A Macedonian Songcatcher Saves Ancient Traditions (Part 1)

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)



Part 1 of this fascinating interview with a leading Macedonian ethnomusicologist discusses her interests in the field, the challenges one faces in coaxing songs out of reluctant villagers, and the importance of ritual music in Macedonian culture.

32 year-old Velika Stojkova Serafimovska, a professional ethnomusicologist at the Macedonian Institute for Folk Dance and Culture, thoroughly loves her job: exploring remote, almost forgotten villages in search of folk songs that have been handed down through the generations, but which have become endangered as the forces of emigration and urbanization pull
Macedonians away from their roots.

Armed with a trusty tape recorder and enthusiasm, Velika has since 1992 regularly ventured out into the mountains and plains of southern Macedonia, hunting for elusive songs that, like rare species of flora and fauna, may have never yet been recorded.A jangling bag of cassettes that she keeps on her desk is testament to her 13 years of experience, as are her numerous anecdotes from the field.

While Velika actually started off in a medical high school, she discovered that her true calling lay elsewhere, and she went on to get a degree in ethnomusicology. This year, she plans to finish her MA in Belgrade, with a thesis entitled, ‘The Functionality and Aesthetic of Macedonian Folk Singing.’

Her experience has left her eminently qualified for these higher studies. “I’ve been going out in the field since 1992, into the villages,” says Velika. “In these expeditions, my job has been to collect tape recordings of traditional songs and then write papers on the vocal traditions of Macedonia.”

Velika, whose father is a composer, was immediately taken with the work back in 1992. “The first time I went to the villages, I fell in love with it,” she says. “I’m very happy to have been here, doing so many ‘undisciplined’ things- my colleagues around the world are jealous.”

Macedonian Ethno-Music: An Emerging Field

Circumstances have contributed to her luck. Unlike in more developed places, there hasn’t been so much ethnomusicological exploration to date in Macedonia; the current researchers comprise merely the second generation of scholars. According to Velika, the oldest recordings in the collection of the folk institute date only to the 1950’s.

However, she says, one can trace Macedonian song and folklore traditions at least 100 years back, through the oral testimony of old people who remember from their grandparents and great-grandparents. “You can find old people in their 80’s who know the songs, melody, and lyrics,” she says. “A lot of traditions are preserved in the songs.” However, oftentimes in eastern Macedonia especially, it can very hard to understand the words because of the unique way of singing, she says.

The songs of greatest interest to the researcher are those concerning seasonal rituals and events such as weddings and holidays. But they are constantly evolving – something that only adds to the fascination. The younger generations are increasingly leaving the villages for the cities, and are of course influenced mostly by television, Western music and Western trends in their own Macedonian pop music. This means that by and large they are neither able nor interested in learning the unique polyphonic singing, which requires multiple singers and a difficult throat technique that Macedonia is known for.

“The very old songs are quite difficult for them to sing, physically, and Western pop music has had an influence,” says Velika. “They’re just not used to it. This kind of singing involves 2 or 3 people, and is very loud and intense. They sing with open throat, but closed mouth. It’s very difficult to learn this kind of singing, which is typical of Slavic countries like Macedonia, Bulgaria, Russia and Serbia as well.”

Nevertheless, for those youngsters who still live in their villages or who visit during the holidays, the rituals are still preserved. There’s no danger of losing them, Velika emphasizes; but what has changed is the technique and complexity of the music. “In order to keep the ritual, they have allowed the songs to be changed to be easier for them to sing.” This tendency has been noted time and again in various field trips that we will discuss in part 2 of this article tomorrow.

The Methodology of Persuasion

In her trips to rural Macedonia, Velika has developed a certain methodology in collecting information, which first of all involves tact and sensitivity- in other words, how best to approach people who for one reason or another aren’t so interested in opening up.

The process is a long and involved one. She usually visits the same village 2 or 3 times before even trying to collect any data. This process is essential, says Velika, so that the natives get to know her first. It also helps to have a local contact from the village, since in most rural areas, the locals are wary of outsiders. “I always go with local people who know the inhabitants and have their trust,” she states. “And then, after these initial explorations, I am able to get the best material.”

A typical sonic ‘interview’ usually begins with assembling and getting the names of the volunteers- usually, a group of elderly women who have the best knowledge of the oldest songs. Oftentimes they need to be kick-started into action; “when they say, ‘oh, I don’t remember!’ you have to prompt them by singing a little to jog their memory,” says Velika. And then they say, “oh yeah, now I remember!”

Of course, how an ‘outsider’ appears is also important in this process. “The people become very hospitable,” she says, “when they sense that you are natural and relaxed. Then they are very warm and open up to you. I try even to speak their local dialect, which also helps.”

The researcher likes to follow a set order, getting the women to go through the calendar, starting from Christmas and continuing with the year’s subsequent holidays until Mitrovden, a holiday with which commences the usual winter festivities. “This represents a sort of life-cycle,” says Velika. “The order of rituals follows the great order of events, from birth to marriage to death.”

A Concentration on Ritual Songs

Velika doesn’t concentrate on songs with reference to historical events – though many do exist – because they aren’t in as great danger as the ritually-associated ones. According to her cumulative research thus far, “many of the songs must be at least 100 years old, but probably much older. After all, the traditions and rituals often precede the Ottoman period, so perhaps some of the songs do too.”

The “oldest layer” of songs in traditional culture is the ritual one, she says. “Other types, like love songs, are more open to influence and change, since they are not connected with a function. Still, every song has a story, even if it has been lost now.”

However, not all ritual songs are easy to catch hold of. Ritual laments especially are very hard to collect, she says, because of the superstitions surrounding death. People are unwilling to sing such songs ‘out of context’ for the most part. Usually a researcher can only capture such songs on tape at the graveside- “but you have to hide the tape recorder!”

However, there are occasional exceptions. Velika speaks of a colleague who went to the culturally rich but sparsely populated Mariovo region to observe customs for dealing with the dead, and even recorded some songs. Another time, he encountered a professional lamenter from the village of Kuckovo, north of Skopje, an old women named Zvezda who agreed to sing some laments for him- “but only down in a basement, where no one could hear!”

In part 2 of this article tomorrow, we will see some fascinating examples of how traditional Macedonian songs change depending on their geographical setting and ritual use, as well as how the ancient, pre-Christian traditions still survive in the forgotten villages of the Macedonian heartland.

All the Way to the Top, Baby

Well break out the eggnog and throw another log on the fire, because it sure looks like we'll be snowed in for a good while to come this Fitzmastime.

And ain't it grand? For any citizen with a shred of decency, waiting for the war party to implode of its own arrogance has been a long and painfully drawn-out affair. Yet it looks like good things come to those who wait...

What is most agonizingly entertaining now is waiting to find out what fate awaits Karl Rove- who seems to have been spared the chopping block only until they find him some appropriate company.

Which is why I draw attention to this recent story which, if it hasn't been exactly ignored, seems to have been undervalued in terms of its ultimate implications. Providing the sources are legit, what it suggests is not only that 'Bush knew' about the Joe Wilson smear campaign, but that he was only infuriated that it hadn't been done in a more efficient and less traceable way:

"...Karl [Rove] is fighting for his life," says the article, quoting an unnamed 'key Bush official' (Andrew Card, perhaps?), adding, "but anything he did was done to help George W. Bush. The president knows that and appreciates that."

Given the timing and context of the Plame leak, what could have helped the president more than to liquidate someone (Wilson) who essentially proved that the commander-in-chief went to war with bogus intelligence and under false pretenses?

The article adds:"...the president felt Rove and other members of the White House damage-control team did a clumsy job in their campaign to discredit Plame's husband, Joseph Wilson, the ex-diplomat who criticized Bush's claim that Saddam Hussein tried to buy weapons-grade uranium in Niger."

And then,"'...Bush did not feel misled so much by Karl and others as believing that they handled it in a ham-handed and bush-league way,' [a second] source said."

In other words, it looks pretty clear that not only did Bush know about the smear campaign- but also that he had the major role, along with Dick Cheney, in orchestrating it. Don't be surprised if before all is said and done, both of them are implicated, should the Bulldog manage to 'turn' their loyal foot soldiers.

Happy Fitzmas, everyone!

One Tito Bails, Another One’s Resurrected: Macedonia’s Theater of the Bizarre

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Tito Petkovski, the longtime SDSM man and losing presidential candidate in 1999, announced his departure from the governing party this week. Simultaneously joining him in dissent, if not in camaraderie, were devotees of another Tito – Josip Broz, that is.

Petkovski’s exodus from the SDSM came as no surprise. For a long time, rumors of such a move have been circulating, as this elder member of the party felt himself marginalized by the current leadership. His departure attests to the fracturing within the party, which has been apparent for at least 2 years. Nevertheless, the SDSM has maintained an impressively unified front, something that has helped it survive despite less than stellar results and low public confidence.Petkovski’s new party will probably be named the ‘Social Democratic Alternative,’ according to A1 TV on 24 October. The station relayed his assurance that the new party will attract ‘real’ professionals, successful businessmen, university professors and students who were “not until now involved in politics”- though he refused to provide names.

Petkovski hopes that other disgruntled SDSM members will join him, and he has apparently begun a trip around the country to whip up support for his breakaway venture. Saying that “I no longer wish to be a ‘partybreaker,’” Petkovski announced his departure, leaving the question of his future political allies open. However, initial speculation that he will join forces with Skopje Mayor Trifun Kostovski, an independent who himself was expected to form his own party, now seems unlikely. While Petkovski said that Kostovski was a good friend, he added that “our target group comprises people who live from salary, not from profit”- basically ruling out the established tycoon who is himself grappling with the problem satisfying the demands of a diverse group of opposition parties who campaigned for him in March.

When asked about the prospects of recruiting Liljana Popovska, formerly a member of coalition partner LDP and vice-speaker of parliament sacked for supporting last November’s referendum on territorial decentralization, Petkovski only said that, “she’s a politician whom everyone would like to have.”

According to Petkovski, the new party will be left-center in orientation. By the end of November it will be registered. Notably, the SDSM exile even stated that the party leadership will include two Albanians- something rarely seen in Macedonia’s ethnically-divided political landscape.

It remains to be seen whether Petkovski will make a significant dent in the SDSM’s base on the local level. A local source suggests that at least one quite corrupt businessman is likely to be a major player in the new party, something which could be damaging in the public eye. Further, though Petkovski was able to capitalize on a wave of righteous indignation in 1999, when his defeat to Boris Trajkovski in the presidential race was widely regarded as the result of rigged elections and Albanian voter fraud, he is perhaps now too old and too much associated with the Communist-era old guard to make a serious political impact on his own.

On the other hand, there are others who wish to glorify Macedonia’s Communist heritage out of simple nostalgia or with more ulterior motives in mind.

In the grand ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of the death of Josip Broz Tito, President Branko Crvenkovski went only so far as to suggest that a statue of the Communist kingpin be erected in Skopje. Now, however, a purposeful bunch of retired renegades are taking things one step further- by creating a party built specifically on Tito’s ideals and apparently immortal cult of personality.

The new party plans to give the established Macedonian Communist Party (a thriving political force which consistently polls in the low single-digits) a real run for its money. On November 29th, the ‘birthday’ of the old Yugoslavia, we will also witness the foundation of the “Union of Tito’s Leftist Forces,” a party created specifically to tap into residual Yugo-nostalgia among Macedonia’s older and more embittered generations.

