so much easier if it had been done right the first time around!

Third, and perhaps most significantly, UPI utterly failed in its promise to “refer back to the original story” in its “new item”/corrected piece. In the world of online journalism, we feel confident that by the statement “refer back to the original story,” one reasonably can expect to mean the embedding of a hyperlink to a specific URL at which can be found said original story.

However, UPI unfortunately decided not to do this. And, not only did they not insert a link to the original Feb. 3 Balkanalysis.com story, they also failed to insert a link to their Feb 4.

plagiarized piece. Thus, readers who might have wished to compare the original stories, and thus the veracity of UPI’s claims, could not do so. To show that their brazenness knows no bounds, UPI failed even to provide the titles of both original pieces; they thus ensured that there would be no chance for readers to “refer back to the original story.” UPI thus acted in utterly bad faith.
On the other hand, Balkanalysis.com has always provided links to articles it has cited – including many interesting and informative ones from UPI authors – and will continue to do so.

Unfortunately, it seems that certain of the “big” media (UPI is not alone in this deficiency) look down on adding links. One might speculate that this reticence owes to a belief that information appears “more exclusive” or more “original” if there is no other source linked. But this is just a matter of image, not substance, as we will see.

2.) UPI high officials deliberately chose to avoid the issue of plagiarism, perhaps out of a desire to avoid embarrassment.

The last few years have seen various major plagiarism scandals (most famously, that involving former NY Times reporter Jayson Blair) that have rocked the mainstream media, those vaunted torchbearers of ethical standards. In that context, it is understandable why UPI would not want to add its name to the list of those who shall live on in infamy. However, this time they have made the mistake of picking the wrong small independent media body to exploit.

In our opinion, both fairness and patience were expressed from our side, all throughout this arduous three-month negotiation process. Rather than print an immediate accusatory story upon discovering this violation in August, we gave them not one but four chances to consider whether the claim of plagiarism was valid in this case. How many people would exhibit such tactical patience?

However, after the first statement from UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall on Aug. 10, in which he stated, “be assured that we take the charge of plagiarism very seriously,” not one word was written in response to this charge.

It thus appears that UPI does indeed take the charge of plagiarism very seriously- that is, seriously enough to avoid it at all costs. This is very telling in itself. We thought only the White House and Pentagon could get away with such behavior. Guess not.

3.) UPI announces a new editorial ‘policy’- 98 years after having started operations.
Perhaps the strangest accidental disclosure in the above correspondence is Editor-in-Chief Marshall’s statement of Sept. 2 that “our policy now is that all ‘briefs’ must be sourced.”

Considering that UPI takes pride in being a venerable old media institution established in 1907, and that it looks forward eagerly to its centennial anniversary, it seems strange that it took until 2005 for wild innovations like providing source attribution to be implemented. It’s like when after Abu Ghraib Rumsfeld gave the soldiers a manual on proper prisoner treatment; you’d think the US Army had been formed yesterday.

In both cases, why does it take public embarrassment to force a lumbering institution into even a weak sort of accountability?

However, the most interesting implication of the statement, though it is a subtle one, is that Mr. Marshall seems to have been trying to draw a distinction between regular UPI news articles/analyses and ‘intelligence briefs.’ In our original email of Aug. 10, Balkanalysis.com Director Christopher Deliso questioned their motive, i.e., whether the hasty cut-and-copy hack job was accomplished because the writers thought a piece “buried” within an 'intelligence watch' brief would be less likely to be spotted. This question was never answered.

The larger question that thus emerges is this: given the long experience and vast talent of many of its staff, why had the question of providing ‘sourcing’ in UPI’s intelligence briefs never come up?

Although it is speculative, we sense that basic marketing strategies led to this decision. The word ‘intelligence’ is as valuable to news agencies as the word ‘feta’ is to Greek cheese producers. When one claims to be offering ‘intelligence’ information, therefore, it is understood that this refers to valuable, unique and hard-to-get information. People understand that for various reasons, oftentimes the name of a source cannot be given. Fair enough.

However, when all you are doing is reading foreign newspapers – or, better yet, stealing the translations from others who did – the result can hardly qualify as ‘intelligence’ according to most people’s definition of the word.

Indeed, we feel that we have been rather good at avoiding the temptation to “sex up” information and present it as being more than it is. The only times we do not provide links or publication references are when that information can be found nowhere else- this is why readers recognize when we have something exclusive to report, because we keep a fine line and clear limits to what we write and how. This requires patience and determination, but we feel our readers appreciate this.

Certainly, we did not try to play up the Feb. 3 article about Sibel Edmonds as a great work of ‘intelligence’ gathering on our part; it was merely a synthesis of relevant information centered on a unique translation of a Turkish media article that was and is readily available via a hyperlink. Really, can something that can be linked to ever qualify as ‘intelligence?’

Which brings us back to the question of why UPI (and many other large media bodies) are so link-averse; were they to provide the reader with the freedom to see where their information actually originated, the reader might no longer be so impressed with these so-called ‘intelligence briefs.’ Let’s just hope that people who are paying for UPI’s subscription ‘intelligence briefs’ service are getting more exclusive information than a daily recap of what foreign newspapers are saying. Still, when it comes to the Balkans anyway, with one-billionth of the budget and resources available to UPI we can outdo them at will, whenever we so choose. And this goes for many other rich media bodies too.

While this whole incident was unfortunate, and a colossal waste of our time, it was worth mentioning- if only to show that we are very serious about plagiarism and will act swiftly and decisively to put a stop to this practice wherever possible.

With the help of our loyal readers, we have been alerted to the problem on more than one occasion. Above all, it is a matter of fairness and respect: if you expect someone to cite, quote and link to your articles, then you should do the same. Even - no, especially - with articles we disagree with, we always make a point of linking to them. This is what media freedom is all about- giving readers the information they need to come to an informed and independent decision. If UPI staffers are so pressed for time that they have to resort to ransacking other people’s texts, perhaps they are taking on more than they can handle. Come on, we all have deadlines!

To sum up, publishers have two choices: either quote/link to Balkanalysis.com articles, or else cough up for the reprint fee. We don’t care about page rank; we are not working 10-14 hours a day here to give UPI and the rest free content. Finally, it’s worth noting that at no time have they ever given us assurances that any future profits from reprint fees on the Feb. 4 article would be redirected this way.

Note: Readers who wish to discuss anything mentioned in this text with UPI Editor-in-Chief Michael Marshall can write to him at: mmarshall@upi.com. Comments for us can be sent to contact@balkanalysis.com.

How to Handle Turkey’s Legitimate Nuclear Aspirations

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Mehmet Kalyoncu

This provocative analysis of Turkey's nuclear ambitions, informed by current political realities and a historical summary of the country's previous plans and nuclear partnerships, asks the devil's advocate question: what do the US and EU plan to give Turkey to keep it from going nuclear?

Recent heated statements of a nuclear variety made by both Iran and Israel toward each other introduce a whole new dimension for Turkey’s security concerns in its neighborhood. Given the current circumstances, Turkey could even be considered late in developing nuclear capabilities for defense purposes. However, that Turkey can and that Turkey might procure nuclear weapons are determined by two different sets of conditions. The former possibility largely depends on Turkey’s financial and technical capabilities as well as political connections with nuclear powers such as Pakistan. The latter possibility depends on primarily the US’, secondarily the European Union’s approval.

There are legitimate reasons for them not to approve Turkey going nuclear. The question is: what do they have to offer Turkey instead, to convince it not to go nuclear? Accordingly, how can Turkey take advantage of the nuclear debate going on in its immediate neighborhood?

Despite its seemingly stable (albeit somewhat rocky) relationship with Iran, Turkey neighbors here on one of the most threatening nuclear powers of the time. Recently, openly radical Islamist and anti-democratic Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his aides seized power in the country. Accordingly, Iran has been more confrontational not only with its long time foe, the US, but also with arguably friends, or relatively less foes, the European powers. Let alone it does not comply with the rule and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on opening its all facilities for inspection.

Moreover, as some Western commentators argue, Turkey has turned to be an equally potential target for fundamentalist Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda and its global derivatives. A series of bombings in both Istanbul and Ankara in 2004 has only bolstered that argument, showing that the same terrorists who attacked the US on September 11, 2001 and Spain on March 11, 2003 would not hesitate to attack secular and democratic Turkey, either.

In addition, even though it seems to have a rather friendly relationship with Israel, Turkey is neighboring another nuclear power, one which would not think twice in case it feels obliged to use its nuclear capabilities to counter a standing national security threat. Given all these reasons, Turkey even would appear to be late in obtaining nuclear weapons, whereas some of the Western countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, have procured their nuclear powers even though they are not exposed to the same level of nuclear threat. Apparently, Turkey should have nuclear capabilities to protect itself.

Yet does Turkey qualify to go nuclear? To be realistic, whether Turkey qualifies to possess nuclear weapons or not depends not on its technological and economic capabilities, but on whether the United States, and increasingly the EU, allows Turkey to have nuclear weapons. To put it another way, whether Turkey may go nuclear or not depends on international factors, mainly on US approval, whereas whether Turkey can go nuclear or not depends on Turkey’s own technological and economic capacity. It accordingly entails two questions: If the US and the EU do not approve of Turkey having nuclear weapons, what do they have to offer Turkey instead? How could the Bush administration justify its dissidence with Turkey’s potential nuclear aspirations whereas it has been more than willing to tolerate India, a long time Non-Proliferation Treaty rebel, to continue its nuclear program; and similarly let North Korea continue its uranium enrichment activities?

Is the Iran-Israel Confrontation a Threat for Turkey?

It is more obvious than ever that as long as it is headed by a man who does not hesitate to publicly pronounce his aspirations to wipe another sovereign country off the map, nuclear Iran will continue to be a major threat to Turkey. Even if Iran does not directly target Turkey, its nuclear confrontation with third parties equally threatens Turkey’s national security because the effects of nuclear warfare are not limited geographically as in conventional warfare. In this case, Iran’s confrontation with ever-vigilant Israel is a perfect threat for Turkey.

Iran is rapidly rolling back from former President Khatami’s tolerant discourse, towards the revolutionary discourse of the 1980’s. On October 26, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the annihilation of the Zionist regime as one of his government’s priorities during his speech at the “World without Zionism” conference. Referring to Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, Mr. Ahmedinejad insisted “As the Imam said; Israel must be wiped off the map.”[i]

One could reasonably attribute such an extreme statement to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s political inexperience and ignorance of diplomacy. Nonetheless, it represents a major shift for Iran from Mr. Khatami’s moderation back to the revolutionary doctrine. More importantly, Mr. Ahmedinejad is not exhibiting an attitude original to him and his government. As he puts it in his statements, he justifies his anti-Israeli attitude by referring to earlier statements of Iran’s revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini. That makes the case even more critical and threatening.

Both Tel-Aviv and Washington have responded in a relatively calmer mood to Mr. Ahmedinejad’s radical statements. Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev, likening Mr. Ahmedinejad to another extremist and Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, noted “[t]he problem with these extremists is that they followed through on their violent declarations with violent actions.”[ii] Similarly, White House press secretary Scott McClellan added “[I]t confirms what we have been saying about the regime in Iran. It underscores the concerns we have about Iran’s nuclear intentions.”[iii]

Although calm, these responses might set the stage for another legitimized “freedom operation” next to Turkey’s border. Even if Turkey is not likely to be a direct target of any nuclear attack, it may still want to have nuclear weapons to deter attacks between its neighbors that would indirectly and yet extensively affect Turkey, especially indirect effects such as trans-border conflicts and forced migrations. A nuclear arms race reciprocated by other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq would only increase Turkey’s legitimate desire to obtain nuclear weapons. However, just as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey is highly likely to face strong international opposition against its nuclear aspirations, most notably from the US and the EU.