Stating explicitly that its key target would be the sexy demographic of pensioners and workers, UTLF top man Slobodan Ugrinovski promised that “…we’ll work very hard, honestly and for real. Our party will stop the downfall of the country. But before anything else, we’ll do something about pensioners’ problems. The leftist political option in the country is now in crisis- a party [should include] not only doctors and professors and rich people, but also workers.”

Displaying an almost religious veneration for the deceased Yugoslav leader, party organizers at the grand gala – appropriately enough, held at the ‘Kaj Marshalot’ restaurant in downtown Skopje – cranked out such old chestnuts as “International [Committee]” and “Comrade Tito, We Swear to You” from a cassette player.

In a mysterious, symbolic gesture, an empty place at the head of the table was even left for the “new Macedonian Josip Broz.”

Further bizarre comments from the new party’s president left one wondering whether the issue here really is religion and not politics. Comrade Ugrinovski cryptically attested that “…the new Josip Broz has been born, he’s already walking, but it’s still not the right time for him to show up.”

How long, then, will we have to wait? Or are we supposed to venture out into the Macedonian hills to search for him, the way Buddhist monks scour Tibet for a future Dalai Lama? The Little Tito- coming soon to theaters near you!
Ironically, were a film about the late, great Josip Broz ever to be made, they way things are going it would probably not be shown in Macedonia. The only modern theater in the country has been out of commission for months now, after it failed to pay its electricity bills.

In any case, when it comes to reconciling with the Yugoslav legacy the younger generations, if not the pensioners have moved on. In today’s Skopje, the only allusion you will see to Tito comes in the slick new Broz Café, which ingeniously sells bland, American-style caffeinated drinks made of coffee beans coming from countries in the original ‘non-aligned’ bloc (of which Yugoslavia was a charter member).

And so, even if NATO/EU aspiring Macedonia is pretty well aligned these days, one can still enjoy a taste of the non-aligned Communist past, while reclining in the comfort of couches and ambient music and surrounded by lithographed walls of third-world workers. Nevertheless, unlike in Communism, you have to pay for your mediocre drinks.

But there is a bright side: by obtaining a membership card in the Broz ‘party,’ you feel the benefits - just like in America, for every 9 cups of coffee purchased, the tenth is free.

Oh, and make sure to leave a seat at your table free, in case Tito shows up- whichever Tito it may happen to be.

How the Ohrid Agreement Almost Killed Our Ambassador

It was almost the biggest story in the world, but then it wasn't.

Even as George Bush was praising the Ohrid Agreement to high heavens alongside an appreciative Vlado Buckovski earlier this week, his top representative in Macedonia barely escaped alive from the fallout of that august accord.

On Sunday, when attempting to leave Skopje Airport and embark on a plane, American ambassador Gillian Milovanovic was almost shot by a newly recruited airport police officer.

According to a story on A1 and other accounts, the officer was "playing" with a 38 Special pistol that he had found lying around in one of the airport's offices. Another source stated that while twirling it on his finger absent-mindedly, the officer discharged the weapon, sending a bullet within inches of the new ambassador, who was nearby at the time.

Although no one was hurt, in the aftermath a huge police and security presence came through to see what had happened. It turned out that the airport officer who fired the gun so recklessly was an ethnic Albanian who had been hired to fulfill the ethnic quota/affirmative action policy laid out in the Ohrid Agreement. This means that an experienced Macedonian officer was unceremoniously fired, so that an untrained Albanian could take his place, and almost kill the US ambassador by mistake.

Now there are no doubt many certified and well trained Albanian police officers. It is not an ethnic issue. But the sad fact is that there are also many like the guy in Kumanovo in 2003 who, when gathered with an eager bunch of hopeful recruits outside the police station, stated that his ownership of a whistle entitled him to work as a policeman. These are the kind of qualifications the West sought to reward through their peacemaking in 2001.

Forced affirmative action designed by oh-so-helpful Western diplomats has also compromised Macedonia's medical facilities. Trained and experienced doctors have been fired over the past couple years solely because of their ethnicity, so that less trained and less experienced doctors could be hired, again solely because of their ethnicity. This, we are told, is for the health of the state. It certainly doesn't sound like something for the health of the patient.

Principled opponents of the Ohrid Agreement have long argued that, whereas empowering people of different minorities is a beneficial long-term strategy for any country, attempting to do so immediately always invites disaster. Not only does it create arbitrary job loss for people who worked hard to get where they are, it also lowers the quality of services when untrained individuals are rushed in unprepared, just to maintain the charade of ethnic harmony and empowerment.

Not that the Westerners care. Its not like they use Macedonian public health care facilities anyway. It's just sad to see the US have to learn the hard way, through a near fatality, that they really, really screwed up in 2001, and that we have to live with the consequences- unless we don't.

Vevchani’s Magical Mystery Church Continues to Puzzle

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Could an enigma of the ‘Da Vinci Code’ variety be unfolding in the Macedonian wilds? In Vevchani, that loveably eccentric southwestern hamlet where last month was discovered the ruins of an old church, archaeologists already knew that they had a significant find. But they are still trying to figure out exactly how a strange story that may include Ottoman vengeance, Bulgar-Serbian rivalry, Communist demolitions and even the cryptic rituals of secret societies all fit together.While digging has paused now due to lack of funds, and probably will not resume until March or April, excavators have found numerous clues that point to a fairly recent construction, but perhaps one that was built over a much larger foundation – maybe even a 4th-6th century Christian basilica. But whether or not such a structure lurks further underground will remain unclear until the excavation resumes next year.

What is known is that the present major church structure, measuring 24 meters long by 18 meters wide, was constructed in 1895, during the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia. An inscribed obsidian stone found 2 meters below the surface and written in Old Church Slavonic (Macedonian dialect) identifies the church as Sveti Bogorodica, built “in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid and Archimandrite Grigory.”

This revelation resulted in disappointment locally. “The Vevchani people were really hoping that it was much older, even perhaps a 10th century Byzantine church,” recounts Pasko Kuzman of the National Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments in Ohrid. According to Mr. Kuzman, who spoke with us on Sunday in Ohrid, “we couldn’t get our work done- they were all hanging over us and eagerly staring every second.”

Indeed, a local resident intimated darkly to us that villagers are hoping to try their luck clandestinely, armed with rudimentary farm tools, in search of hidden gold and silver and whatever other moveable treasures they might find.
Although in the first days of the excavation a protective perimeter fence served to deter trespassers, the fence has inexplicably disappeared, leaving the site – a half-dug series of trenches hugging elliptical church walls – exposed to the elements and whoever should choose to enter.

However, any treasure seekers are likely to be disappointed. “There’s no gold in Vevchani!” vociferates Kuzman, citing its distance from the ancient Via Egnatia and the lack of any major discoveries there. With his flowing white hair, multiple diving watches and wire-rimmed glasses, the jovial archaeologist who says he “turns 33 again every year” strikes one as a combination between Indiana Jones and Father Christmas.

“Anyway,” he says, “I trust that the villagers won’t steal anything from the site, because they are proud of their Vevchani and will protect it. They’re just very curious about what they may have there, and that’s understandable.”

So far, what’s most interesting for Kuzman is that though the church structure was found so far beneath the ground, the site is only 110 years old. “This is very ‘new’ archaeology for the Balkans,” he says. “For me and my colleagues from Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece etc., it is very unusual to chance up on such a recent though unknown site.”

Construction and Demise: Some Hypotheses

Vevchani’s buried church was born into a very turbulent time. At the turn of the 20th century, the Ottomans were steadily losing control of their Balkan possessions and, as a motley assortment of rebel groups and terrorist societies provoked the authorities, the Turks cracked down with unprecedented barbarity. The short-lived Ilinden Uprising of 1903 and resulting scorched-earth campaign against the Macedonians by the government is just one of the possible catalysts for the destruction, or at least non-completion, of the church.

It’s also possible that the church suffered due to the general chaos of the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. An unusual blocking wall preventing access to the church’s apsides may have been caused by the “everlasting feuds” between pro-Serb and pro-Bulgar factions in the village, or even between the villagers of upper and lower Vevchani (an endearing distinction that continues to this day), says Kuzman.

Like many other villages in the area, Vevchani’s economy always relied on sending the local men to work abroad. They were well known for their stonework, and Belgrade was a common labor destination. Thus it is believed that following the First World War some rich Vevchanites working in Belgrade, in association with a certain “Priest Zoran,” funded the rebuilding of Sveti Bogorodica.

While the work went originally according to the priest’s plan, apparently around 1928 unspecified problems were encountered and work was halted. Not too much later came the assassination of Serbian King Aleksander by a VMRO man, then the Second World War with Bulgarian and German/Albanian occupation, and ultimately, the victory of Tito’s Partisan forces.

This time, there would be no resurrection- the church, which had been constructed only up to window levels, was unceremoniously toppled and left for dead under huge heaps of earth in 1948. But the atheists did construct nearby a statue dedicated to Vevchani’s Ilinden-era war heroes, perhaps as a means of recompense.

These few details seem tentatively accurate, though as Kuzman notes, “I’ve heard about 60 different stories from the old villagers” about the structure’s legacy. It is remarkable that the house of worship apparently never entered the history books- although, according to one local resident, the perennially wrecked church left villagers with an ample supply of thick stone blocks, which still exist in the foundations of their own homes.

Enter the Masons!

If that were all, the story would be fascinating enough; however, things took a decisive turn for the weird last weekend, when it was disclosed that a buried triangular stone containing a glass circle – or is it an eye? – might well really be a secret Masonic symbol, cryptically placed under the church’s floor, in its inner recesses by wealthy donors and patrons of the legendary order who wished to remain unknown.

According to Pasko Kuzman, “I have found no other explanation for this symbol. It’s possible that a few rich Vevchani men who were living in Belgrade were Masons, and funded the church.”

However, the theory goes, because the Masons were viewed “almost like the anti-Christ,” their esoteric symbol could not be placed in the open. Therefore it was buried deep underground, beneath the floor where only priests could enter. The glass apparently did not break because there were a few inches of open space between it and the next layer of stone above it.

The Masonic connection might not be as strange as it may seem. Chochorovic and Jovanovski are two known family names of Belgrade-dwelling Vevchani Masons, according to Kuzman. It is also believed that Macedonian revolutionary leader Jane Sandanski was a Mason, as was activist Kiril Prlichev from nearby Ohrid. And according to Wikipedia, Yugoslav king Alexander I Karagorgevic (1888-1934) too was an initiate in the esoteric rites.
Further, a remarkable long text by an anti-Masonic Turk details Sultan Abdul Hamid’s great fear of Freemasonry- and especially in Thessaloniki and ‘Rumelia’ (the then-Ottoman administered Macedonia). The e-book contends that the Young Turks in their battle against the sultans enjoyed strong support for the masons, and for this reason the government sought to shut down the lodges.

Another odd temporal conjunction here was the somewhat later solidification of Masonry in the first Yugoslavia. According to a British site, “…the Grand Lodge of Yugoslavia was established in 1919 and waited an entire twenty years for British recognition. Confronting the rising powers of Nazism and totalitarianism, the Grand Lodge of Yugoslavia was put to sleep at its own request in 1940.” Considering the close ties between Vevchani villagers and Belgrade at the time, and the known facts regarding the post-war rebuilding of Sveti Bogorodica, is it just possible that the archaeologist’s hunch might be right?