Turkey’s Nuclear Experience

Turkey has never consistently pursued a nuclear program, so far as is known to the public. However, both opportunities and demand to obtain nuclear weapons have been attested. Dave Martin of the Nuclear Awareness Project presents a short history of Turkey’s nuclear weapons experience: Ankara’s encounter with the available nuclear resources dates back to the time when Turkey ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on April 17, 1980 [iv].

In the same year, Turkish President/General Kenan Evren and Pakistani President/General Zia ul-Haq started to exchange ideas on cooperation in developing nuclear weapons technology, which continued up until the latter’s death in a tragic plane crash in 1988. Later, in 1990-91, cooperation between Argentina and Turkey to build the CAREM-25, a 25 MW nuclear reactor in their respective territories was ceased due to international pressure [v]. In 1998, Turkey, in cooperation with several international companies sought to build a nuclear reactor at Akkuyu Bay on the Mediterranean for civilian purposes. The bidders included Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a German-French consortium (Nuclear Power International-NPI), and a partnership between Westinghouse and Mitsubishi.

However, in the same year Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sherif offered then Turkish President Suleyman Demirel cooperation in developing nuclear weapons on May 11, 1998 during the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan- an act which increased international suspicions that the “civil” nuclear reactor could also serve military purposes [vi]. Therefore, due to international and environmentalist pressures, the Akkuyu Nuclear Reactor project was halted as well.

In the meantime, some generals in the Turkish military have indicated their desire for Turkey to develop its own nuclear capabilities rather than to rely on international alliances like NATO. According to a news report that appeared in Turkish daily newspaper Radikal, the most notable champion of Turkish nuclear weapons was Lieutenant-General Erdogan Oznal, then-in charge of the Balikesir NATO Air Base [vii]. Recent historical experience thus indicates that both the desire and technical opportunities are available in case Turkey resolves to go nuclear.

Offers and Opportunities

So, what can the United States and the European Union offer?

The six-party talks and the EU3-Iran negotiations have proven that neither international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor economic incentives are sufficient to convince North Korea and Iran to halt their nuclear programs [viii]. Besides that, neighbors of the respective nuclear countries have realized that reliance on international alliances instead of their own nuclear weapons could be a fatal mistake. Moreover, the Bush administration’s willingness not only to tolerate but also to assist the long-time NPT rebel India in its nuclear program has only undermined the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Consequently, it convinced the willingly-non-nuclear countries - one of which could be Turkey- that they could have ratified the NPT, and yet they can go ahead and develop their own nuclear weapons, given that the US, the big-time NPT guard, and India, the big-time NPT rebel, could agree on nuclear cooperation.

The recent US-India cooperation on developing India’s nuclear technologies has only bolstered the global common wisdom that the US always preaches but hardly, if ever, practices whatever it preaches. On July 18, 2005, President George W. Bush and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement establishing a “global partnership” between their countries. In addition, Mr. Bush expressed his intention to achieve full cooperation with India to strengthen its nuclear energy facilities, and ask the US Congress to adjust the current US laws to allow such cooperation [ix]. Accordingly, in the October 26th hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Chairman Henry J. Hyde noted, “[T]o implement the nuclear cooperation elements of the agreement, congressional assent must be obtained in the form of amending the relevant laws now forbidding such cooperation with India and other countries which are not in compliance with key nonproliferation practices and conventions”[x]. These recent developments have further undermined the credibility of the US’ dedication to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Under these circumstances, both the US and the European Union should realize that it would not lead to positive consequences in the relations to behave in a dictatorial way with Turkey in trying to prevent it from procuring nuclear weapons. A dictatorial approach would only further diminish the level of trust in Western democratic fairness felt by Turkish society and the wider Muslim world in general. Such an approach could lead Muslims to conclude that no matter how democratic and “rational” a Muslim country can be, the Western powers will never let it be as powerful as them.

As Cirincione and Vaynman of Carnegie Endowment of International Peace suggest,[xi] US policy and rhetoric should never be dictatorial and arrogant in ways that would make officials in countries that are willingly non-nuclear conclude that Washington would be more respectful of their interests if they had their own nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, both Washington and Brussels should engage in high-level diplomacy with Turkish officials to convince Ankara that it does not need nuclear weapons to protect the country. They should assure Ankara that they are ready to discuss alternative security shields and alliances. In this vein, Brussels should address the nuclear threat Turkey faces in its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and accordingly expedite the negotiations for Turkey’s EU membership. Similarly, Washington should encourage the EU to do its part, and be more responsive to Turkey’s security concerns. In this regard, it can first start with the Kurdish PKK problem burgeoning in Northern Iraq. Doing so would also restore the US image as a reliable ally in the mind of the Turkish public. Lastly, both Washington and Brussels could and should back Turkey’s candidature for the non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council for the term 2009-2010.

Mehmet Kalyoncu is a graduate student at Georgetown University's Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies. This article was originally published in Zaman US.

[i] See http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/15E6BF77-6F91-46EE-A4B5-A3CE0E9957EA.htm

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Cited at: www.cnp.ca/issues/turkey-nuclear-background.html

[v] Ibid.

[vi] Ibid. excerpt from Zeyrek, Deniz “Pakistan’s Offer for Cooperation”, Radical Daily, June 1 1998

[vii] Ibid. cited in www.cnp.ca/issues/turkey-nuclear-background.html

[viii] See “North Korea: The deal that wasn’t” the Economist, September 24th 2005

[ix] See http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=55556

[x] See http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Oct/26-224640.html

[xi] Cirincione, Joseph; Vaynman, Jane “Lock in Nuclear Successes”, Proliferation Brief, Vol.8 No.2

Smugglers and Legends Complicate Fight against Antiquities Theft (Part 2)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Yesterday appeared the first part of this article. As we said, since the following interview was conducted back in June, there have been various developments in the area of the topic under consideration. However, the reader will find here a detailed and fascinating discussion of the general topic as it applies to the case of Macedonia.

Archaeology: Benefits and Dangers

The archaeologists, however, view their work as vital – to get to the treasures before the thieves can. But they too are strapped for cash, and have had to be creative in order to get results. One Macedonian archaeologist privately discussed a program held during the late 1990’s, in which retired American couples seeking to fulfill their own ‘Indiana Jones’ fantasies would visit the country for two weeks and, under the direction of professionals, help excavate sites in south-central Macedonia. “They didn’t get to keep their finds,” he says. “The thrill of it was enough for them. And they pumped money into the local economy. But unfortunately the program was cancelled.”

Yet such zeal is not always beneficial, argues Bojcevski. He affixes some of the blame on the well-meaning archaeologists themselves. “Because these scholars are impatient to write their studies, they want to discover more things and faster. But in their rush they don’t see that they end up losing in the end. They make our work harder.”

In the other cases, where a theft has occurred, “we can only try to document the theft and hope to trace the items with the help of the police and INTERPOL.”

The problem with money is not only a general lack, but also a failure to allocate it realistically, he contends. The CHPO may be given 1,500 euros to monitor up to 30 known sites, with the result that “we can’t check up on any one of them properly- it would be much better to concentrate on fewer sites, but follow the discovery process from beginning to end.”

A Rare Victory

These setbacks paint a depressing picture indeed. But the news is not always bad. Sometimes the good guys win, Bojcevski reminds. In recent months there have been two major smuggling busts, one involving a huge amount of ancient Macedonian jewelry from a burial tomb, another also involving treasures from a 7th century BC necropolis. In his office, Bojcevski showed photos and a summary of the police report on the latter bust, and told the story of how the criminals were stopped.

“The items, mostly jewelry, were put on a bus in the northwestern city of Tetovo, bound for Leverkusen,” he says. “But luckily during a routine check on the Croatian-Slovenian border, the authorities discovered them and sent the whole collection back to us. We were very grateful for this. It was an example of successful international cooperation.”

The items taken were very valuable, Bojcevski says. “Macedonian Iron Age, 6th and 7th century BC treasures are currently very popular on the European market. Something you could sell here for 5,000 euros will be worth 30,000 euros in the West.”

The Lure of Legend…

But not all of the collectors are motivated by financial reward. Since the country is littered with countless antiquities, not a few Macedonian households boast one or two centerpiece items from the remote past. Aesthetic fondness and even patriotism are the most common motivations for such private collectors, who inevitably have a story behind every discovery.

For example, a local man in the southwestern village of Vevchani proudly shows off a second century AD Roman statue of a horse sitting in his living room. “I stumbled on it by accident,” he says. “I enjoy reading about the ancient history of our region, and I was following the ancient road that re-connected with the Via Egnatia – and there it was!”

This thrill of the hunt motivates many. Because of its long and complex history, Macedonia abounds with tales and legends about not only great cultures- but also what they left behind.
The appeal of such stories seems to lie in their vagueness; percolating in the popular consciousness for generations, the legends are typically awash with the blood, plunder and magic of long-dead kings, armies and priests. But nobody can ever say exactly where the fortress stood, where the battle took place, where the temple was overtaken by vines. Such tales always seem to originate ‘from a friend who heard it from a friend who heard it from a friend…’

Legends of ancient treasure appeal to many Macedonians. Stole, a 28 year-old man from Skopje, enjoys wandering the mountains on weekends with a metal detector in search of buried treasure. “I’ve only found one iron horseshoe,” he says. “But that’s okay- I just do it for the fun of it.”

…And the Curse of Discovery

However, other Macedonians are superstitious about such adventuring and strongly oppose it, believing that it can only bring on bad luck. The story recounted by a young woman from Skopje fits the mold exactly.

“Many years, ago my uncle’s friend’s grandfather was adding on to his house south of Kratovo, and they discovered a bag of Turkish gold buried in the yard,” she says. “When he died, he left it to the friend’s father. But every time he touched it, he got sick. There are many stories like this. So many of us think it’s better not to look for these things.”

Picturesque Kratovo, surrounded by the Osogovski Mountains and traversed by a winding river, was the local center of silver mining under the Ottomans. It remains one of Macedonia’s most unique towns, connected by 6 bridges, punctuated by watchtowers, and crisscrossed by a labyrinth of underground tunnels.

Because of its distinguished history, the Osogovski region has been explored by several foreign mining companies. Locals tell tales of wilderness areas secretly fenced off, of unknown helicopters hovering in the distance, of armed guards protecting isolated terrain. But all of these stories remain unverifiable. What many believe, however, is that the companies were not after silver or gold- but ancient antiquities.

Suspicions and Lamentation

The Macedonian government had such a suspicion about a decade ago, recalls Ilce Bojcevski. “In the mountains between Kratovo and Probistip, an American mining company was given a license to operate. They said they were looking for gold, but we suspected they were really looking for antiquities. But we couldn’t do anything because we couldn’t prove this.”

Some Macedonians have even claimed that NATO soldiers engaged in organized theft over the past few years. “After they came as peacekeepers in 2001,” says one former policeman who did not want to be named, “they were found in certain areas digging in a very systematic way – we believe they were looking for ancient treasures. But what can we do? NATO is very big and powerful, and we are very small and weak.”

While Bojcevski cannot corroborate this claim, he does allege that the wealthy “internationals” – the NATO peacekeepers, UN employees, OSCE and others – have individually taken illegal antiquities out of the country by buying them from the ‘back room’ collections of unscrupulous Skopje dealers. “These people have a lot of money, and they don’t particularly care about our national heritage,” he says. “They just want ancient souvenirs to take home.”

In the end, the market value for Macedonian antiquities abroad, as well as the allure of treasure hunting for locals, makes a hard job for the country’s cash-strapped police. “There are many things we miss,” concedes Ilce Bojcevski. “But we are doing our best. The job is very important for the country.

“Macedonia is supposed to protect its cultural heritage- God knows we have so much of it. We can’t say we’re great at other things, but in this we are one of the best in the world.

Smugglers and Legends Complicate Fight against Antiquities Theft (Part 1)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Since the following interview was conducted back in June, there have been various developments in the area of the topic under consideration. However, the reader will find here a detailed and fascinating discussion of the general topic as it applies to the case of Macedonia. The second part of this story follows tomorrow.

Despite being a tiny country, Macedonia has a very rich history of diverse cultures and civilizations, dating back millennia. In fact, the observatory at Kokino – heralded by NASA as the fourth most important such site in the world.

As a fixed territory, Kokkino is staying put. But what about the millions of little things, the discovered and mostly undiscovered artifacts and other small treasures like ancient coins, jewelry, religious objects, weaponry and statues?

A Moveable Feast

Unfortunately for the country and for scholars everywhere, these represent something of a moveable feast for unscrupulous thieves and smugglers, who have over the past 15 years removed many important artifacts from Macedonian soil. There are over 4,000 known archaeological sites in Macedonia, of which approximately 130 are officially protected by law.

However, most are not excavated, and doubtless there are many more waiting to be discovered.
Now the government is trying to do something about it. But as Ilce Bojcevski, Macedonia’s top cop for antiquities concedes, it’s a tough job. More often than not, the well-organized traffickers succeed, because of a lack of preventative resources- chiefly, funds – available for his staff at the CHPO (Cultural Heritage Protection Office) in Skopje. Further, a long-awaited law that would enhance investigatory practices languishes in parliamentary procedure, and is not expected to take effect until January 1, 2006.

In an interview with Balkanalysis.com, Mr. Bojcevski explained the challenges facing counter-smuggling efforts, the methods used by smugglers and the areas of the country hardest hit over the past few years.

The Scrupulous West’s Secret Market

With the help of international police cooperation, his team focuses on the market abroad – the high-paying collectors whose greed gives smugglers the motivation to perform the difficult and sometimes dangerous work of re-appropriating Macedonia’s cultural heritage.

“There is a big auction market in countries like Switzerland, Austria and Germany,” says Bojcevski. “These are closed auctions- that is, open to a very few rich private collectors who know that they are bidding for stolen antiquities.”

According to him, it’s very difficult for the police and INTERPOL to find these auctions, because they are organized in secret and varying locations. “Every day we’re working with the Ministry of Interior and INTERPOL,” says Bojcevski, “but it’s difficult because the bad guys are very smart and experienced.”

According to Bojcevski, most of the thefts take place in Macedonia’s most culturally rich area- the south. Every empire that has taken root here over the centuries - the ancient Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, medieval Bulgar and Ottoman – have had a strong presence in the south of the country. It was always a major east-west trading route; the Roman Via Egnatia passed through here.

A Trouble Spot: the Sunny Southeast

The latest “attacks,” as Bojcevski calls them, have taken place in the Dojran-Strumica areas of southeastern Macedonia. While he doesn’t know for sure how many attempted thefts are going on at any given moment, he suspects the number right now to be around 40. “Most cases involve local people with a criminal background,” he says. “They are approached by well-organized international gangs that know the real value of the goods on the closed auction market in the West.”

Since the majority of villagers in these areas work in agriculture, they are familiar with vast stretches of land far from the roads. And, since it is their job to dig in the earth anyway, in the case of finding some ancient treasures the temptation to make some money from it is often too hard to resist.

Who, aside from the local collaborators, is responsible for this trafficking? Although a mafia exists, Bojcevski states, “from what we have seen, it’s not really the big drug smugglers. But they do sometimes include some of our former ‘freedom fighters’” – that is, ethnic Albanian criminals who fought against the state in the 2001 war.

According to Bojcevski, the European antiquities smuggling mafia works with its smaller Macedonian counterpart, which in turn works with locals to unearth antiquities and then arrange transport. The foreign smugglers do their research beforehand in textbooks and through the input of collectors, in order to know what to search for and where they can find it.

International Collaborators and Local Offenders

Further, Bojcevski alleges, legitimate international antiquities societies are often corrupt and secretly working the illegal market. As a specific example he mentions a biannual fair for antiquities lovers, held in Belgrade’s Hotel Yugoslavia. While there are plenty of legally-procured antiquities on display, “the collectors are also using this opportunity to tell the smugglers what places in the region to ‘hit,’ and what treasures they want from them next.”

Macedonian authorities are working together with their Serbian counterparts to fight this problem. The two countries have signed a convention for regulating the import and export of antiquities. But the battle is difficult, because the antiquities community is a tight one and very hard to infiltrate.

This same problem occurs at home, says Bojcevski. He believes that Skopje’s few antiquities stores – publicly offering everything from gold coins of Alexander the Great to World War II paraphernalia – have ‘extra’ collections available to specific customers.

“While in the shops you see only legal things,” he says, “there’s always a ‘back room’ which is open to certain customers, where they keep the illegal artifacts.”

A Legal Impasse Prevents Antiquities Protection

Given his suspicions, why don’t the police perform sting operations on the dealers? According to Bojcevski, he can’t, because the new antiquities law has not yet come into effect. “The law is meant to enhance our investigative procedures, but unfortunately it has been stuck in Parliament since last July,” he says. “We were supposed to have it by January 1, 2005, but there were some holes- so they put it off for another year.”

According to Bojcevski, “there is huge support in the Parliament [for the law]. Only a few are against it - merely for political reasons.”

The new law will also increase the funding for the CHPO. Currently, complains Bojcevski, “we don’t even have a Jeep. How can we go off-roading, to where the important sites are, in a two-door car?”

While politicians and minister regularly promise more assistance, he claims, their support tends to be merely ‘decorative.’

Because of the lack of resources and blocked legislation, CHPO officers usually arrive on the scene too late – after another treasure has been stolen. “This is a real problem,” sighs Bojcevski. “We do what we can. At least with the known archaeological sites, we can hold regular inspections and make sure that things are being done properly.”

Part 2 of this article will appear tomorrow.

How Do You Steal a Roof?

Apparently, they figured it out.

"I cannot help but ask myself after this how it is even possible to talk about the status of Kosovo and Metohija of acts like this are still taking place in the province. Of course, now we can say that the perpetrators should be found and punished but keeping in mind that Kosovo and Metohija, that the people there are responsible for realizing standards at the same time that talks are going on, the destruction of the roof in Bogorodica Ljeviska suggests how well those standards are going to be realized," says Slobodan Samardzic, advisor to Serbian prime minister Vojislav Kostunica for Tanjug.

Meanwhile...

State Lottery, Sports Fraud Aiding Drug Money Launderers in Greece?

(this article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Statistically speaking, your chances of winning the lottery are roughly 1 in 13,983,816.
Not in Greece- at least for some.

A leading Greek newspaper last week added to its long-time investigation of potential fraud in Greece’s national lottery. Athens’ Kathimerini suggested on November 7 that a degree of luck akin to divine providence would have had to be involved with the suspicious concurrence of winning tickets held by well-connected citizens over the past 5 years.

“…Official lists of football pool winners that show about 1,200 people won amounts of over 100,000 euros between January 1, 2000 and July 21, 2004,” reported the paper.During this period, the national lottery (OPAP) paid out 536 million euros, mostly to “…a small category of minor celebrities, led by middle-rank football club (PAE) officials and some referees… over a two- or three-year period, entire families, along with their friends and relatives, broke the OPAP bank to the tune of tens of millions of euros.”

Most provocative of all was the charge that “…the laundering of cocaine money is one of the main uses for OPAP lists by entire crime rackets who also launder bribes and fund football conspiracies.”

An investigation initiated by OPAP itself through the government’s financial crimes squad has centered on a few key players who have strong connections with one of the most powerful businessmen in Greece- fueling speculation that the investigation may go very high indeed.
One of these lucky winners is Stamatina Marmara, a woman who between 2002-2004 garnered some 11 million euros through the Pame Stihima (‘Let's Bet’) lottery. However, this was technically speaking nothing to celebrate, since Marmara’s declared total wagers in that time amounted to even more than she won.

On October 27, Kathimerini also referred to the arrest of Greek businessman Alexandros Angelopoulos on drug smuggling charges. It was believed that he “…had been using betting games to launder money. The probe, sources said, revealed up to 10 people who had cashed in an unusually high amount of winning coupons from all over the country.”

The arrest came after “…a drug bust in July last year aboard a Belize-flagged trawler off the coast of Spain which uncovered a haul of 5.4 tons of cocaine.” Angelopoulos’ trial, which also involves 4 other alleged co-conspirators, began on November 9.

A third figure in the case is one Giorgos Salonikis – the husband of high-roller Marmara. Further, the numerous business connections between Salonikis and billionaire businessman Socrates Kokkalis led the newspaper to speculate that in the end, the investigation may go higher up.

According to the article, “…Salonikis has a close professional relationship with Socrates Kokkalis, the chairman and main shareholder in Intralot, which supplies OPAP with software and runs its Pame Stoichima betting game. Salonikis has also served as vice president of the Olympiakos basketball club and held a position on the board of Olympiakos soccer club, both of which are presided over by Kokkalis. Salonikis was also on the board of Intralot in the past.”

Socrates Kokkalis: A History of Controversy

Socrates Kokkalis has long been a lightning rod for accusations of various financial crimes. The current Nea Demokratia government, when they were in opposition, repeatedly charged him of illegal collusion with the then-ruling PASOK government of Costas Simitis, and later made a compelling campaign issue out of such ties.

A Greek blog summarizes the prior charges against Kokkalis. On February 19, 2002, after relentless pressure from the ND opposition, the businessman “…was charged with four felonies and two misdemeanors, including espionage against Greece; money laundering (through off-shore companies); defrauding investors in his flagship Intracom telecom company; bribing government officials; and receiving criminal proceeds in the form of ‘gifts.’”

Soon thereafter, on February 28, he “…was additionally charged with defrauding investors to the tune of €483 million via sale of new stock and failure to invest proceeds in his publicly quoted companies as required by law.”

Further, Kokkalis is wanted in Russia for his role in an illicit instant lottery game that siphoned off “an undisclosed amount of Russian government money,” a scheme that apparently involved large-scale money deposits in Swiss banks.

The same article noted that the aforementioned Angelopoulos is not only linked to “a major international cocaine trafficking ring;” it further “…turns out that Mr. Angelopoulos is an avid gambler like Mrs. Marmara: by his own tax declaration, he has won 9,524,042.92 euro (or, roughly, US dollars 11,425 million) between 2002 and 2004.”