As catastrophic war descended again on Europe, right-wing groups across the continent, including in Serbia, presented the Masons as a suspicious, Communist-sympathizing and often Jewish cabal out to create a leftist one-world government – a conspiracy theory kept alive today by thousands of anti-Masonic groups and websites. Despite the obviously ludicrous nature of many of their claims and associations, it is true that Masonic members over the past 300 years have included numerous important figures, from presidents and scientists to entertainers and sports stars.

Until just two years ago, Macedonian initiates into the secret society had to belong to either the Serbian or Bulgarian lodges. However, the country has acquired its own Masonic center, as Skopje’s Channel 5 documented a few weeks ago. According to the station, a ranking member from Great Britain came to Skopje to give official recognition to his Macedonian peers.

If the Vevchani church association turns out to be accurate, would it put the little Balkan country on the map? Will key events from local history now be revisited by the conspiracy theorists international, to imbue them with new significance and import? Will the ongoing school textbook furor over how to properly represent Macedonian and Albanian historiography require further revision?

It could also mean a tourism boon, at least for a certain ‘niche market.’ Just think- Macedonian could act as a magnet for conspiracy-loving, illuminati-hunting visionaries delving into the murky past for the keys that could unlock their own suppositions. It would certainly make for a novel variety of tourism in a region long revered for its willful obfuscation of events.

Funding Falls Short

We shouldn’t get ahead of ourselves, however. Whatever other mysteries the site has to offer will have to wait until at least next spring. According to Pasko Kuzman, the discovery came too late in the year to be included in the Ministry of Culture’s 2005 budget. “We only received 70,000 denars (around 1,170 euros), which covered about a week’s worth of work,” he says. “The current minister [Blagoja Stefanovski] is a good and decent man, but archaeology is not his field, so it’s not a surprise that isn’t their first priority.”

However, when the excavations resume, if it is discovered that in fact an early Byzantine basilica lies beneath the modern structure, it’s likely that far more attention – and perhaps money – will be devoted to the project.
Until then, we can only wait and see whether the government will support the project. Of course, as has happened elsewhere, for example with Skopje Mayor Trifun Kostovoski’s financial support for the renovation of the Sveti Jovan Bigorski monastery near Debar, private donations could conceivably move things along faster.

That said, is it not impossible to imagine some wealthy Macedonian(s) from the diaspora stepping forward to finance the speedy excavation of a long-forgotten village church? After all, it’s certainly not as unlikely as the idea of an ancient and worldwide secret society having surreptitiously financed its construction in the first place.

Balkanalysis.com's Unknown Archive- Available Exclusively from CEEOL

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Some readers may have wondered what exactly is that funny little man in the ad on the left side of the page all about. So let's take a minute to explain.
Since 2004, Balkanalysis.com has been partnered with the Central and Eastern European Online Library, a cool German company that makes the works of a wide range of Balkan Web and print publishers available online, instantly and inexpensively. However, it's only been since July that we've added hundreds of exclusive archive articles, some dating back several years and covering developments in Macedonia, Kosovo and Serbia. Many of these 'private stock' articles cannot be found anywhere else. The CEEOL databases now include upwards of 200 publishers from all Balkan and Eastern European countries- you will truly be spoiled for choice. As with our own back archive, many of their articles are not available elsewhere. Quite simply, the CEEOL website is a treasure-chest of information for Balkan-lovers everywhere. The company continues to grow, attracting an increasing number of clients from the world's leading universities, research libraries, think-tanks and other relevant institutions. Private subscribers are also welcome.

Here, thousands of articles and e-books covering all conceivable Balkan-related topics are available, at very attractive prices (generally, $1-5), via secure credit card transaction. (The varying prices you will see for Balkanalysis.com archived articles there have been created by us according to a complex formula judging the relative exclusivity, length, illustrations and importance of each piece).

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To start browsing, go to the Central and Eastern European Online Library website, click on "periodicals" on the left-hand side, and then select "Macedonia" from the drop-down country box that will appear. Then select "Balkanalysis" to browse the archives by year and month.

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America's Inheritance in the Caucasus

(This article is from the Balkanaysis.com archive)

This article, originally published by Antiwar.com on September 24, 2005, points out the difficulties the US will face as it seeks to take over control of Russia's strategic southern sphere of influence.

While intervention is never praiseworthy, the one thing that can be said about international involvement in the Caucasus is that it has at least been fairly cosmopolitan, marked by a wide variety of voices and nations, and less prone to polarizing truisms than in, say, the Balkans, where the unchallenged ascendancy of the "Milosevic is guilty for everything" line has basically eliminated the possibility of a more nuanced discourse and contributed so much to the domination of US/EU single-track ideological rule.

Indeed, as the Christian Science Monitor recently put it, "the region is a patchwork quilt of warring ethnic groups and rival religions that makes Europe's other tangled knot, the Balkans, look tame by comparison."At least with the Caucasus, one encounters more reasoned analyses and a wider variety of organizations, governments and individuals championing a much more complex bundle of interests. Cut-and-dried conclusions appear less frequently, and when war and ethnic cleansing is brought up, there is guilt enough to go around on all sides. The Western mass media, despite its unfortunate adulation of Georgia's "Rose Revolution," has been fairly even-handed, though perhaps unintentionally. This is because a large part of their "objectivity" owes to the region's great distance, mentally and geographically, from the average Western reader; whereas the Balkans was more or less in Europe's backyard, the Caucasus is on the edge of the property – or maybe even on the other side.

Turbulence in the North

Meanwhile, on the other side of the other side, in the North Caucasus, tensions have been rising as a murky web of secessionists, Islamists and common criminals provoke an already tense situation with renewed violence. The goal, boasts a Chechen commander, is to provoke a region-wide war that would see the definitive exodus of Russia from the Caucasus. In an interview with a Polish newspaper posted on the pro-Chechen site Kavkazcenter Chechen "President" Abdul Sadulayev stated:

"We cannot doubt our victory. It is enough to look at the situation which is taking shape in Chechnya for that. The Russians started this war, hoping to make a 'local conflict' out of it. They have been pursuing their 'wise policy' here, and as a result Dagestan has turned into a military front, as has the whole of the Caucasus. A Caucasus front has been organized including all the areas (sectors) of Ingushetia, Kabarda-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygeya, Stavropol Territory, Krasnodar Territory and North Ossetia."

Unrestricted Attacks, Expanding Fronts

While Sadulayev's familiar if disingenuous logic of blaming everything on Russia should be taken with a grain of salt, it is true that the violence has been spreading.

Last week, four explosions hit Ingushetia, targeting a cargo train, court building, bus stop and military column. While damage was small, the bombings rattled an already tense republic whose Muslim population has been aiding the fighters of neighboring Chechnya. And, since the terrorist attack on a school in Beslan a year ago, tensions have dramatically increased between the Ingush Muslims and Orthodox Christians of North Ossetia to the west, where Beslan is located. The two republics fought a brief war shortly after the break-up of the USSR and it cannot be ruled out that they will not clash again. According to Russian police, the four bombings were the Muslim terrorists' choice of "revenge" against the government, which had "recently conducted successful operations against several groups of local militants."

Meanwhile, a police officer in the truly multiethnic (over 30 indigenous groups) Dagestan was shot, and several Russian troops have been killed in fighting as well, reports the BBC. Another recent article, reporting an attack on a Russian oil pipeline in North Ossetia, claims that "Moscow controls this area in name only. In reality the news has admitted that a lot of the violence is not even being reported. Police and troops die daily across the North Caucasus to the Caspian... The area is completely up for grabs."

Finally, according to the CSM, Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, who "narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of a suicide car-bomber and a sniper," is being targeted by Islamic militants loyal to Basayev, who last year briefly captured the capital, Nazran, "killing almost 100 police officers and government officials" in the process. While Zyazikov put out a brave face for the newspaper, claiming that things are basically peaceful, locals aren't so sure: "'everyone here is always talking about getting ready for war with the Ingush, to get even with them,' says Madina Pedatova, a teacher at Beslan's spanking new School No. 8. 'I'm terrified of it, but I'm sure it's coming.'"

Internal Fractures as Well

"Our forecasts say that Tatarstan and Bashkortostan will rise up next, because Russia's policy there is aimed at suppressing Muslims, and this cannot fail to end in an explosion of emotions among the masses," adds Sadulayev in the Polish interview. "The role of Islam in the Caucasus is huge. The Muslim population is in the majority here. Since we Chechens are surrounded by friendly Muslim people, there are friendly traditions and kinship links between us."
However, not all involved see the conflict in such terms. As the situation deteriorates further, infighting between the sides continues. According to Interfax on Sept. 17, Chechen leader Akhmad Avdorkhanov, "a one-time aide to the late Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov and the commander of the so-called Eastern Front of Ichkeria" was killed by militants loyal to rival group leader Shamil Basayev.

Chechnya's First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov described the slain Avdorkhanov as a moderate; he was allegedly "among the most influential field commanders, was notable for his particular courage, was categorically against Wahhabis (radical Muslims), and did not recognize Basayev." Indeed, Sadulayev praises Basayev as "a disciplined amir and mojahed."

However, according to the deputy premier, while Basayev viewed Avdorkhanov as a threat to be dealt with, "the immediate motive behind the murder is the 1.5 million US dollars recently received by the Chechen separatists. 'The incident that led to Avdorkhanov's death was prompted by Basayev's attempts to lay his hands on this money... the leaders of illegal armed groups, primarily Basayev, have no ideals, but only the desire to make money, kill, and please their foreign patrons, despite numerous victims among the Chechen people,' the official noted."

Neocons in the Midst

Who are these "foreign patrons" of the Chechen cause? Without doubt, wealthy Islamic fundamentalists from the Arabic world rank high on the list. However, moral support for the Chechen militants can be found closer to home. Less motivated by lucre than by a bizarre obsession with reviving the Cold War, Washington hawks have taken a prominent position on the Chechnya issue, it seems, solely with the aim of weakening Russia. Unfortunately, a powerful and influential bloc in Washington – some neoconservative, all predatorial – would like to shape events in a way that could have disastrous long-term effects for America, guided by a desire to cling to archaic antagonisms and to seek vindictive "victories" through extremely short-sighted tactics.

A prime nesting ground for these hawks has been the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (ACPC) Writing a year ago, in the wake of the Beslan tragedy, John Laughland stated:
"The list of the self-styled 'distinguished Americans' who are its members is a roll call of the most prominent neoconservatives who so enthusiastically support the 'war on terror.'

"They include Richard Perle, the notorious Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams of Iran-Contra fame; Kenneth Adelman, the former US ambassador to the UN who egged on the invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be 'a cakewalk'; Midge Decter, biographer of Donald Rumsfeld and a director of the rightwing Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of the militarist Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed Martin, now president of the US Committee on Nato; Michael Ledeen of the American Enterprise Institute, a former admirer of Italian fascism and now a leading proponent of regime change in Iran; and R James Woolsey, the former CIA director who is one of the leading cheerleaders behind George Bush's plans to re-model the Muslim world along pro-US lines."

Unfortunately, the braintrust that brought us the twin "liberations" of Iraq and Afghanistan seems to have similar plans for Russia. Their plans proceed along two fronts: one, replace Vladimir Putin with a malleable "pro-Western reformist" such as the celebrated businessman and former Yukos boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky; and two, humiliate the country through its dissolution, starting with its Caucasus possessions.