At the time of the original charges against Kokkalis, the Socialist PASOK party was in power. But leaders soon began seeking to distance themselves from the tainted businessmen, as they started falling under the withering fire of opposition leader (and current Prime Minister) Kostas Karamanlis of Nea Demokratia. Karamanlis was successfully able to use such examples of Shady PASOK dealings to defeat the Simitis government in March 2004 elections.

On February 20, 2002, the BBC also reported that Kokkalis was under scrutiny for alleged ties to the Stasi, East Germany’s feared secret service during Soviet times. According to the BBC, he was “…the first Greek citizen to face a formal probe for spying against his own state.” The businessman was born in the Soviet statelet to Communist parents, and was educated later in Moscow before returning to Greece. His subsequent fortune ($1.2 billion) came through the creation of telecoms suppliers Intracom in Greece, as well as through dodgy lottery schemes in both Greece and Russia.

Kokkalis protested the charges, according to the BBC accusing “…well-known circles, through the same political personalities and newspapers, that have specialised in a war against me… all those who publicly slander my name will take responsibility when the charges collapse.”

The Kokkalis-Simitis Communist Connection and Philanthropic Pursuits

As is so often the case in dynasty-prone Greek politics, the relationship between Kokkalis and leftist leader Costas Simitis can be traced back to their ancestors. According to an Athens News article, their links were forged early on:

“…Simitis and Kokkalis have a close relationship which goes back to their parents. Simitis' mother, Fani, was a leader of the feminist movement of the communist resistance during World War Two. Those who knew her describe her as a powerful personality and fiercely intelligent Marxist ideologue. Simitis' father, George, was a leader of the communist youth movement during the same period.

Both were close friends of Kokkalis' father, Petros, a venerated surgeon who abandoned a lucrative practice in Athens to cater to wounded communist guerrillas during the War and during the Civil War that followed. Fani, the more devoutly ideological of the couple, is said to have been especially close to Kokkalis.”Today, the firmly capitalistic Kokkalis has long departed from his Communist upbringing. He presides over a philanthropic educational foundation based in Boston, USA. Unsurprisingly enough called the Kokkalis Foundation, the group was established in September 1997 and resides at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. It offers scholarships to students from Balkan countries, ostensibly with “…the aim of building bridges and networks for peace across Southeastern and East-Central Europe and between the region and the rest of the world,” through “…educational and research activities that aim to support the transition to democracy and market economy now underway in the Balkans by bringing together senior policy-makers, scholars and students.”

Lectures and seminars on a range of political and economic topics organized by the foundation at Harvard and its Athens branch regularly feature respected academics and current and former government officials of countries such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and even from Israel.

Perhaps most ironic of all, all things considered, was the foundation’s September 23, 2002 conference in Athens titled, “Sports as a dynamic industry of the new economy.” The conference’s keynote speaker was then-Minister of Culture Evangelos Venizelos. Other notable speakers included Greek Development Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos and Undersecretary of State for Sports Giorgos Lianis, as well as foreign luminaries such as Norwegian lottery czar Reidar Nordby Jr., president of the World Lottery Association, and Sergio Henriquez Diaz of CIBELAE, the official Latin American lottery organization which “…currently comprises 39 State Lotteries from 19 countries, as well as 12 Lottery supplier companies.” Other delegates included “…ambassadors, official state representatives and lottery directors from Europe.”

What really put the event over the top, however, was that it was designed to coincide with “…the celebration of Intralot's 10th anniversary as a leading cooperation in the gaming industry.
To mark the anniversary, Kokkalis’ company “…decided to donate to the Ministry of Culture and Sports of Greece a special tailor-made report published by the Kokkalis Foundation in cooperation with IOBE, the Greek Institute of Economic and Industrial Research, on the economic impact of sports. The study stresses that sports, apart from a physical activity and entertainment, are a dynamic and expanding industry with a significant contribution to economic growth.”

Economic growth? Yes indeed!

A Lotto Kingpin

The same piece narrates Kokkalis’ rise to prominence through lottery schemes carried out under different regimes. In 1993, he won from the government the first private license for lottery tickets, during the reign of Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis. The former’s innovation was to produce instant scratch tickets as are common in many countries. The tickets proved very popular and “business flourished” throughout the last tenure of Andreas Papandreou- like Mitsotakis, another scion of an old dynasty.

But it was under Simitis when Kokkalis truly branched out: “…Intracom became [national telecom operator] OTE's exclusive supplier, not just in Greece but also in OTE's acquisitions abroad, and a major defence contractor. In the popular imagination, Kokkalis epitomises special interests.” He thus became a popular target for the conservative opposition, which scuppered a 2000 initiative to fund the coming Olympics through “videolotto” fruit machines. Soon thereafter, Nea Demokratia began a personal attack on “Socialist weak spot” Kokkalis, an attack that reached a crescendo with the February 2002 charges.

More than a Sporting Chance?

The recent Kathimerini allegations about the sordid Greek sports world are not new. In a June 2002 report by Alexander Kitroeff, it was recounted that “…the domestic club tournaments have become deeply mired in suspicions of corruption and allegations that the championship is rigged. Assumptions that referees have accepted bribes have led to ugly scenes of violence in games between the top teams over the past few years.”

The existence of a “soccer Mafia” was conceded in the fall of 2000, Kitroeff adds, when then-undersecretary for sports George Florides admitted that a criminal group had been “…bribing or blackmailing referees and club officials in order to obtain favorable outcomes.”

“…A few days later, a popular television talk-show host, Makis Triantafyllopoulos, played tapes of secretly recorded telephone conversations that included explicit references to game-fixing and bribes to referees. The dramatis personae of the tapes included Thomas ‘Uncle Tom’ Mitropoulos, a board member of Olympiakos and later a major shareholder of Egaleo, an Athens soccer team. In the most frequently quoted phrase since the tapes were made public, Mitropoulos apparently tells a referee, ‘Hey, don’t you worry about a thing! We want Olympiakos and Egaleo to win, the others can go fuck themselves.’”

Once again it was Kathimerini, the report continues, that implied (if not directly) that football fraud was being directed by Olympiakos owner Kokkalis. “…If Mitropoulos’s machinations were meant to benefit Olympiakos, then one would assume that the team’s powerful owner, Socrates Kokkalis, had to have been in the know.”

Three years later, in its recent article of November 7, Kathimerini added that the logic of the lottery fraud scheme, which has been surmised to exist on a national level, seems to also involve the purchase of winning tickets at “premium prices” by criminals who thus add another legal “revenue stream” to their coffers.

The natural question that arises from all of these murky activities is how widespread they may be. Do similar lottery and sports fraud schemes exist in neighboring Balkan countries, and even elsewhere in Europe? The Greek case will no doubt inspire regional investigators, politicians and journalists to dig under some very big rocks in their own countries.

Intralot Continues Expansion, Driven by Growth Abroad and At Home

However, all the controversy has not stopped the growth of Kokkalis’ flagship gaming company. In recent months, Intralot either acquired or made contracts with numerous lotteries in far-flung nations, including Poland, Nigeria, Cyprus (where it owns a subsidiary), Egypt, the United States and Israel.

A press release of November 10, 2005 said that the company is “in the pleasant position” of being able to “…revise upward its FY 2005 guidance to revenues of €500m and EBT of €150m from €500 m and €120m, respectively, as it was provided during the Annual General Meeting of our shareholders in late April 2005. The reasons for this change is the robust performance of international operation, especially Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria and the stronger than expected profitability of Stihima in Greece.”

In Vino Veritas: Macedonia to Lose More Jobs?

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Jason Miko

This op-ed by the inimitable Jason Miko, about the government’s hostile actions against leading Macedonian winery Tikves, was originally published in Skopje daily Vreme on November 8, 2005.

The Romans made the phrase, In Vino Veritas or, “in wine, truth” a common saying- and it applies not only then but today. The sad truth today is that the largest winery in the Balkans, an up-and-coming business that provides jobs to over 5,000 families, is under attack from a Macedonian government ministry run amok. This is a travesty and an injustice.

The blocking of the Tikves account by the authorities is sad. It’s sad for Tikves, it’s sad for the people who depend on Tikves for their livelihoods, it’s sad for the Government and it’s sad for Macedonia. But it doesn’t have to be this way. Let’s see what this case is and is not about.This is not about personalities as the Government would like it to be. However, I feel that certain members of Government (I won’t name them but their initials are Nikola Popovski), are out to make an example of a group of businessmen who have done reasonably well in the market economy. This misses the point, however. If the Government succeeds in bankrupting Tikves, then M6 will not be hurt -- they’re smart businessmen who have saved their money and they will simply go out and look for another investment -- possibly in another country that is interested in creating jobs and promoting growth.

Instead, this is about the rule of law. Secondly, this is about the abuse of power and private property. Third, this is about the stability of Macedonia. Fourth, this is about maintaining a friendly business environment. Finally, it is about jobs, jobs and jobs.

Now, let’s review the case. Tikves is the largest winery in the region. It has a history, a name and a reputation and it has, in the past, produced reasonably good wines. It provides jobs to the grape growers in the region and the folks who work in the winery, all in all over 5,000 Macedonians and their families.

Not too long ago, M6 bought out the winery, paid a fair price, assumed its debts and vowed to turn it around and restore it. They invested several million euros in new equipment and improvement, brought in expert sommeliers to figure out how to increase the quality, brought in marketing experts to re-establish everything from the labels to the packaging and set out on a course to turn Tikves around and make it into a stellar winery producing high-quality wines which could be exported to the West. Exporting high-quality wines from Macedonia is not just about exporting wine. It is about exporting Macedonia and it is about economic growth, and most importantly it is about securing and creating jobs that have a real future.

So the management took on this challenge, took on the risk -- as all good businessmen do in a market economy -- and has been attempting these past two years to turn it around. And they have been succeeding. They have developed a plan that will help farmers grow higher-quality grapes – grapes that can be sold for more money to Tikves and grapes that will produce a higher quality wine that can then be exported abroad – and are attempting to implement it. In essence, they have taken a former state asset that needed rehabilitation and they are now attempting to rehabilitate it. Until now.

The biggest problem they are facing right now is the blocking of their account by the Minister of Finance, a move, I am told, that is against the law. The Minister claims that he has a court order to block their account when in fact it is only an order from his ministry. This is the first issue -- the rule of law. Either it is legal or illegal for the Ministry to do this. And clearly, it is not legal.

Now, if the Government can block the account of Tikves, one of the largest companies in the country, then it can certainly take away a small or medium-sized company. It can take away your house. It can take away your job. The Washington, DC-based think-tank Heritage Foundation ranked Macedonia 4 on property rights in its Index of Economic Freedom 2005 (1 being best and 5 being worst) which quoted the US State Department as saying “the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in practice, although the court system at times was inefficient and subject to political manipulation.”

Worse yet, the U.S. Agency for International Development noted that “an inefficient judiciary and a lack of rule of law are key impediments to the economic and democratic development of the country.” This is also why Macedonia ranked 103 out of 158 countries in the corruption index recently released by Transparency International, next to such countries as Gambia and Yemen. This is the second issue -- the abuse of power and lack of private property rights.