Richard Perle's championing of the Khodorkovsky cause is well-known; less clear is the degree and type of support his bunch provides the Chechens. Does it end with providing asylum to Chechen terrorists in America and Britain, or are the neocons trying to "give Russia their Vietnam" (as cold-warrior extraordinaire and current ACPC Chairman Zbigniew Brzezinski once put it) for the second time, and again through more direct support?

There's little definite proof, but the one thing that is sure is that the most fervent supporters of the "war on terror" exhibit a predictable schizophrenia in supporting "good" Muslims, as was the case in the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions: "In Chechnya, the conflict has created a cultural and demographic crisis rivaling the tragedies witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo." Of course, there's no mention of the very real terrorist attacks carried out by foreign-backed Chechen and other Islamic fighters, who would like to replace Russian rule with "a single Islamist state stretching from the Caspian to the Black Sea."

Indeed, in an unpredictable era of shadowy enemies and "non-state actors," Brzezinski's celebrated 1998 quote now seems even more foolish than ever:
"What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?"

Preconceptions, Simplifications and Hard Realities

Yet apparently the Cold War is not yet over. If Brzezinski and his crew have their way, America's inheritance in Russia's final lost provinces of the Caucasus will be just as auspicious as it has been in Afghanistan.

The Cold Warriors' presuppositions seem to rest on the following false assumptions: that Russia is the enemy, and harming it in any way is thus in America's interests; that Iran is evil and uncontrollable; that the Caucasus can be divided into a north and south, meaning that one can be stabilized to the detriment or enhancement of the other; and, finally, that America has the resources and capabilities to control everything in the world.

However, the opposite is clear in every case. Russia is not the enemy; it has no extra-territorial ambitions, and its delapidated military poses no threat. On the other hand, NATO's expanding remit, American bases in Central Asia, and the increasingly anti-Russian attitudes of US and EU client states in Eastern Europe have pretty much finished off the Russian bear. Much to the ire of Perle and Co., the only trump cards Putin's vast nation still enjoys are nuclear weapons and a huge supply of oil. However, the Russian leader is not averse to involving foreign oil companies, as his recent meetings in America indicated. And considering that the US has declared the possibility of Russian nukes falling into the wrong hands, there seem to be few reasonable arguments for accelerating the country's decline. Expediting dissolution in the North Caucasus only increases the risk of Russian nuclear materials and other weapons coming into the possession of terrorists.

Indeed, while the neocons might be gloating when they see Russia fall apart, it is hardly likely that successor "republics" such as Chechnya aspires to be would be more Jeffersonian than Islamic. No one in Chechnya is going to thank a Washington thinktank for championing their cause when it comes time to establishing the mores of social life and the rules of the political that will govern them. But given the narcissistic delusions of the war/democracy party, which have reached glorious fulfillment in Iraq, they are no doubt expecting to be embraced as benevolent role models by the Chechens, the Ingush and whoever else comes next.

As for Iran, the destabilization of this charter member of the "Axis of Evil," whether under democratic or security pretenses via Iraq, would only harm the fragile balance of power in the Caucasus. This perceptive article discusses in detail why Iran "has acted as a moderate and balanced player in the region by placing the geopolitical, economic, and security aspects of its national interests over ideological or religious motives." Yet disinterested in seeing the complete picture of rival religious and ethnic interests in the Caucasus, an arrogant American leadership has labored under the pretense that its multi-colored revolutions and its oil pipelines can be the only guarantors of regional "stability."

They seldom consider the complex web of religious and ethnic relations that go into forming the policies of neighboring states which seem "outside" the equation, such as Iran. They thus fail to consider how the destabilization of such states would have wider ramifications for areas where they had believed everything was under control.

In the present context, this area under control would be what conventional wisdom deceptively calls the "South" Caucasus. Despite their very real internal antagonisms and frozen conflicts, the countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are relatively quiet now, more or less pacified by Western largess and (except for the last) a desire to break out of the Russian sphere of influence. Contrasting this situation of relative tranquility to Russia's ongoing woes on the northern side of the mountains, the Bush administration quietly gloats over the Pax Caucasia it has brought with the elevation of Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, and the recent completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

However, such a north-south distinction cannot realistically be supported. Throughout history, the Caucasus has been characterized by its singularity, its wealth of disparate ethnic and religious groups, and by its geography – simultaneously impassable and yet everywhere vulnerable to intrusion. For the most part, the region's formidable mountains make a joke out of all attempts to impose state controls. Clan and ethnic groups straddle national and sub-national boundaries, adding to this tendency to make the latter irrelevent. Terrorist groups "safely" ensconced in Chechnya can and do spill over into Georgia. Ossetians view their national territory – memorably described by the Economist as "a smuggling racket with a patch of land attached" – as unfairly divided between Russia and Georgia, and support the former in its own interventionist policies against Georgia. Meanwhile, foreign Islamic groups trained in Chechnya and Dagestan have penetrated "pro-Western" Azerbaijan, and are starting to agitate for the overthrowing of the state. And the list goes on.

That said, America's pride and joy for "regional stability" – the BTC pipeline – has a better chance of emerging as a gigantic target for various groups of malcontents. In an appropriately titled article called "The Pipeline from Hell," Antiwar.com's Justin Raimondo draws a likely conclusion of this "strategic investment":
"If American oil companies are due to make mega-profits in the Caspian region, then the U.S. military will be doing guard duty along every inch of the BTC pipeline, ensuring 'stability' in a land of nomadic herders and exporting 'democracy' to a region formerly ruled by pashas, sultans, and various and sundry dictators."

Yet while it is true that this new asset will increase the US military commitment to the region, it is also probable that the job of providing "security" for the pipeline will also be taken over by various local lords and chieftans along the route – some of whom, like the recently reactivated Kurdish rebels in Turkey, might ask a price for their cooperation that is exceedingly high. Unfortunately, the "or else" clause is likely to become a part of the vocabulary of all such local security providers. America and its Western co-investors are likely to be in for an expensive and all-consuming headache, rather than a neat global solution to their energy and security needs.

And this is just considering the largely subjugated "South" Caucasus. How much more can these headaches be compounded, if you consider a post-Russian "North" Caucasus, characterized by tiny and volatile statelets run by dueling local chieftans, most of them under some variant of Islamic law? Are the democracy proliferators of the ACPC prepared for what they are about to get in a post-Russia Caucasus? While they hate Russia's perceived interventionism in the Caucasus, they fail to consider what the ensuing power vacuum will look like, deprived of all counterbalancing forces.

A Sobering Conclusion

In the end, there is a comparison to be made here with another neocon-inspired war. Back in March 2003, when America's invasion of Iraq began, syndicated columnist Charley Reese drolly congratulated the American people on their imminent "adoption" of 22 million Iraqi citizens. We've now seen just how much the Iraqi inheritance has benefited America. The worst thing about the situation in the Caucasus is that no one, not even the enthusiastic expansionist leadership, is aware of what they will be inheriting there.

Yet as Gabriel Kolko predicted in Another Century of War?, America's resources are not unlimited. Heavily in debt, with foreign nations funding 43 percent of its wars, and unable to react to simple natural disasters at home, it is clear that the imperial ambitions of the neocons are simply neither sustainable nor realistic. The desire to replace Russia as imperial power in the Caucasus is a case in point.

In short, there are no indications that America has the resources, will or intelligence to "manage" this convoluted region any better than the Russians have. In fact, they will likely do much worse – Russia, at least, had the benefits of geographical proximity, thousands of years of intermingled cultures, a long-term institutional presence, etc. America has none of these. Its pretensions to rulership are largely based on the airy platitudes of armchair strategists in Washington, who have little or no appreciation for the local realities on the ground, counting on abstract values to see them through.

In the end, the American supporters of expanding the empire to the Caucasus should be careful what they wish for. They have yet to show an interest in reading Russia's will, though the document is right in front of their eyes.

Culinary and Cultural Delights of the Tikves Wine Region

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Darko Angelov

(Photos courtesy of Samir Ljuma)

In this engaging travel piece, the author recounts a summer 2005 expedition into Macedonia’s wine country, and a trip down the country’s ‘other’ lake- Tikves (pronounced Tikvesh), which is also the general name for the entire dry and dusty region of south-central Macedonia where the country’s best wine is cultivated and where life still moves to an age-old bucolic village rhythm.A sunny summer day’s breeze opened the gates of something that turned out to be a most pleasant surprise- my discovery of an isolated but stunning expanse of land, water and the past in south-central Macedonia. A trip organized for international expats living in the country took us to Lake Tikves, an area relatively unknown even to many of us Macedonians, and well off the beaten track for most occasional tourists to this Southeast European country.

Although few know it, the long, snaking Lake Tikves is Macedonia’s biggest manmade lake. It is located 12 km southwest of the town of Kavadarci on the River Crna, or 3 km from the village of Vozarci. The lake, which was built in 1968, is some 30 km long and traces its long and narrow course southwest from Mt. Kozjak, where the River Crna widens to create it.

An idyllic boat trip from the northern Kavadarci side of the lake took us on an hour-long tour all the way across to the other end of the lake, from where the River Crna feeds into it, flowing down over the mountains above the vast Mariovo plains. The constantly-changing features of the terrain remained vivid throughout our voyage, with the landscape changing from the gently undulating vineyards of the southern slopes of the Tikves wine region to arid, semi-desertified rock hills, and finally to the lush forests that predominate on the lake’s lower half.

The whole area of Lake Tikves, I found, is particularly rich in fauna. The lake is simply bursting with fish; the most remarkable is the sheatfish, a legendary type of catfish that can reach up to 2 meters in length. The wider rocky region of Tikves also plays host to 23 endemic species of predatory birds (17 of which nest in the area), making this region an ideal spot for anglers and bird watchers alike. Specifically, the endangered predators present in the Tikves National Reserve are the Shot-toed Eagle, the Griffon Vulture, the White Egyptian Vulture, and the Bearded Vulture.

Indeed, because of all these natural rarities, the Macedonian government has officially designated some 10,000 hectares of untouched forests in the Tikves region as a protected national reserve.

Aside from the fantastic nature, my interest in cultural heritage was piqued when we came across a small bay at the southern, Mariovo end of the lake, where a truly wonderful collection of art was hidden – early medieval Orthodox frescos painted on remote rocks high above the lakeshore. In a similar vein, for me the lake’s biggest attraction came further on the southwestern shore, in an area only accessible by boat. Here, directly above the lake, I encountered the Polog Monastery with its church of St. George, a significant monument of culture dating back to the 14th century. Richly decorated with frescoes, the church is assumed by historians to date back ultimately to the 9th century, as its architectural style is very similar to that found in the churches of Ohrid.

When we finally made our way back up the lake to the Kavadarci shores, it was time to venture out to taste what culinary delights the Tikves area had to offer. The chief two among these, I soon found, were Lake Tikves’ delicious fish and the area’s top quality wines.

Out of the many restaurants in the area, we choose a small family-owned restaurant in the village of Vatasha, adjacent to the town of Kavadarci. It turned out to be an excellent decision. Vatasha is a peaceful village located in deep forests on the shores of the river Luda Mara; the name literally means ‘Crazy Mary,’ because in the past high water levels in spring have caused dramatic flooding in the whole area. For Macedonians, Vatasha is most famous for its World War II memorial, which commemorates the 1943 massacre of local Macedonians by the Bulgarian occupying army. Another must-see site in the village is the medieval church dedicated to the Mother of God.