Now, if a business cannot operate in Macedonia without the fear of the Government coming in and seizing assets with no legal reason, then stability breaks down and the people fear for not only their businesses, but their lives. This is the third issue- the stability of Macedonia.
Further, if local businesses cannot operate unhindered in Macedonia and fear the Government, then this sends a signal to potential foreign investors. When there is not a friendly business environment, then there will not be foreign investment. This explains why Macedonia had the lowest share of foreign investment in the region last year. This is the fourth issue -- the lack of a friendly business environment.

The final issue is that of jobs. If the Government drives Tikves into bankruptcy then people will lose their jobs. At a time when 37.4% of the Macedonian population is unemployed, there is no reason to be adding to that -- especially at the hand of the Government. The Government’s role is to create conditions that allow businessmen to create and sustain jobs, not destroy them.

Tikves and their management are socially responsible community members and will continue to invest in Macedonia -- but only if they can operate their business without undue and illegal interference by the Government. Otherwise, why would anyone want to invest here?

The question is, what to do now? In my opinion, you can best show your support for Tikves, its grape growers, its employees and Macedonia’s reputation - and at the same time your opposition to the Government’s heavy-handed tactics - by buying Tikves wines.

Editor's note: For more information about the Macedonian wine country published on Balkanalysis.com, read Darko Angelov’s Culinary and Cultural Delights of the Tikves Wine Region.

Save Lives by Supporting Alternative Media- Antiwar.com Fundraising Week

(A special message from Christopher Deliso).

Readers (whether from the American left or right, or even from foreign countries) who believe that the train of American foreign policy has been dangerously derailed by the present administration should consider supporting Antiwar.com during their present fundraising week. And I'm not saying this because I write for them, but rather because cumulatively the website provides a valuable and perhaps life-saving service. We're all in this world together, after all.

Just visit the Antiwar.com website and check out the service they are providing. There's no other single online source that provides, day in and day out, such a variety of well-chosen information from the most important conflict zones of the world- complete with informed editorials and analyses from a range of voices. Providing this service is a time-consuming and often difficult job that reminds us of the old adage that there's little profit in telling the truth. And that's why they need your support.

As it turns out, the website was also on it from the beginning when it came to many of the murkiest episodes surrounding the Iraq invasion: the fundamentally bogus nature of the evidence of Sadam's alleged WMD; the involvement of AIPAC and other foreign lobbies in compromising American policy and national security; Plame-gate, Niger-gate and so on.

Antiwar.com is a registered non-profit and is currently asking for $60,000 to keep the boat afloat during the next quarter. Even a small donation will help towards this goal.

However, anyone feeling particularly philanthropic should realize that with not too much more money to work with, the website could probably dramatically up its research and investigatory potential, something which might allow it to publish the kind of "pre-emptive strikes" that could conceivably save lives and stop useless wars and wasteful spending by exposing government lies and propaganda, thus slowing down this crazy train of disastrous policy before it has the chance to go off the rails by being implemented.

You can click here to donate. Just think of it as your good deed for the day: it's like helping that little old lady carry her grocery bags, assisting a blind man trying to cross the street, saving those abandoned kittens in the woods. Only difference is you will be helping many people at the same time, all without leaving the computer. Think about it.

-Chris

Macedonia Gets a Guarded Welcome from the EU

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


The European Commission delivered its long-awaited verdict today, recommending Macedonia as finally fit for EU candidate status. The positive opinion, or avis, came as a breath of relief for the beleaguered SDSM-DUI government whose victories have been few and far between over the past year.

Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski, fresh from his audience with President Bush in the White House, had plenty to say about the historic decision. According to Makfax, he stated that “…today is the day when the question whether Macedonia will become an EU member is definitely closed… now, the question is when will Macedonia become a member of [the] EU.” Of course, the announcement came with the expected caveats. According to MIA, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated the “…the Commission considers that negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with the country once it has reached a sufficient degree of compliance with the membership criteria.” Some of the outstanding “criteria” that Rehn referred to include “serious administrative weaknesses in the judiciary and public administration.” Other reforms outstanding come in the spheres of European legislation and the economy.

The next test comes next month, with the EU Summit, when the EC’s avis needs to be approved in order to make Macedonia a candidate country for membership. “Afterwards, states MIA, “a date for entry talks will be set on all aspects of the EU membership - 32 chapters of the Union's legislation, including trade, environment, competitiveness, health care...”

A day before the EC’s announcement, while lobbying for support in Finland, Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski expressed his optimism that the country would attain official candidate status at the EU’s December summit.

In his announcement, Ollie Rehn depicted Macedonia as a “success story,” noting that “…only a few years ago it was on the brink of civil war, and today it is knocking on the EU door.”

Nevertheless, it’s going to be knocking for a long time to come. The positive avis and approval from the EU, should it in fact arrive, are unlikely to provide a set timeframe for accession- leaving Macedonia in a Turkey-like limbo.

At the same time Macedonia’s avis was handed down, Turkey was granted ‘market economy’ status, “a key hurdle on the road to full membership of the EU,” reports the BBC. Despite this positive sign, says the BBC, Turkey should look forward to spending “…at least 10 years implementing promised reforms and adopting thousands of pages of European law.”

Meanwhile, other EU hopefuls have received more lukewarm signals from Brussels. Citing “overstretch,” Rehn’s new strategy paper also cautioned against taking on new enlargement challenges beyond Bulgaria and Romania (slated for a 2007 entry), the Balkans and Turkey. This came as something of a disappointment for Ukrainians. According to the EU Observer, “…a high-ranked commission official said he ‘did not object’ to the analysis that the commission strategy paper represents bad news for Kiev´s EU aspirations.”

The EU Observer also points out that the French and Dutch rejections of the proposed EU constitution this year simultaneously did away with provisions “for institutional arrangements for integrating Turkey and Balkan states.” The current document (the Nice Treaty) only covers the 25 EU members, plus Bulgaria and Romania. “…I hope member states can soon agree on what the accession of a 28th member state would mean in terms of the composition of the commission and voting rights in the council,” Rehn was quoted as saying.

While the going seems good for Macedonia, there are several potential impediments. The unresolved status of Kosovo and renewed militancy there have cast a pall over everything from international border demarcation to ethnic Albanian secession, something recently championed by opposition leader Arben Xhaferi. It is hardly implausible that spill-over violence tied to the final status negotiations could derail Macedonia’s EU ambitions.

Further is the question of Greece, which has threatened to thwart Macedonia’s European course because of the name issue dispute. On 30 October, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis stated that “…there can only be an accession course to the EU in two cases. Either after a mutually acceptable solution or with the name FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). There is no other path.” Nevertheless, yesterday unnamed officials stated that they would not block Macedonia’s candidacy – at least for now. Speculation is that at the later stages of negotiations the Greeks could bring pressure to bear on finding a ‘compromise’ name.

In any case, the EU’s attention has been redirected inward for the time being by the ongoing rioting in France and elsewhere. The Western countries’ domestic woes, plagued by seething, impoverished immigrant suburbs, will have a ripple effect, not only giving right-wing Euroskeptics more ammunition but also probably siphoning off more public funds for alleviating the social woes of their disgruntled immigrant youth, as Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin has promised.

According to the Globe and Mail, France’s “…economic stagnation in the ghettos will be addressed with the equivalent of $140-million in subsidies for local associations, 25,000 new government-funded jobs and 15 economic zones with lower taxes.” It’s hard to imagine that French (and probably soon to be other European) taxpayers vexed with the imminent additional burden of subsidizing what they regard as their societies’ deadweight are going to be thrilled with the idea of further EU enlargement. Indeed, as an unnamed EU official told the EU Observer, “…we have to listen to citizens´ concerns.”

Given the current climate of uncertainty, Macedonia is thus likely to remain pretty far down on Europe’s priority list. While it may not take the country 10 years to implement all the reforms, and while issues like torture (which has held up Turkey) don’t seem to factor in, Macedonia will be a very different place in say, autumn 2012, the hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the Balkan Wars that originally dismembered it.

Organized Crime and Montenegro’s Construction Industry

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Vanja Calovic*

According to the 2005 TI Global Corruption Report “…estimates of the total size of the global construction market are around US $3,200 billion per year.” This turnover has thus made the construction industry very attractive for organized crime structures. As for Montenegro, the public largely fears that the money taken out of the country during the transition process is coming back in, and is being laundered through construction of buildings by the transition “winners.” At the same time, this is the reason why those who dare speak about corruption in the construction industry are very few.

In the Montenegrin construction industry there is an obvious presence of the Russian oligarchs who are especially interested in the construction of hotels and residential buildings on the coast. The experiences of other countries show that this kind of business is very attractive for organized crime syndicates, because it is both highly profitable and a favorable means of money laundering. Russian criminal groups have rich experience in this field.Inadequate implementation of laws and undeveloped national companies enable the formation of monopolies and establishment of control over the process of planning and developing space by the mafia. In such a situation, politics becomes just another kind of business.

Montenegrin and Russian officials have confirmed several times that during the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia, money was transferred from Montenegro to Russia, and that the public was never informed regarding the amount of money involved and the way in which it had left the country. According to daily newspaper Vijesti on October 6, 2004 Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic lamented:

“…between 100 and 150 million euros are kept in outside banks or in accounts outside Montenegro. We must encourage people to invest the money into business. If the money does not come from criminal activities or something similar, which is the task of the authorized bodies to determine within the defined legal procedure, then these people should not have any fears.”
Ironically, Djukanovic himself has been accused of corruption in the past. In July 2003, he was accused by Italian prosecution for having links with the Italian mafia. According to the London Guardian, “…the prosecutors' office in Naples named Mr Djukanovic as a linchpin in the illicit trade which used Montenegro as a transit point for smuggling millions of cigarettes across the Adriatic Sea into Italy and into the hands of the Italian mafia for distribution across the EU.”

As a sort of response to the prime minister’s statement, Russian Emergency Services Minister Sergei Soygu pointed out the context of the investments on October 19, 2004. According to Vijesti, Soygu said:

“…since Montenegrin and Serbian business transferred most of their money to Russia during the sanctions, nobody in Russia said that it was dirty money obtained owing to the war. We tried to support development of the Montenegrin business as much as we could.”

Since control of property and determination of origin of capital invested in the economy has not started functioning yet in Montenegro, the public largely fears that the money is being returned and laundered through the construction of buildings, both by the Russian and Montenegrin "winners" of the transition process. There is no data as to whether there have been any investigations of money laundering in the construction industry, however.

International experience show that money laundering in the construction industry is especially present in administrative and industrial centers where population migrations from inland are evident, something which naturally causes increased demand for homes and thus more construction activities. Construction companies can hire sometimes illegal immigrants in order to avoid paying taxes and fees, something which enables a higher competitiveness through reduction of costs, but which also encourages trafficking in human beings.

Construction and Trafficking in Human Beings in Montenegro

At present, there is an ongoing trial for organized crime in the Higher Court in Podgorica that started in January 2005. The trial concerns the criminal act of trafficking in human beings, on the basis of the indictment of the Special Prosecutors for fighting organized crime. According to the indictment, between April 2003 and August 17, 2004, four Montenegrin citizens were dealing with trafficking in human beings in an organized way, with the purpose of gaining profit.

The crime of abuse by forced labor was leveled against the indicted persons for their appalling treatment of several dozen Ukrainian construction workers who they had lured to Podgorica under false promises. They established companies called "Pavlo-V" and "Mojmilo-Kompani" in order to import foreign workers for their construction sites, known as “A.D. Gorica” and d"Lunex-Monta.” The Ukrainians were forced to work 12 hours a day for 2 months- without ever receiving any pay.

According to the indictment, one of the accused owned a company that cooperated with 2 uncertified Ukrainian tourist guides who had been indicted for trafficking in human beings in Ukraine as well. They put an advertisement in a newspaper offering construction work in Podgorica, and offered a salary of between 500-1,000 euros a month. The interested workers had to pay 800 euros, allegedly for passports and for arranging their stay and work in Montenegro.

Then the Ukrainian workers were transferred by bus to Montenegro, where their passports were immediately taken away from them. They were kept in the huts of A.D. "Gorica" and provided only the most basic food. When the workers asked for their salaries, they were threatened that they would be deprived of food and accommodation if they refused to work, and were warned that they would be abused. Thus, they were kept in the position of slaves, according to the indictment.

Spanish Police versus the Construction Industry: Operation "White Whale"

A relevant case from Spain illustrates another dimension of the problem. In April 2005, the town of Malaga came under investigation regarding suspected money laundering in a veritable orgy of local construction. Investigators suspected that the industry’s economic infusion was coming primarily from money laundering.

Half of the new construction sites in Spain are on its Mediterranean shore. During an operation codenamed "White Whale,” the police for the first time established a direct link between organized crime and the dramatic explosion of the Spanish construction industry.

Operation "White Whale", the height of the eighteen-month investigation that included police forces from seven countries, caught 41 suspects and seized 251 pieces of real estate. The combined value of these was estimated at 250 million euros. The seized properties included luxurious villas, weekend flats and shopping centres. Bank deposits of 30 million euros were frozen, and contents of several bank safes were seized by inspectors.

Spanish police believe that through this operation they stopped the biggest chain of money laundering in Europe, one which has branches in the USA and Canada. Candido Conde-Pumpido, the attorney general, described the investigation as being just “the tip of the iceberg.” According to the Financial Times, he said "we are witnessing the silent invasion of mafias on our coast," adding, "and the big fish have yet to be caught."

Following the tracks of narco-cartels, the article continues, police raided the offices of Fernanto del Valle, director of the lawyer's firm in Marbella. The police stated that he established hundreds of companies for foreign criminals so that they could invest their illegal profits and real estate in Spain. The police estimate that more than 600 million euros could have been laundered through del Valle's firm, and they doubt that many other lawyer's firms along the shore are not involved in money laundering.

Most sensationally, documents confiscated in Del Valle's firm point to the fact that large amounts of money were transferred from Yukos, the famous Russian oil group, to a Dutch company and were then invested in Spain.

However, Yukos denied having businesses in Spain and asked for detailed information from the public prosecutor. There are no reliable estimates regarding to what extent organized crime is involved in the Spanish construction industry, but Per Stangeland, head of criminology at the University of Malaga, said that the presence of criminal networks in the construction industry and real estate field cannot be denied. “It is a driving force, perhaps the most important driving force, behind the construction industry,” he said for the FT. “How else is there to explain that [Malaga], with one of the highest unemployment rates and lowest incomes in Spain, can sustain a 1,600% growth in the construction of private housing in five years?"

Budva’s Hotel Splendid and a Russian Magnate

In June 2005, at the construction site of the Hotel Splendid in Budva, Montenegro, three explosive devices were set off within a few days of one another. According to the media, photographs showing the perpetrators exist. So far, the police have arrested several persons suspected of being involved in the explosions. The motives have not been discovered yet. There are several versions regarding who was behind the explosions. According to one, it is a war of local construction lobbies. According to the other, it involves racketeering and money of suspicious origins.

Hotel Splendid was sold to the Russian-Montenegro Company "Montenegro Stars Hotels Group" for 2.4 million euros in 2004. The same Russian-Montenegrin company bought hotels "Blue Star" and "Montenegro." "We are originally a Montenegrin firm and we remain Montenegrin", said Žarko Radulović at the press conference.

An interlocutor involved in the privatization of several Montenegrin hotels told the Montenegrin weekly The Monitor that the majority owner of the "Splendid" is one Viktor Ivanenko. “The Montenegrin shareholder in the ‘Montenegro Stars’ has a minority package” states the article, which adds that Ivanenko entered the Montenegrin hotel business through the firm Rašan Investors, registered in Switzerland.

Ivanenko, Russia’s 84th wealthiest main according to Forbes’ 2004 report, has an impressive biography. He went a long way from the village of Koltsovka, where he was born in 1947, through the secret Russian police, to the top of the Moscow business and politics. He entered the Russian secret service immediately upon graduation in 1970, during the depressed Communist years. He also stayed on after the disintegration of the USSR, until 1993. Then he went to Yukos and became the First Vice-President of this oil giant. In the 1990’s, private empires appeared in Russia after state property came into the hands of oligarchs through suspicious privatization processes. Ivanenko became one of Yukos' shareholders.

Russian oligarchs were then recruited from the circles in and around the government, especially from the KBG secret services.

When Russian President Vladimir Putin entered into war against Yukos and its main owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, due to unpaid taxed and other alleged suspicious activities, the empire worth billions was destroyed overnight. But Viktor Ivanenko survived.

Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Cohort Platon Lebedev is also in prison. Other shareholders of Yukos are under surveillance and many have left Russia and are hiding abroad. Only Ivanenko, along with three other shareholders of Yukos, has stayed in Russia.

At the time when Khodorkovsky was on trial in Russia, at the other end of Europe – Spain - an affair involving the destroyed Russian oil company was unfolding. As we discussed above, several people were arrested last spring in Spain due to the suspicion that they laundered Yukos' money through construction and tourist businesses in Marbella.

An interesting coincidence: the large board in front of the construction site of "Splendid" has a notice reading that the construction company, the contractor, Unik Trade, in addition to Becici, has jobs in Moscow, Belgrade and Marbella.

A text published in the weekly Nedeljni Telegraf last year on the subject of Russian investments in Montenegro claimed that the Montenegrin shareholder of the "Montenegro Stars," Zarko Radulovic, said that his Russian partner in the oil business made millions in annual profit. However, Radulovic then protested for The Monitor that, “it is not true that I said that. The whole text was made up.”

At the same time, Radulovic denied claims that his partner is one of the former directors of Yukos. He did not want to reply to the specific question of whether Viktor Ivanenko was the majority co-owner of "Splendid."

................

The author is a native Montenegrin and Executive Director of the NGO MANS. She has worked in the non-governmental sector since 1999 on issues related to poverty and corruption. Ms Calovic is also a member of the Expert Task Force for monitoring implementation of the Plan for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime established by the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro.

The Genius of Serbian Tabloids

This article by Florian Bieber is really quite funny.

Analysis: The Efficiency of the Macedonian Banking Sector

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Borko Handziski

The following article is an abridged version of an in-depth study on the Macedonian banking sector, originally published in the Monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Macedonia. We are making both the abridged version and the original text (.PDF), which contains several charts and tables, available for the first time in English.

The author, Borko Handziski, is the Economic Affairs Officer for the Delegation of the European Commission in Skopje.

The Macedonian banking sector has grown rapidly over the past few years. However, its current stage of development, measured by the level of financial intermediation, is still lower compared to the other transition countries (of Central and Eastern Europe) and the EU member states.

Introduction: Some Vital Statistics

The banking sector in Macedonia comprises 21 bank and 15 saving houses and has a dominant share in the overall financial sector. The banks have the majority assets of the banking sector, whereas the saving houses manage only 1.3% of the total assets. The banking sector is largely concentrated, with 2 banks having 55.5% of the total assets and 55.9% of total bank activities. By the end of the first half of 2004, 95.1% of banking capital had been privatized, and foreign capital was present in 15 banks (foreign capital has a 45.7% share in total banking capital). Out of the 15 banks, 8 banks (with 47.5% share in total assets) have foreign investors as majority shareholders.

Comparative analysis with the other transition countries shows that the Macedonian banking sector is lagging behind in the bank consolidation process. In the group of 16 transition countries, Macedonia (after Slovenia) has the highest number of banks per population. Despite the large number of banks, a high concentration of assets is present, with the two largest banks having 55.9% of total assets and the 12 smallest banks accounting for only 13.9% of total assets. This structure results in lack of competition among banks, thus hurting their efficiency. On the other hand, Macedonia ranks 14th for the foreign banks to total banks ratio, so the banking sector needs to further attract foreign investors. The entry of foreign capital is particularly important for strengthening competition and achieving higher efficiency. The advantages of foreign banks operating in Macedonia are multiple: transfer of know-how, investment in IT, using modern risk management methods, additional capital etc.

Factors Determining Low Efficiency

The banking sector is rather specific in terms of the factors that determine bank performance, and bank operations are strongly influenced by exogenous developments. Bank liabilities (taken deposits) are mainly determined by the sustainable economic stability and future expectations of the economic and political environment in the country and the region. The assets side is also influenced by macroeconomic developments in the country and the region, as well as by the monetary and fiscal policy. The inefficiency of the banking system is mainly determined by: legislature, macroeconomic environment and the bank management.

Legislature

The legal acts related to the functioning of the financial system are a key factor that determines the overall performance of the banks. This particularly relates to the legal acts regarding the collection of collateral assets. The efficiency of court procedures is an essential requirement for good bank performance, as it allows banks to pursue a more efficient (and more expansive) credit policy. If the judicial system does not allow for timely, efficient and simple resolution of court disputes, the banks’ credit portfolio will have high share of non-performing loans and investments in securities, something which is exactly the case in the Macedonian banking system.

On the other hand, such a credit portfolio implies higher lending rates and reduced possibility for crediting (having only few investment projects that can earn such a high return to be able to cover to high interest costs). The inability to provide more credit to clients would then result in risk free investments (such as CB-bills or government bills), even keeping cash on its own account. The above mentioned scenario captures completely the current situation in the Macedonian banking system. The weakness in the judicial system has resulted in a large share of uncollected loan repayments (NPLs), even though there is a positive trend in declining NPLs (13.8% in 2004). As a result, banks operate with high interest margins (lending rates), meaning they are unable to invest all of their assets as loans. This is reflected through the excess liquidity banks have on their accounts at the central bank. In 2003, the average excess liquidity of banks was around 28 percent.

In 2003 the EBRD introduced a new method for measuring reform progress in the legislature (related to the banking sector) in the transition countries, as an addition to the existing regional survey for the reforms in the legislature related to secured transactions. The results of the survey on secured transactions (which began in 1999) show that Macedonia falls in the group of countries with low progress in reforms. The aim of the new survey is to assess “the laws in action,” meaning how the legislature on secured transactions is applied in the court practice in these countries. The survey measures the level of reforms through the following indicators: (1) time needed to recover the assets, (2) amount expected to be recovered (as % of total value) and (3) simplicity of the process. According to this indicators, Macedonia ranks in the middle of the 15 SEE and CEE countries, lagging behind the advanced transition countries, and the least developed countries such as Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Moldavia (and Romania) at the bottom of the list.

Macroeconomic environment

The performance of the economy has a significant impact on the development of the banking sector. The level of economic development as well as the current economic trends strongly influences both the asset and liability side of the banks’ balance sheets. The frozen deposits, collapse of the pyramid schemes and bankruptcy of several small banks during the 1990’s had a substantial negative impact on the confidence in the banking system. As a result, Macedonian banks operated with a very limited deposit base, with most savings being stored “under the matrices” (and in foreign currency).