Our little restaurant was delightfully located amidst the tranquility of Vatasha’s lush nature, and we were serenaded by the sounds of water bubbling from nearby springs. Instead of opting for the well-known premium quality wine produced by southeast Europe’s biggest winery, Tikves or something from the smaller but also excellent Bovin, Povardarie or Dudin, we accepted our convivial hosts’ offer of the genuine homemade wines of Vatasha- and we were not disappointed!

ndeed, it was truly the drink of the gods that we discovered in that remote village restaurant. And it perfectly matched the catch of the day, carp from Lake Tikves. Interestingly enough, the locals distinguished their homemade wines according to gender- “Mashko” (masculine) and “Zhensko” (feminine) reds, perhaps hearkening back to some primeval time when wine had archetypical relations with religion, customs and fertility rites. Yet even in the modern age, we discovered that in keeping close to the earth the Tikves people really know how to keep the old traditions of vinecraft alive.

How to describe the tastes we enjoyed on that balmy summer’s afternoon? Both the ‘male’ and ‘female’ wines were exceptionally flavorful, the former having a more strikingly edgy taste, while the latter seduced one’s senses with its charming mellowness. Both were notable for their fruitiness and deep color; long after our glasses had been drained, deep, dark red stains remained, running down the edges. These colorations attained almost the status of ink, very much evidencing the wine’s deepness and intensity of taste. The singular quality of these local masterpieces cannot easily be described. Since such concoctions of course cannot be found in stores, we felt lucky to be able to savor them there at their point of origin, in an overlooked but extraordinary little corner of Macedonia’s heartland.

When to Go

The ideal time to visit Tikves is the last week of September, when the town of Kavadarci hosts the annual Wine Fest, which celebrates winemaking in one of Europe’s oldest winemaking regions (wine production in the Tikves region dates well over 2,000 years back).

How to Get There

The Tikves region (including Lake Tikves, the town of Kavadarci, the village of Vatasha and so on) are located conveniently just west of the major north-south E-75 highway that connects Skopje with Greece’s northern port city of Thessaloniki. Tikves is approximately a one-hour drive south from the capital, and about a two-hour drive up from Thessaloniki.

Ideally, a visit to the Tikves region can be combined with a trip to one of Macedonia’s best preserved ancient towns - Stobi, located just 15 km north of Kavadarci, and perhaps some of the local vineyards, where premium Macedonian wines can be sampled and purchased. Also adjacent are the Vitacevo Plateau and the Mariovo plains, which with their unspoiled nature and centuries-old ghost villages remain perfect getaways for hikers, romantics and adventure-seekers alike.

Note: for organized visits to the Tikves National Reserve, contact the Management of the Tikves National Reserve by email at: tpolekv@mt.net.mk or by phone at +389-(0)43-411503 and +389-(0)43-411603.

Reders interested in the Tikves area's diversity of wildlife can contact Mr. Tome Lisichanec from the Wild Flora and Fauna Fund of Macedonia at: +389 (0)75 541-874.

Finally, wine-tasters interested in visiting a small local winery can make arrangements by calling +389 (0)70 218-531; ask for Marjan.

Tales of an Old Partisan: An Interview with Metodija Markovski

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


Earlier this summer, the 25th anniversary of the death of Josip Broz Tito was an occasion for mild Yugo-nostalgia across the former Yugoslavia, with Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski even vowing, perhaps not entirely facetiously, to erect a statue of Tito in Skopje.

Josip Broz is revered by the older generations who nostalgically recall peace and prosperity during the time of the nonaligned Yugoslav state- and especially by those who fought under his command in the Second World War. Starting off as irregulars culled from the villages, the “Partisans” were shaped into a respectable fighting force partially through the help of the Allies.

One of these decorated veterans is Metodija Markovski, who earlier this month celebrated his 79th birthday. After the war, he went on to become chief of the Skopje fire brigade in the 1960’s, and still lives in the capital with his wife. His memories of the war and the old Yugoslavia provide a vivid living history regarding some of the key formative events in the Balkans, and his thoughts on the current situation in Macedonia show that in some respects the country is rotating towards its WWII axis- literally.

Humble Origins

The isolated Struga-area village of Vishni, (meaning ‘sour cherry’), is where Mr. Markovski was born, on September 10, 1926. At the time, he says, the village was populated by around 500 people, all Macedonians. But as was (and still is) the case with many villages in the west of Macedonia, “all of them survived from work abroad,” he says.
Being located near the border with Albania, the village was vulnerable to Albanian Ballists allied with the Axis powers of Italy and Nazi Germany. In fact, during the Fascist occupation of Albania, the 14 year-old went to work there. Called by one of his two older brothers, Markovski went to work for the intervening Italian power. “My brother had gone there first as a construction worker for them,” he says. “My job was to help the Italian troops with their daily work.”

However, after not too long he was back in Vishni. The war had expanded, and large parts of western Macedonia were under occupation. One day in autumn 1944, Markovski’s life would change forever when by chance a Partisan unit came through the village and asked for any volunteers from the ages of 17-25. “I was not aware of politics, or interested in Communism,” says Markovski. “I only wanted to defend my country.”

The First Mission: Karaorman

The first objective for the unit was to set up a base on Mt. Karaorman, well to the northeast of Vishni and on the other side of the Crn Drim River that flows northwards out of Lake Ohrid and up towards Debar. The mountain was a strategic point where the Partisans could regroup and hopefully get supplies from Americans and British airdrops. But there was one problem- breaking through enemy lines.

“We went through Vevchani to get to Karaorman, but first there was the river,” recounts Markovski. “We were supposed to cross the bridge, but it was being guarded by Albanian Ballists.” The operation was going on under the cover of darkness, in October, 1944. At this point, he relates, the soldiers had to come up with “a trick”- a deadly one, as it turns out.

“A soldier who spoke Albanian disguised himself as a Ballist. There were two guards, one on either side of this bridge. It was big enough, though, that they couldn’t see each other from the opposite ends,” says the old Partisan. “When our man approached the Ballist, he asked for a cigarette - but then knifed him and threw him in the river! He did the same to the guy on the other side.”

With the bridge thus cleared, the rest of the unit was given the OK to cross to the other side. Now they were only 10 km from Mt. Karaorman, but had to proceed cautiously. Finally they reached the summit and reconnoitered with several other Partisan units. Together they all formed a brigade, called the Karaormanski Odredi, with approximately 3,000 soldiers. The exact spot where they were camped, says Markovski, was near Lokov. Along with him, there were 7 other fighters from his home village of Vishni.

Interestingly enough, they had some foreign fighters. Following the capitulation of Italy on September 3, 1943, a small number of Italians deserted in order to fight for the Partisan side. “There were about 200 in all,” recounts Markovski. “They joined our side to avoid the Germans, who had started arresting Italian soldiers when they capitulated.”

Once the brigade had been formed, the Partisans remained on Karaorman to train and prepare for the liberation of the country. “At that time we had very old equipment,” says Markovski. “But still we were up there for a month, training.”

“You Had to Be Like a Fox”

The Partisans’ luck soon improved, however, when they made contact with an American-British mission in Greece. “They sent us weapons and blankets. We’d light a fire at night, and they parachuted the stuff to us.”

Officially, the detachment was known as the “1st Macedonian Proletarian Brigade.” It had been established in 1943, under the command of Tihomir Sarevski- who soon gave the inexperienced young recruit a dangerous new mission:
“being the youngest member, I was selected by him to serve as the courier. I had no idea about shooting when I joined. The job was very tough. You could never know where the enemy might be. You had to be like a fox, to manage in all situations… either by foot or by horse, to manage liaison between units.”

According to Markovski, the job involved lots of hiking through the Macedonian wilds. He always traveled by night, and hid in forest huts. “There were four of us couriers in all,” he says. “And I carried a Schmeiser [gun] for protection. But I was lucky- I never came across any Ballists.”

At the time, he recounts, there were 10,000 Partisans in Macedonia. As their abilities steadily improved, first they liberated the villages, and then seize the towns. The first was Debar, followed by Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga, says Markovski.

The Wild Ones”- the Ballists

What about the nature of the Ballists? Were there any differences between the Albanian recruits from different areas?

“The Albanians in our region were relatively calm,” says Markovski. “But in Kicevo, there they had the wild ones, as well as in Gostivar. The Ballists in the Kicevo mountain villages of Podvis, Malkoec and Popoec committed atrocities and war crimes.

At one point in 1944 they lit bonfires in these villages, and forced the local Macedonian women to dance around them naked for their entertainment. And then they threw the screaming women into the fires where they burned to death.”

Markovski blames the outbreak of inter-ethnic war on the Italians and Germans ultimately: “until the Fascist powers attacked us, there had been no major hostilities between our two ethnic groups.”

At first, the balance of power was in the Albanians’ favor. “The Germans had given them heavy weapons when they originally came to Macedonia, but then they went to North Africa – leaving the area in the hands of the Ballists.”
According to the veteran, “they [the Ballists] entered quickly because they had better equipment. Grupcin was the border between Italian and German control.”

Macedonians and Bulgaria

What about the controversial question of Bulgarian and Macedonian identity? While some Bulgarian historians have claimed that Macedonian identity was a Communist construct, Markovski remembers differently:
“all my ancestors felt themselves to be Macedonians, but they didn’t have the right to say so. There were no Macedonian volunteers in the [occupying] Bulgarian Army- only people who were forced against their will. Many were shot when they tried to desert.”

In August 1943, a Kavadarci partisan commandant nicknamed Ovcar (Shepherd) was sent to make contact with the Bulgarians- “and was promoted to general just for this reason, to seem more important to them.”

According to Markovski, two Partisans were sent with him as guards. They were at the Greek border. He reckons that approximately 5,000 Bulgarians were present, compared to only 2,000 Partisans.

“However,” he adds, “our forces were dispersed in such a way that every 20 meters in the forest was one Partisan fighter. The Bulgarians demanded we lay down our weapons- Ovcar returned without success. He made the decision to attack the Bulgarians, but on a wide front, and they actually did attack and the Bulgarians surrendered. Around 15 days later [on September 9,1944] all of Bulgaria capitulated.”

The Battle Shifts North: the Srem Campaign

After the liberation of Macedonia in 1944, the Partisan army was 150,000 strong. At the time, 40 percent of the rest of Yugoslavia was still under German control. “We were incorporated into the Yugoslav forces,” says Markovski, “and sent north to Srem, where one of the key fronts was still undecided.”

This decision to send the troops north instead of south, where they could “liberate” Thessaloniki and the southern half of Macedonia, remains controversial. A significant portion of the Macedonian leadership and rank-and-file wanted to press on to the south, for a campaign which Winston Churchill warned Tito not to undertake but which he conceded privately “would be difficult to stop.” In any case, those who wanted to liberate the rest of the nation were taken aside and shot. “I didn’t question my orders,” says Markovski, who decided that the prospect of dangerous battle in far-away north-western Serbia was preferable to a certain death for nationalism.

The brigade set out on foot, marching from Skopje to Vranje in south Serbia, roughly 100 km. According to the veteran, this was necessitated because “the retreating Germans had mined all the roads.”

At the town of Stara Pazova, just north of Belgrade, the Macedonian fighters got aid from a new source: Russia. They received new Russian weapons in January-February 1945. From that town it was only 20 km to Srem, in the Banat border area near Bosnia and Croatia.

The action intensified for the Macedonian division near the city of Ilok. According to Markovski, the front was 250 km long. “The first days were decisive, with the biggest core of remaining Germans,” he says, and recounts a harrowing story from the trenches:

“five meters from me was the gunner, and I was feeding the bullets. When I saw that he was wounded, I pulled him over and in the trench in front of me. I tried to bandage his head. At first I thought he was dead, but then he looked up at me, very much alive. ‘Say hello to my folks back home,’ he said.

Then other soldiers came and evacuated him, and I took over gunning. To this day I don’t know if he lived.”

Chasing the Ustashe in Croatia, and the Entry into Slovenia

At the time 1,000 soldiers were in the Macedonian unit that continued to liberate the towns of Vinkovci, Daruvar and Dugo Selo on the road to Zagreb. “It took us 3 months to liberate these towns,” says Markovski. “The Croatian Ustashe had committed many atrocities. All the villages around Vinkovci were Serbian, and had been controlled by the Ustashe. They destroyed two entire villages. 80 percent of the inhabitants were murdered.”

At this time, Russian tanks and planes were supporting the advancing Partisan units. However, their new allies soon made an unfortunate error. Before Zagreb, Russian planes fired on Markovski’s unit, “because we were all wearing seized German uniforms. Three soldiers were wounded before we could frantically tell them to stop by radio.”

Although the infantry was Yugoslav, the veteran remains that there were Russian advisors inserted in the units.
Finally they reached the eastern extremity of the front, in Celje, Slovenia. “We captured 200,000 Germans,” recalls Markovski. “And we found on them thousands of wristwatches that they’d stolen from people they’d killed.”

The German prisoners were lined up in groups of 8, and their numbers extended for 5 km. Every 100 meters was one Partisan guard. But they were hardly dismayed. “You know what?” Markovski continues, “the Germans were so happy and singing- they had survived the war!”

All of these prisoners were put in a camp near Zagreb. The Germans were kept there for two months before being sent home. Markovski takes pride in pointing out the civility with which they were treated, and adds that, “of all the other armies that had German prisoners, ours was the first to release them to go to their homes.”

As for the hardware recovered, about 80 percent of the seized German equipment stayed in Zagreb, and about 20 percent went back with the Macedonian units to Skopje.

When the operation finished in Celje, everything was fine, except that Ustashe deserters were still causing problems in Bosnia. “In Srem, we had been fighting on the open field,” recounts Markovski. “But the Ustashe went up into the mountains instead. They had no courage to surrender, and that is why they were considered as criminals later.”
Although the war was for all intents and purposes finished, his unit was sent to Mt. Majevica near Sarajevo to chase down fugitive Ustashe members. They spent only a month there, capturing some Ustashe in the process. “However, others escaped to the mountains, our through Albania to Greece.”

The Contradictions of Victory

With the war finally over, Markovski’s unit returned home. At Belinbegovo, near Skopje, they stopped to prepare for the celebratory parade. The new leaders, Cento and Kolisevski, who had argued so vociferously about whether to liberate Ssaloniki or sent troops to Strem, were on hand. It was May of 1945.

But Markovski and his comrades were soon to find how much things had changed in only 8 tumultuous months. The new world order had been uneasily established by the reigning great powers, and the understanding of who was friend and who was foe became blurred:

“when we finished the parade in Skopje, we went to Mt. Kozuf on the border with Greece,” recounts the old Partisan. “And our friends, the American soldiers, were on the other side, guarding the Greeks!

They inquired as to our intentions, and warned us not to go further south- or else. It was exactly the opposite from when I started out, less than a year before, with the Americans dropping us supplies on the mountain!”

Yugo-nostalgia, and the Grim State of Current Affairs

Like so many Macedonians, Markovski waxes nostalgic for the old Yugoslavia, when the standard of living was high and when the cleverness of Tito left the country with friends from both east and west, meaning Yugoslavs were free to travel wherever the liked. Now, Macedonians are overwhelmingly poor and need a visa to travel most everywhere- while countries they had previously looked down on have now surpassed them.

“During the first Yugoslavia [the pre-WWII kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], there was only one factory in Macedonia,” attests Markovski. “But in Tito’s time, we built many, and became even like America! We lived better, of course, than Greece and Bulgaria, and even were better off than Italy and France for a long time. Only Germany and England were better off than us. When Tito died, all of Yugoslavia cried for him.”

The most recent violent events in Macedonia, starting with the Albanian secessionist war of 2001, have caused great sadness for those of Markovski’s generation who risked their lives to liberate Macedonia from their fascist forebears. Indeed, Albanians today have resumed the narrative of recreating the ‘Ethnic Albania’ which they believe was robbed from them with the defeats of their best allies, Mussolini and Hitler.

The residual affection for the Ballist cause has been witnessed in not only Macedonia but in Albania and Kosovo as well. Everyone from radical nationalist parties to football hooligan groups name themselves after the Ballists, and monuments and memorials are going up in memory of the “Skenderbeg Division” and other infamous units belonging to the Albanian fascist militants. Such eagerness to glorify the former Nazi collaborators have left many Macedonians deeply uneasy regarding the intents of the Albanians and especially the DUI party of former rebel fighter Ali Ahmeti.

"They are all the same,” avers Markovski. “It is sad to say, but for us the Ballists are now once again in power.”
When asked for his views on the memorials, Markovski states, “the Ballist monuments are not right. They considered themselves to be fighters, but they committed atrocities and forced us to leave our homes and towns. They are wild people- they felt no guilt for their crimes. They were not like the Turks, who remain very good neighbors.”

However, he admits that older Macedonians who feel so outraged by the current direction the country is headed are unable to influence anything: “the Veterans Association complained, but we have no power.

Out of 150,000 of us, only 3,000 are still living. And of course, with every passing year there are less and less. I can only hope that people somewhere are interested to hear the stories from those of us still alive, while there is still time.”

Between Political Gathering and Tavern: Turn-of-the-Century Pirot

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


By Dejan Ciric*

If we want to comprehend the richness and diversity of private and public life in a town with a sense of community, like Pirot in southeastern Serbia, we should firstly outline the cultural and political influences at work. The fact that Pirot is situated in the very center of the Balkans and on the main road in Southeastern Europe (Belgrade-Istanbul) guarantees that researching the town should be both interesting and inspiring, because of the opportunities provided to compare Pirot with other regions, both near and distant.

Besides, Pirot has long been inhabited by different nationalities and ethnic groups (Serbs, Bulgarians, Turks, Jews, Gypsies and Greeks) having their own religious, political and cultural traditions. So the mixture of different heritages, traditions, customs and behaviors provides a very complex but consistent image of the town.During the 19th and into the first two decades of the 20th century, Pirot was a typical central Balkan town, full of pre-modern and even archaic attitudes toward everyday life, social values, economy and relationships in both private and public situations. But it was also a time of change, in which the firm old Oriental heritage of the Byzantines and Turks was slowly being pushed away by a strong Central European influence, in all aspects of communal and private life. In light of this transition, it would be useful to explore the process of gradual cultural and social changes through analyzing places and aspects of public life in the town.

As is the case with communities everywhere, the diversity and richness of public life in Pirot depended on the cultural environment and political circumstances, and was also a consequence of long-term changes. One of the most important events in this regard was the liberation of the town in December 1877. From the beginning of the 15th century until the Berlin Peace Congress (1878), Pirot had been within the borders of the Ottoman Empire; but what was more important for its future development was its location on the main regional road and near the Serbian-Bulgarian border.

The sources for this article include documents from the Historical Archive of Pirot and Ponishavlje Museum, published documents from the Historical Archive of Serbia and also newspapers and photos from the local museum and private collections.

During my research, I discovered that everything outside of one’s home and yard, except for in some special cases without strict boundaries, is part of public life and naturally liable to the public gaze and public judgment. Beside that, public events were happening at various places and with the participation of small, coherent and close groups, but at the same time there were many mass events attended by thousands of people from diverse social backgrounds, political ideologies, and sometimes, of very different purposes. What is more, some events lasted no more than an hour, but others lasted for several days or even weeks.

In addition to streets and squares, the major places and occasions for the town’s public life also included: the theater, the library, charity meetings, governmental buildings, the worker’s association, religious celebrations, the Gymnasium, churches, and around 150 taverns, coffeehouses and restaurants. All in all, during the 1870’s, Pirot had 6,500 inhabitants and 22 guesthouses (han), 119 restaurants (mehana) and 31 coffeehouses (kafana).

One of the most important and interesting event in the period was the welcoming of the liberators on December 28th, 1877. It happened at the western entry of the town, with the participation of hundreds of people of all ages, and included the clergy and local economic and cultural elite. The celebration continued on the streets and on the squares, in the church and in the taverns, and even in private houses during the following days. A local priest and rebel against the Turks, Djodje Ignjatovic says in his memoir that the entire life of the local population during that short period was dedicated to their liberators. For instance, almost every house accepted a few solders, giving them food, accommodation and fun.

In such a moment, the ordinary boundaries between private and public were definitely hard to keep fixed. According to accounts of a military officer, townsmen and solders were mixed together, dancing on the streets, squares and yards of houses, and women and children were bringing food and drink, giving no thought to their poverty and uncertain future. It seems that during this historic time the entire town of Pirot became a combination of an extensive living-dining room for private celebration and a public space for expression of national pride and joy.

Much later, at the end of the First World War, the town’s liberation was celebrated in the main street and in the Hotel Nacional, with the participation of the French and Greek allied armies and organized by a special welcome committee. The members of the committee were local politicians, several well-known merchants and Gymnasium teachers. Together with many helpers they prepared various street decorations, a temporary triumphal arch made of wood and flowers and a variety of food and drink served in the best restaurant in the county. A special welcome was made for the first Serbian soldier, Pirot citizen, Petar Vuckovic. The mayor’s delegates and many curious people went to Vuckovic`s house and greeted him on behalf of all the citizens.

Immediately after the liberation of 1878, many meetings happened; this was a reflection of the massive political will then demonstrated by the people, eager to retain the successes of war against the secret negotiations then going on between the Great Powers (Austro-Hungary, Germany and Russia). For several months, between the Treaty of San Stefano and Berlin Peace Congress, many private houses, courtrooms, schools and streets in the town (as well as nearby villages) became places where thousands cast their signatures on popular petitions to the Serbian prince, Russian tsar and German Chancellor. The leadership of these initiatives came from the local economic elite (usually merchants), who had been connected with the Serbian government since long time before the war, and were very experienced and prepared for all sorts of eventualities. At the same time, the people had great respect for their previous cooperation towards the common national interest. The enthusiastic mood characteristic of all these meetings seems to have had had a significant influence in Pirot, in the county and even on the international level.

Diplomats as far away as Berlin heard their voices and arguments.

During the reign of the Ottoman Empire (until 1878) political life in Pirot was kept on a very low level because of the permanent repression of the Christian population, which itself partially resulted from the perception that many citizens were secretly cooperating with the Serbian government. But after the liberation, there was a practical eruption of political activities. Every party had a local organization and began to take a significant role in public life. They held large-scale public meetings during elections in the streets and the squares of Pirot, and put on small conferences at the town’s hotels and restaurants.