In November 2001, NBRM conducted a survey to estimate the size of foreign currency savings outside the banking system. The results of this survey showed there were between 1-1.5 billion deutschmarks of savings circulating outside the banking system. The improved economic environment, strengthened banking supervision and the creation of the Fund for insurance of deposits resulted in a return of confidence in the banking system. However, a key milestone in the transfer of savings back to the banking sector was the introduction of the euro and the need for conversion of the 12 national currencies into euro, which began on January 1, 2002. The banks offered conversion with no commission if funds are deposited in a savings account for a minimum of 15 days. So, in the last quarter of 2001, households’ deposits had an enormous increase, ending 3.6 times higher (or 27.7 billion denars) on year-to-year basis. During the first quarter of 2002 there was withdrawal of deposits, but between 60 and 70 percent of the new deposits remained in the banking system.

The poor economic performance and the developments in the region also had a negative impact on banks’ credit activity. In an environment of economic and political instability, low level of foreign investments and high interest rates, banks had a difficult time finding suitable investment projects to invest in. The low usage of foreign credit lines (only 45.7%) which are available with low interest rates is a further proof of the limited opportunities for investing. Thus, it is not surprising that investments in other banks (of which 80% are in foreign banks) are higher than loans to clients. The high level of funds deposited in foreign banks, which are low risk but also low yield, has adversely affected banks’ profitability.

Management

The skills and capacity of the top management is also an important aspect that determines the performance of any company. The managers of the Macedonian banks play a significant role in the performance of the banking sector. The role of the management can be analyzed from two aspects: the skills of the top managers and the functioning of the system of corporate governance. In addition to the previously mentioned factors, the management in Macedonian banks further contributes to the present poor performance of the banking sector. This can be measured through the low level of investments in IT (which has been one of the main contributors for increased efficiency in the past decade), little use of latest risk management methods, poor customer orientation etc.

This situation is clearly observed through many examples and anecdotal evidence. For example, whereas Estonia has 93% of transactions conducted online, (only few) Macedonian banks have only recently introduced online banking. Customer orientation has been the main company focused for decades in the developed countries, but Macedonian banks (again only some) only recently have introduced a “yellow line” to protect the privacy of the customer (an investment of less than 10 euros). Significant progress has been made in the past few years in developing new risk management methods and models (for reducing credit, foreign exchange, market, liquidity risk etc.), however the implementation of these new findings lacks in most Macedonian banks.

One of the reasons is that only a fraction of top managers have participated in trainings on these topics. My conclusions are supported by the bankers themselves. I tried to conduct a survey among bank mangers in which (among other things) I asked top managers to provide their opinion on the impact of the management on the bank performance.

Although I did not receive the critical amount of feedback to publish the results, I received enough answers on this particular question, and the results was the bank CEO’s agree that the skills of bank managers in Macedonia represent a significant constraint on banks’ profitability.
The second aspect of the role of the management’s role is the corporate governance in the banking sector. Corporate governance depicts the relationship between the company and the interest parties such as shareholders, managers, creditors, employees, clients etc. The lack of an adequate corporate governance is not only present in banks, but in the overall corporate sector, having detrimental impact on the quality of the decision-making process in the companies. Lack of transparency and unclear relationships between shareholders, managers and the clients (which are very often the same) are particularly present within smaller banks, and seriously jeopardize effective corporate governance.

Conclusions

Historical analysis and comparative approach with the other transition countries point to an insufficient level of development and poor performance of the Macedonian banking sector. Measured by the share of total assets to GDP, the Macedonian banks are lagging well behind the more advanced transition countries. The structure of the Macedonian banking system shows high concentration, while at the same time a large number of small banks. Macedonia has the second largest number of banks per population, whereas over a half of bank assets are owned by the two largest banks.

The result of this inadequate structure is lack of competitiveness in the banking sector, which seriously undermines the banks’ efficiency. The DuPont analysis of the banks’ financial results shows high level of non-interest revenues (from fees and commissions) and lesser interest revenues, meaning that earnings from non-core activities (rather than the core business of financial intermediation) are the main determinant of the banks’ profitability.

Bearing this in mind, the fact that Macedonian banks are the least profitable among the transition countries comes as no surprise. The high level of non-performing loans and high interest margins also point out to the poor performance of the banking system, and trying to reduce this two will have further negative impact on rates of return. The EBRD index on reforms (in the banking sector and non-banking financial institutions) is an additional indicator for the insufficient level of reforms compared to the other transition countries.

The reasons for the poor performance of the banking sector are both endogenous and exogenous. The most significant exogenous factors are the legislature and the macroeconomic environment. These two factors have had adverse impact on the banking system in the past. However, the latest reforms in the judicial sector (and banking sector related legislature) as well as the improved economic environment are a positive signal for an enhanced performance in the future. The skills of bank managers and the inappropriate system of corporate governance present an additional obstacle for improved efficiency and profitability of the banks in Macedonia. The managers have not been following the latest trends in banking regarding risk management methods, customer orientation, investment in IT etc. Corporate governance also remains an issue for the overall corporate sector, and the problems with lack of transparency and mixed shareholders, managers and client relationships are particularly acute in small banks.

The banking system has an irreplaceable role in providing financial assistance to the private sector and promoting economic growth. Thus, the efficiency of the banking system allows for more efficient (cheaper) financing of private entities, resulting in increased investments for companies and higher consumption for households. In the current environment where Macedonian enterprises are facing undercapitalization and low inflow of FDI, the banks’ role as a source of financing is even more important for promoting investments and economic growth. The results of the 2002 BEEPS survey show that half of companies in Macedonia finance only up to 20% of the working capital with bank credits.

There have been some positive trends moving the banking sector closer to the standards of the advanced transition countries (now EU member countries). The most significant trend is the reduction of the lending rates, which resulted in increased lending and narrowing of the interest margin. On the other hand, the reduction of deposit rates has not decreased the positive trend of deposits growth, implying a strengthening of confidence in Macedonian banks and return of financial assets of households in the banking system. The expansion of the banks’ credit portfolio and introduction of the latest bank products and services (such as online banking) in some banks has resulted in improved performance.

This positive trend needs to have a broader acceptance within the banking sector and to continue with more intensive pace, in order for Macedonian banks to achieve the level of development of the advanced transition economies.

Macedonia: Terrorism Returns, Perhaps Kosovo-linked

Perhaps the latest signs of unrest in Macedonia have something to do with the increasingly ominous situation in Kosovo and the neighboring Presevo Valley of south Serbia, where Albanian militants have reaffirmed their presence in a bid to force the independence of Kosovo and spark its assimilation of neighboring countries' Albanian-populated areas.

On November 3, Macedonian state media MIA reported an illegal weapons seizure on the Debar-Gostivar road:

"During a routine control at road Debar-Gostivar, police found Tuesday illegal weapons in a car, and detained two persons, with one other injured, Ministry of Interior announced.The police found one mortar type "zolja", one missile launcher, five explosive loads and five grenades. Investigation in the case is ongoing."

Mortars and missile launchers- looks like these weren't a couple of hunters out for a joyride.

Both Debar and Gostivar are Albanian-controlled towns, the former in the western mountains on the border with Albania, the latter south of Tetovo on the main highway to Ohrid. The report is unclear about where on the road the car was stopped; whether on the highway or on the low-quality road connecting it to Mavrovo and then Debar.

On the same day, Makfax reported that an Albanian was murdered in Tetovo, for reasons unknown:

"...One person was shot down last night at around 20.00 hrs outside the restaurant Prince in the Tetovo's Sports Center. According to its preliminary information, the police identified the victim as Rexhep Aliu from the village of Prsovce. While stepping out of his car, he was shot in the head and leg by as yet unknown person. The police blocked the site immediately. An investigative judge carries out inspection at the location, as the authorities set out for tracking down the perpetrator."

A day earlier, Makfax reported that disaster had been narrowly averted at a Tetovo church apparently targeted for ethnic demolition.

"...The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team of police anti-terrorist units detonated early this morning an incendiary device which was planted near"Sveta Bogorodica" church in Tetovo, Makfax news agency said. The incendiary device had been reportedly planted under support wall in churchyard. The local residents spotted the device late on Tuesday and reported it to the police. The police sealed off the site.The police took the necessary explosive-disposal measures and destroyed the device safely. Investigation is ongoing, police said, adding that they are searching for suspects."

Things bubble along...

Analysis: American Interests Vs. Turkey’s EU Membership

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Mehmet Kalyoncu

This provocative argument for why America supports Turkish EU membership, even though it is in some respects counter to its own interests, comes to us from Mehmet Kalyoncu, a Graduate Student at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

“The US favors Turkey’s EU membership because it considers that it could exploit an EU-member Turkey as a ‘Trojan horse,’ through which it could occasionally stir things up in the Union.”

This argument is relatively widely accepted, especially in circles that oppose Turkey’s EU membership. Yet it is a misleading one, and amounts to nothing more than mere conspiracy theorizing. Actually, American interests are not dramatically benefited by Turkey’s EU membership; in fact, on several critical issues they are even threatened.Nevertheless, the US still favors Turkey’s EU membership because first, clear opposition would put it at odds with both Turkey and the EU member countries; and second, impeding Turkey’s official attainment of Western ‘status’ would undermine its efforts towards the democratization of the broader Muslim world. Therefore, the US favors Turkey’s EU membership, but only because it is less detrimental to its interests to have strong ally Turkey in the Western bloc than otherwise.

Yet at the same time, American interests are not only challenged but also endangered on two grounds. First of all, with a more powerful and self-sustained European Union, the US will be challenged on issues ranging from military power projection to trade capability. Second, as the former US Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz implies, the US may lose yet another ally to the opposition side on the international criminal court issue.

Furthermore, Turkey may have to adopt a more European, and hence more critical stand vis-à-vis Israel in terms of handling the Palestine conflict. Above all, a nice and smooth transition of Turkey from longtime US ally status to a more or less European ally, even if these two are not dichotomous to each other, would send to the other states in the international system, be they Muslim or not, the message that they are not confined to side themselves with the world’s reigning superpower, and that there could be other appealing regional or continental alternatives to the alliance.

Based on the assumption that the EU with Turkey would be stronger militarily, politically, and economically, the US interests on each ground will be threatened. In terms of military technology transfer and arms sales, just like with other member countries, a Unionized Turkey will have to constrain its military spending in accordance with the EU’s budgetary policies. Moreover, it will most likely be required to buy its military hardware from suppliers within the European Union. This will automatically lead to a decline in the lucrative Turkish-American military equipment trade.

Similarly, Turkey will be asked to develop better relations with Airbus S.A.S. for airline technology and purchasing, to the detriment of its long-time relations with the Boeing Company. Added to that, such a redirecting from US suppliers to European one will entail accordingly a shift in terms of services and training.

As argued in the Van Oudenaren Report on EU expansion “The Changing Face of Europe: EU Enlargement and Implications for Transatlantic Relations,” EU expansion poses threats to the US interests in the fields of both agriculture and investment. It is more so with Turkey’s EU membership, given that its huge population and developing economy makes Turkey appealing for potential American investors and exporters.