Pirot also became fruitful ground for the flowering of Socialist ideas. This owed to the growth of the workers’ population during the last decade of the 19th and the first years of the 20th century. In this period the Pirot Worker Association was very active in social and even cultural life. For instance, workers even founded a singing group from among their ranks in September 1902 and established a small theater troupe in June of 1903. Both of these impromptu groups gathered enthusiasts who prepared programs for the association’s members as well as for the general citizenry.

Naturally, the Worker’s Association participated in the town’s political life too. For example, they began to organize mass celebration for the May 1 holiday, starting in 1906, and succeeded in attracting not only members of their social class, but many villagers, several intellectuals and even many children and students from the Gymnasium. During the 1906 celebration, around 800 people with red shawls around the neck, including children carrying small red flags, passed through the main streets and in front of the Military Club. They were protesting against having a standing army. In front of the Gymnasium they protested what they called ‘bourgeois education,’ and in front of the main church they called for the separation of church and state. After that they went into the fields outside the town, and continued the event with speeches. In the afternoon the Workers Association organized a big final celebration which included music, food and drink, at the same location.

One of the aspects of social life in Pirot was the gathering of the educated citizens in the town’s library. It had been founded during the period of the Ottoman reign. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find documents that provide a definitive founding date. According to an 1881 account, the Reading Room at that time had 45 members, and regularly received about 15 journals and newspapers. Regarding this membership total, I should stress that according to the 1889 census, Pirot had 8,138 inhabitants, and amongst them 1,222 literate men and 41 literate women. In other words, only 15.5% of citizens were literate. So the library’s membership total is in a way impressive.
Besides the library, educated citizens founded a Theater Association in May of 1879. A decade later, on June 15th, the 500th anniversary of the epic Battle of Kosovo was commemorated in a play by Jovan Subotic. Along with citizens of Pirot, many guests came from close towns, surrounding villages and even Bulgaria.

Charity meetings were events of big social influence because there were many reasons and occasions for such activities. For example, the Pirot Library board gave a public tribute to citizens who contributed money in order to support poor schoolchildren in 1878. Among the 111 contributors, the local elite was well represented: the head of the county, 15 military officers, 18 merchants, 8 court clerks, 8 local government officials, 2 judges, 2 teachers, a doctor, an engineer, even two tailors and a mailman. Similar events happened every year on St. Sava’s day, when the pupils from primary schools and Gymnasium were giving a special program and received modest donations. A big public celebration was performed for the opening of a new building of the Gymnasium St. Sava in October 1907. The event consisted of the church service, speeches given by the headmaster of the Gymnasium and Ministry representatives, as well as a performance by the students. A lot of citizens and guests came to see the school addition, because it was the first large public building to be constructed in the ‘European’ style.

The head of Pirot County, Proka Knezevic, introduced the international celebration of the first Friday after Easter. The proximity of Pirot to Bulgaria had an effect here. During the years after 1889 the borders were opened, mutual crossings allowed, and mass celebrations were held in the border area as well as in Pirot, Caribrod and Sofia. Gymnasium students from both sides visited one another; and the Pirot choir gave a concert in Hotel Odessa in Sofia. About 12,000 Serbian citizens took part in this event, which lasted three days. The Pirot Choir also traveled to Plovdiv on Ss. Kiril & Methodius Day in 1896 to give a concert. And members of the Teacher’s Association traveled to Srem, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1907.

During the period in question, high Serbian rulers visited Pirot twice. Prince Milos and Princess Natalija visited the town in September 1879, and Princess Natalija returned 5 years later accompanied by the young prince Alexander. With the former visit, the ceremonies included a church service and military parade at the main square the day after the arrival of the ruling couple. In the evening, the town’s hosts prepared fireworks dedicated to their royal guests, followed by folk music and dancing. Everything came to an end the next day with cannon fire.

The second royal visit, conducted in 1884, began with a welcome made by local officials and inhabitants of villages closest to Pirot. The Princess received the 30 most honorable women in Pirot and talked for a short time with them. Afterwards, the guests visited the Co-operative Society for Kilim Production. On that day, the town’s main streets were decorated with flags, flowers and many kilims on the windows.

*The author is a native of Pirot, Serbia, and a graduate of the Belgrade University Faculty of History. After postgraduate study at the same university, Mr. Ciric worked as a history teacher in Zemun (Belgrade), Pirot, and again in Belgrade). As a writer with a keen interest in local history, Mr. Ciric also worked in the local museum of Pirot, ordering manuscripts and old documents. From 1999-2002 he was an advisor for culture and education in the Pirot NGO, Civic Library, working on projects related to political culture, spreading of democratic values and development of local community.

Since 2001 he has been involved in the activities of the European Movement in Serbia and CeSID (Center for Free Election and Democracy) through monitoring activity and the creation of a website devoted to his hometown (www.pirot.org.yu), and produced a multimedia CD as coordinator and author.

Mr. Ciric’s main research lies in the field of local social history. He also writes and publishes short stories and essays on art. He was a member of the editorial board of Contra, a journal for culture and urban thought, and is one of the founders of Society for Social History-EUROCLIO (Serbian branch of European Standing Conference of His­tory Teachers' Associations).

Contact the author at: icdejan@ptt.yu

Macedonia in World War II: Debar and the Skanderbeg Division

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


by Carl Savich

This brand new article from Serbian-American historian Carl Savich discusses little-known events in World War II-era Macedonia, and includes rare photos and details of the Albanian Skenderbeg Division and almost unknown Ljuboten Division. It is a must-read for all interested in the turbulent history of wartime Macedonia under fascist occupation, and includes interesting details regarding the history of Debar since Roman times.

Greater Albania and Illirida

Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini created a Greater Albania during World War II. Western Macedonia, or Illirida, as the Albanians called it, was annexed to Greater Albania. Debar, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kicevo were the key Macedonian towns and cities that were annexed. From June 29, 1941 to October 1944, Debar remained part of Greater Albania.The Italian occupation authorities delegated the civil authority and administration to the Albanian population. In Debar, Halil Alia was a key collaborator with the Italian and German occupation forces. All Albanian-inhabited territories, Western Macedonia (Illirida), Kosovo-Metohija (Kosova) and southern Montenegro were integrated completely into Albania proper. Albanian language schools, an Albanian press, and an Albanian radio network were established. An Albanian proxy governmental and political administration was created. Vulnetara, an Albanian paramilitary formation, was organized. Albanian police units were established by the Italian occupation forces.

Albanian became the official language as ‘Illirida’ became a part of Albania. The Albanian national flag, the double-headed black eagle on a red background, was raised in Debar and other cities and towns in Western Macedonia. The Albanian Lek was introduced as the official currency. Meanwhile, eastern Macedonia was occupied by Bulgarian military forces.

The Italian military intelligence service, OVRA (Opera Volantario per la Regressione Dell’ Autifasismo), formed an independent battalion in occupied Tetovo. The battalion was named “Ljuboten” and was a special unit made up of ethnic Albanians in the Tetovo region. The Ljuboten Battalion was financed from Tetovo municipal funds made available by Dzafer Sulejmani, the president of the Tetovo district under Italian occupation.

Gajur Derala, who had been born in Tetovo, was instrumental in the formation of the fascist Albanian Ljuboten Battalion in Tetovo. Derala had studied at the Yugoslav military academy before the war but had maintained contacts with Italian intelligence, OVRA. He subsequently fled to Albania and enlisted as a regular soldier in the Albanian army under King Zog. After the Italian occupation of Albania in 1939, he became an officer in the fascist Italian occupation forces. He became a committed fascist and swore his allegiance to Benito Mussolini.

Derala returned to Tetovo in 1941 as part of the Italian occupation forces. He joined the Ljuboten Battalion as a captain second class. Redzep Jusufi was also a key member of the Ljuboten Battalion. Jusufi had studied at Rome and Padua before returning to Tetovo to join the Battalion. Derala sought to form a Ljuboten Division and instructed hodza or Muslim cleric Bajrem Iljaziju from Gostivar to mobilize Albanian Muslims for the proposed division. This plan was not approved from Tirana so it was not carried out.

The Albanian recruits in the Battalion had no formal military training. What bound the Albanian recruits together was nationalism and an ideological commitment to creating a Greater Albania.

The Italian-created Albanian Axis/fascist Ljuboten Battalion was given the task of uncovering, questioning and annihilating any resistance to the occupation. After the surrender of Italy in September 8, 1943, the German forces retained this Albanian formation, allowing the unit to keep their Italian-issued uniforms and weapons. Members of the Balli Kombetar later joined the Ljuboten battalion. At the end of 1943, the Ljuboten unit was engaged in the attack on Kicevo in Macedonia. The German occupation forces used the Ljuboten Battalion, augmented by additional troops from the Balli Kombetar, to attack and dislodge partisan units in Kicevo. Kicevo was held by Petar Brajovic who commanded the partisan First Kosovo-Macedonian Brigade. The partisan forces intercepted the Ljuboten Battalion at Bukovici and decimated it.

The Italian occupation of Western Macedonia allowed the Albanian population to create an ethnic Albanian-ruled region. Albanian police and paramilitary units were formed as a proxy army by the Italian forces. The civil administration was entrusted by the Italians to Albanian leaders, and Albanian became the official language. The civil and police administration was taken over by ethnic Albanians; Albanian schools, newspapers, and radio stations were established. Debar was transformed into Dibra, an Albanian city in Greater Albania.

The German occupation forces retained the Albanian civil, political, military, and police control and administration of Western Macedonia. The Albanian national flag was flown, the official language was Albanian, and the Albanian Lek remained the official currency in Illirida. Rejeb Bey Mitrovica, however, was replaced by Fikri Dine as the Prime Minister of the Greater Albanian state occupied by the German Wehrmacht. The Albanian Minister of the Interior was Dzafer Deva, an Albanian Muslim from Kosovo. Mustafa Kruja and Mehdi Bey Frasheri also held high positions in the Albanian regime. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who had replaced Reinhard Heydrich as the leader of the SD, was instrumental in setting up the Albanian Nazi Party, which replaced the Albanian Fascist Party that the Italian authorities had set up previously. Much of the civilian and military administration was exercised by ethnic Albanians during both the Italian and German occupations.

One battalion of the Skanderbeg Nazi SS Division was formed in Debar. A pioneer or engineer battalion from the Skanderbeg Division was based in Gostivar. In Tetovo, there were a total of 1,500 ethnic Albanian Waffen SS troops, members of the 1st Regiment of the Skanderbeg SS Division. What motivated the Albanian troops in Skanderbeg from Macedonia was the ideology of Greater Albania, the annexation of Western Macedonia, which they called Illirida, into a Greater or Ethnic Albania. These units fought against Macedonian and Kosovo partisan forces.
In Debar, there were 900 Albanian SS troops, in Gostivar, there were 1,000 Albanian SS troops, while in Struga there were 100. In Kicevo, there were 1,500 Albanian SS troops. The total number of Albanian SS troops in Western Macedonia was 5,000.

The Albanians made up the police force in Western Macedonia: In Debar, there were 16 members of the police force, in Gostivar 10, in Struga 11, in Tetovo 16, and in Kicevo, 5.

There were a total of 5,500 members of the Balli Kombetar in Macedonia, 2,000 of which were based in Tetovo. There were a total of 250 Albanian gendarme units, or armed police units, in Tetovo. An Albanian Battalion for Security made up of 800 members was based in Tetovo. In addition, there were 80 Albanian troops and border guards. The total number of Albanian police and paramilitary units in Tetovo during the German occupation was 4,646.