The report suggests that enlargement could cause an increase in agricultural protectionism and a further loss for US agricultural exports, since the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) puts a limit on them. In addition, the CAP could require Turkey as well as other accession countries to apply the EU’s ban on certain US products. Given the importance that the EU puts on Turkey’s adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy, it is thus highly likely that the US interests will be affected.

Similarly, in terms of investment, certain changes are due. No doubt, EU membership will reduce business bureaucracy, corruption, and other impediments for American and other investors in Turkey. However, EU membership may force Turkey to consolidate its trade agreements with European member states, and favor European investors as opposed to US investors. Again, an expanded EU trade zone would strengthen the euro vis-à-vis the dollar in the international trade system.

Turkey’s EU membership poses challenges to US interests in terms of political relations and security issues as well. The Van Oudenaren report suggests that EU enlargement will affect American interests in two critical areas: NATO and the US defense role in Europe; and global issues such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Landmine Treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions.

First, the enlargement will require new member states to align themselves more with Brussels than with Washington on international issues. It also requires them to support the European Security and Defense Policy, even when it conflicts with US Security priorities. Given that, Turkey as an EU member state will have to follow the pack, again to the detriment of US interests.

Moreover, on various international issues Turkey may have to position itself against the US, just as current EU member states do. The immediate examples of these issues include the Kyoto Protocol which the US has refused to sign so far, and the International Criminal Court. As Morton Abramowitz suggests, Turkey has already demonstrated an inclination towards ratifying the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court. Unless Turkey negotiates with the EU for the exclusive exemption of American citizens from being judged at the ICC, such ratifications would severely restrain the US-Turkish relations to the detriment of both sides’ interests. In addition, EU membership may lead Turkey to take a more critical (i.e., European) stance on Israel’s handling of the Palestine issue, as well as a friendlier stance on Iran’s aspirations. Ankara would thus end up conflicting with Washington on both issues.
Given all these possible challenges, why then does the US still support Turkey’s EU membership?

First of all, any clear and direct opposition to Turkey’s EU membership would not help American interests. Second, supposing that Turkey does enter the Union someday, it is better for the US to have Turkey in the EU as a close ally than to have it as an alienated, former ally. The US can and should reap benefits from a Turkish EU membership by seeking to create a second close EU ally alongside Great Britain. Turkey after all could be an EU member, and yet remain closer to the US, just like the UK, on many issues.

Besides, Turkish society has always had strong affinity for the US and American values, compared to the European ones. In 2005, this is still so to a great extent, despite the provocations still being made by marginal groups in Turkey such as militant secularists and religious fundamentalists. The US should take advantage of that affinity and further develop its cultural ties with Turkey, in order to have a strong ally in the EU.

Note: a slightly different version of this article was originally published by Zaman US.

A Macedonian Songcatcher Saves Ancient Traditions (Part 2)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


In part one of this article, which appeared yesterday, readers were introduced to Skopje-based professional ethnomusicologist Velika Stojkova Serafimovska, and the important work she is doing in identifying the origins and morphology of traditional Macedonian songs. Today’s installment considers some vivid examples collected from her work in the field, and serves to show the great cultural wealth Macedonia has to offer.

A Case Study: Ethnic Migrations and the Evolution of Lazarica

Jargulica is a low-lying little village near the southeastern Macedonian town of Radovis, where every year takes place a special ritual for young women. It’s held on the last day before Prochka (Lent), and sees unmarried girls from the ages of 10-18 go out into the fields to collect certain plants and sing traditional songs. After this, they then return to the village and go to every house, singing and dancing in the courtyard for the health of everyone inside.Around 100 years ago, tribes of the ethnic subgroup Shop arrived in the mountains of the Radovis area. Long settled in mountainous areas further to the north such as Kratovo, Kriva Palanka and Berovo, the Shop with their own folklore rituals and had distinctive anthropological qualities.

According to Velika, Jargulica was at the time populated by the Strumani and Sredno Vardarsko subgroups, who had their own unique characteristics and who were mostly field workers. Some 50 years ago, she recounts, some of the Shop villagers came down from the mountains and settled in the village- with the resulting creation of a 50/50 ethnic balance. Her visit to Jargulica came during the celebration of Lazarica, held one day before another spring holiday, Gjorgjievden (May 6).

Interestingly enough, this migration even influenced the songs of the area. In the course of her research, Velika encountered one Shop lady who, despite her age and infirmity, was a very good singer. In fact, since there was maybe no one else capable of singing like her, she slowly became the leader in that little village. The woman also had a very domineering personality; after coming down from the mountain, she had started to ‘interfere’ in the rituals of the Jargulica people, enlivening the songs with her own Shop type of singing. “Slowly, they accepted her way of singing,” says Velika. “It was very interesting to see how even one person can change long-established customs.”

Another old lady was listening while the domineering one was singing. ‘This is not a Lazarian song!’ she said. ‘It’s from Vodici!’ (a winter holiday). And they started arguing about where the song came from. It was very interesting to see this.”

At the same time as this argument was going on, Velika recounts, two young girls dressed in white Lazarian dress were passing through. While they were singing completely different melodies, their songs both had the same lyrics.

Yet the important thing, says Velika, is that they were preserving the same ritual. “The music had been simplified, for one voice, not two. No one had taught them to sing for a two-part traditional song. They had only learned it in a childish way- one girl would sing it, the others catch on. As a scientist, I wondered if 100 years ago, songs had developed in the same way. It’s a long process, the way aesthetic fashions change over time.”

“With the domineering Shop lady, you have a case of a singer keeping her identity through the melody, while the other are keeping their identity through the ritual. And the older generations sacrifice the melody just to keep the tradition, with the simplified songs that young girls sing today. So now the local musical identity is broader- this is what is happening everywhere in Macedonia.”

The Effects of Geography

Working in the same area of southeastern Macedonia, Velika found another intriguing factor at play in the evolution of traditional songs: geography.

By doing a comparative study of traditional music and ritual in 3 villages that were located close to one another, but in geographically varied settings, she noted striking differences in the style of singing, the sound and the lyrics. She contends that these reflected inherent differences of attitude and even mindset that had perhaps been shaped by the villagers’ singular natural environments.

The Radovis-area villages compared were the aforementioned Jargulica, situated on a plain, the mountainous area of Sopluk and the village of Injevo, located on rolling hills. Although they were all within a few kilometers of one another, they each had certain differences.

“There were big differences in the sonic quality of the songs,” Velika notes. “In Sopluk, it is more clear, sharper and with a more full and wide richness. In the plains village of Jargulica, the singing is more ornamented with little cries and improvisations, and the gajda (a simplified bagpipe) makes for more adornment. And in Injevo, you can say that the sound is mellow, somewhere in between. Some songs, lyrics, and singing technique also vary. When you speak with the different peoples, you can see a real difference in mentality and way of thinking, which have no doubt been shaped by their natural environments. It’s only natural that this should come out in their songs as well.”

Seasonal Holidays – Where Paganism Lives On

Velika also recalls one adventure almost 7 years ago, when she was allowed to observe the all-male winter holiday of Surva, held on the Orthodox New Year’s (13 January). The holiday took place in the mountain village of Dedino, located in the mountainous area separating Radovis from Kavadarci. “It was interesting because I was the only female and I was allowed to watch an all-male ritual,” says Velika.” I had a local friend who accompanied me. Also, I told them my origins were from that region. So they let me be their special guest.”

In the ritual, which dates back to pagan times, the men go out at midnight to collect wood, garbed in costumes and masks, to the musical accompaniment of the gajda, as in other winter carnivals such as Vevchani.

“Christianity is never referred to,” says Velika. “Among the characters, always you have a bride and groom, symbolically representing earth and sky, from the pagan tradition. In this village, it’s all men, in other villages a woman is allowed to play the role of bride. And there’s also someone dressed like a bear!”

When she asked why such a large carnivore was being represented, the Dedino villagers said that the bear was their protector against evil spirits. Because evil spirits were swirling around everywhere in nature, the bear had to be taken along as a guardian.

They also took a donkey with them for all the presents they received from each house. “They could become very loud if the people didn’t open the door,” recounts the researcher. “And all year they would be cursed with bad luck too.”

As could be expected, aside from song and theatrics the celebration centered on copious amounts of drinking- hot wine and rakija mostly. Everyone was also eating sausages, strung onto sticks with nuts and apple. With presents, food and grog thus collected and consumed, the revelers were able to give the house their blessings. After the all-night ritual, the eating and drinking continued in the morning in “collective shops.”

Velika reiterates that modern religion has no part in these ancient rituals. “Nothing is said of Christianity. Everything is dedicated to nature, sky and earth.” However, while pious Christianity apparently hasn’t interfered with age-old rituals, for a while during Communism they were prohibited, she says. Nevertheless, they survived in the popular consciousness and continue today. As elsewhere, a strange symbiosis between pagan and Christian traditions exists. For example, on Gjorgjievden, a church holiday in May but in reality originally a spring holiday, 6 May), people celebrate by collecting special plants, and in the evening women sing songs in front of the church. Such a fusion between the ritual and religion no doubt predates Christianity, and was merely assimilated to the new form of worship with its ascendancy.

An Incredible Living Ritual: the Journey of a Village Bride

For Velika, the magic is in the rituals. She recounts another, involving a traditional wedding from the area. “When the bride leaves her father’s house on the wedding day, her mother-in-law is waiting at the door, with bread in one hand, water and wine, and a special piece of jewelry, one end on her clothes and the other on the bride’s. When she gets to the new house, the bride must take the things and bow on her doorstep because some people believe that dead ancestors ‘live’ there. The mother-in-law is introducing her to them. Then, when the bride enters the house, they put a veil on her and something on the ground, a small carpet, so that she’s doubly protected from any evil spirits”

Once this first battle with the spirit world is over, the ritual of introductions continues to the room where bread is made, and to the fire where it is cooked. “The mother-in-law is introducing here to these important things for daily life. Only female relatives can see her at this point,” says Velika. “Then they put salt in the fire and it drives the bad spirits out. All these things are still happening in some villages.”

Working Towards the Future of the Past

All of these things might be a surprise not only for foreigners, but for urbanites who never leave Skopje. What, then, for the future of ethnomusic and ancient rituals in Macedonia?

According to Velika, the rituals “are in no danger of disappearing,” even if retaining the original integrity of the accompanying music is. With the traditional method of singing being largely no longer transmitted to the younger generations, specialized training is required. Nevertheless, Velika says, she is optimistic – “and that is why I am still here.” Conceding that money is the biggest problem, she nevertheless says that she has big ideas for future projects. However, for her own field research, she has always had to pay, because her institute covers only dance and dance research. So it’s a labor of love.

She admits that there is a lot of work to be done. It’s a big job and only a few people are qualified or interested to do it. But for Macedonia’s cultural heritage, collecting samples of traditional music and vocal technique is crucial.

During this year, Velika and her colleagues have been planning a big concert for New Year’s, which will incorporate traditional music and dance from all of Macedonia’s ethnic groups, and feature traditional Macedonian songs from “all over the Macedonian-speaking areas” in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.

“It’s very interesting, because in the past 10 years there has been some kind of ethno-revival going on in the villages,” she says. “Yes, the young people want to leave, but they always go back for holidays. That is very good; it means that they won’t forget their roots and traditions.”