There were 300 German occupation troops stationed in Debar during World War II. There were 500 members of the Balli Kombetar in Debar. There were 200 Albanian gendarmes or police in Debar along with seven German Gestapo agents. The German Army only had 450 German troops and three Gestapo agents in Tetovo and a total of 2,180 troops and 34 Gestapo agents in all of Western Macedonia. Instead, the German occupation forces created a proxy army and police staff made up of ethnic Albanians, collaborationists who acted as the proxies for the German military forces. Like the Italian occupation forces had done before them, the German military was able to use the Albanian police and paramilitary forces as a proxy force.

Debar: Some History

Debar, known also as Bebar, Dibre-i-Bala and Dibra, is a small town located in central-western Macedonia, near the border with Albania proper. Debar was a key area of conflict during World War II and saw the deployment of the Skanderbeg SS Division.

Debar was referred to for the first time in the mid-2nd century in a map by Ptolemy as Deborus. In the time of the Byzantine Empire in the 11th century, in a charter of Emperor Basil II, Debar is recorded as a settlement in the Archbishopric of Bitola. In 1107, Bohemond of Antioch captured Debar during the First Crusade. In the 13th and 14th centuries, Debar was at various times a part of Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Byzantine Empire. In 1449, Debar fell under the Ottoman Turkish Empire and was referred to as Dibri or Debra by the Turks. In 1502, Felix Petancic recorded the town as Dibri in his itinerary notes. In the 15th century, Gjergj Kastrioti, known as Skanderbeg, fought Ottoman Turkish forces in several major battles near Debar, which was an important frontline. Wealthy Turkish Agas and Beys lived in the town.

Economically speaking, Debar was an important urban center in the medieval era and was a key trading outpost which developed a crafts industry. Many merchants and travelers stopped in the town for lodging. There was a carsija or market bazaar in the town center, as was common in all Turkish towns. There were shops and stalls selling vegetables, fruit, and wares. It had narrow and curved streets and many inns, features which were also typical of Turkish towns. The houses built in Debar had dolapi (wardrobe cabinets), minderlaci (closets), and chardaci (enclosed porches on the second story of Turkish houses). The town was divided into a Lower and Upper Debar. It was noted for its craftsmen, builders, and especially its woodcarvers. In fact, the ‘Debar School’ of Macedonian woodcarving became noted for its artistic excellence, and an amazing example of Macedonian woodcarving can be seen today in the nearby Monastery of St. Jovan Bigorski.

In the 19th century, there were rebellions against the Turks in Macedonia. In March 1822, Atanas Karatase and Angel Gacho led the Negush Uprising in which the town of Negush was seized. The Ottoman Turks retook the town and took away the women and children, who were resettled in other parts of Macedonia. In the first half of the 19th century, Ami Boue (1794-1881), a noted German-born geologist who lived in France and was a naturalized Austrian citizen, traveled to the Balkans and sketched out detailed maps in his book La Turquie d’Europe, which was published in 1840 in Paris. Boue traveled to Debar and other parts of Macedonia and noted that Debar had a population of 4,200 in the early 19th century with 64 shops. By 1900, the population of Debar had increased to 15,500, which declined after World War I. In 1878, Albanian leaders from Debar participated in the Second League of Prizren in Kosovo, which enunciated a plan for the creation of an Ethnic or Greater Albania.

From June 29, 1941 to October, 1944, Debar and Struga were annexed to and made part of a Greater Albania created by Italy and Germany. From September 8, 1943 to November, 1944, German forces occupied the Italian areas once Italy surrendered. Debar thus came under German occupation at this time. The Italians integrated Debar into an Ethnic or Greater Albania in 1941 and placed the town under Italian and Albanian occupation and civil and military administration. The Macedonian Slavic population fled the Albanian and Italian occupation, especially due to the terror and intimidation by local Albanian and Italian occupation forces. Macedonian refugees from Debar fled to Skopje which was under Bulgarian occupation. A refugee area for Macedonians fleeing from Debar was established in Skopje called Debarsko Maalo, or the Debar Neighborhood. Relatively unaffected by the earthquake of 1963, this neighborhood contains some of the best examples of classic Macedonian architecture and is a relaxing, tree-lined area complete with restaurants and cafés.

Debar’s nearby towns and villages are Susica, Trnanic, Selokuki in the west, Krivci in the north, Vlasiki and Rajicki in the south, and Tatar Elevci in the east. The Radika and Crni Drim rivers flow near the town, which is surrounded by the Desat, Stogovo, and Jablanica mountains. There are nearby springs at Debarska Banja and gypsum crystal deposits.

Today, Debar has remained a volatile region of Albanian separatism and a base for Greater Albania ultra-nationalism. The KLA had bases around Debar in the late 1990s during the terrorist/separatist war in Kosovo-Metohija. The town’s proximity to the wild Albanian border has also made it a key place for cross-border arms smuggling since the early 1990’s.

Skanderbeg SS Division

The surrender of Italy on September 3, 1943 forced Germany to re-occupy Debar and Western Macedonia. The German forces wanted to recruit and enlist ethnic Albanians into proxy armies that would assist the German occupation. The Germans retained the Albanian “Ljuboten” battalion initially formed by the Italian occupation forces. The Waffen SS sought to incorporate the Albanian manpower of the region into Waffen SS formations, as a German proxy army to maintain the military occupation of the Macedonian and Serbian Orthodox Slavic populations.

In 1943, the German occupation authorities sponsored the formation of the Second League of Prizren, reviving the 1878 League. The Germans sought to use the racist, extremist, anti-democratic, anti-Orthodox, anti-Slavic agenda of the Greater Albania ideology to maintain and support their occupation of Kosovo and Western Macedonia.

In fact, Bedri Pejani, the president of the central committee of the Second League of Prizren, a militant and extremist Greater Albania ideologue, even wrote Himmler personally to request his assistance in establishing a Greater Albania and volunteering Albanian troops to work jointly with the Waffen SS and German Wehrmacht. Himmler read the Pejani letter and agreed to form two ethnic Albanian Waffen SS Divisions. Like Hitler and Mussolini, Himmler became an active sponsor of the Greater Albania ideology.

On April 17, 1944, Adolf Hitler approved the formation of the Albanian Skanderbeg SS Division after Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler had requested it. The SS Main Office envisioned an Albanian division of 10,000 troops. The Balli Kombetar (National Front), the Albanian Committees, and the Second League of Prizren submitted the names of 11,398 recruits for the division. Of these, 9,275 were determined to be suitable for drafting into the Waffen SS. Of this number, 6,491 ethnic Albanians were actually drafted into the Waffen SS.

There was a battalion of Albanian Muslims from Debar which made up the Skanderbeg SS Division. A reinforced battalion of approximately 200-300 ethnic Albanians, the III/Waffen Gebirgsjaeger Regiment 50, serving in the Bosnian Muslim 13th Waffen Gebirgs Division der SS “Handzar” or “Handschar” were transferred to the newly formed division. To this Albanian core were added veteran German troops from Austria and Volksdeutsche officers, NCOS, and enlisted men. The total strength of the Albanian Waffen SS Division would be 8,500-9,000 men.

Operation Fox Hunt

At the end of June, 1944, Enver Hoxha’s Communist Partisan units launched an offensive against Debar, where a strong German garrison was stationed along with Balli Kombetar troops. What resulted from the attack was the ascension of Fikri Dine to the post of Prime Minister of the German-sponsored Greater Albania. Dine was himself from the Debar area and was the leader of the Albanian clan chieftains in Debar. He took an active role in the German offensives against partisans in his own area of Debar in late 1943.

The German occupation forces accepted Dine with some hesitation but rejected his choice of Fuat Dibra as regent. On July 2, 1944, the German authorities forced the Albanian Parliament to elect Cafo Bey Ulqini, an Albanian Muslim from Kosovo. The Germans relied increasingly on Kosovo Albanian Muslims to run Greater Albania because they were the most fanatical and militant in creating a Greater Albania which Nazi Germany sponsored. The German occupation forces understood that the way to ensure Albanian loyalty and to recruit Albanian proxies was to advocate the annexation of Kosovo and Western Macedonia to a Greater Albania. Consequently, the most committed supporters of the Nazi occupation forces were Kosovo Albanian Muslims and Balli Kombetar members. The three main German occupation leaders in Albania were SS leader Josef Fitzhum, Austrian troubleshooter Hermann Neubacher, and Martin Schliep of the German Foreign Ministry in Albania.

The new Dine administration alienated the German occupation forces by excluding Dzafer Deva from the new Cabinet. Deva was instrumental in the creation of the Nazi German-sponsored Second League of Prizren and was crucial in organizing the formation of the Skanderbeg SS Division. Deva was also a Kosovo Albanian Muslim who was committed to the Nazi cause because of his objective to create a Greater Albania. The German forces saw the move as threatening the security of the German army in Greater Albania and of endangering German war aims. The German occupation provided the only stability and control in Greater Albania. Moreover, the removal of Deva threatened the formation of the Skanderbeg SS Division. The goal of the Dine regime was to create a viable military force under German control.

Meanwhile, Partisan units were operating in the Debar and Mati regions. Dine requested that the Germans provide him with weapons and tanks to create two mountain divisions. The Partisan resistance forces were gaining in strength as the German defeat became more and more certain with each passing day. By the end of July, German and Albanian nationalist Zogist forces attacked Mehmet Shehu’s first partisan brigade at Debar and drove them deep into Macedonia. The resistance forces, however, were weakened by an arms embargo that the British had imposed. British liaison officers reported that the Debar engagement was directed primarily against German forces and convinced British headquarters based in Bari to re-supply the partisan forces. By the end of July, British aircraft resumed weapons drops to the partisan forces around Debar. British RAF Beaufighter aircraft bombed Debar from August 10 to 11. The partisans were thus able to take the town.

The German forces and Dine planned a counteroffensive to retake Debar known as Operation Fuchsjagd or Operation Fox Hunt. The Germans launched the counterattack on August 18. The joint German and Albanian offensive was made up of two German regiments, the Skanderbeg SS Division, a nationalist formation from Debar under the command of Halil Alia, who was a close collaborator with the Italian fascist occupation authorities and the German Nazi forces, and 800-1,000 militia members allied to Abaz Kupi.

The Albanian units performed poorly because they were demoralized and poorly trained. The Germans could not muster enough troops themselves. The Germans called off the offensive on August 27. By August 30, the German and Albanian forces were compelled to retreat from Debar. The German and Albanian forces suffered an estimated 400 killed. They also were forced to abandon their equipment. The two-month battle over Debar was a defeat for the German and Albanian Axis troops. Operation Fox Hunt was a German/Albanian military disaster.

It was the last gasp of the German forces and their Albanian proxies to create a Greater Albania.

Partial Bibliography

Dzeletovic, Pavle. 21 SS. Divizija Skenderbeg (Beograd: Nova Knjiga), 1987

Fischer, Bernd. Albania at War, 1939-1945 (Purdue University Press), 1999

Has the UN Let a Blacklisted Islamic Charity Roam Free in Kosovo?

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.cm archive)


This article, originally published by Antiwar.com on Sept. 15, 2005, details a worrying sign of international failure to confront terrorist-related groups in the Balkans.

When it comes to charities suspected of terrorist involvement, at what point can a series of independent actions be said to indicate coordinated and malevolent intent? And if they do in fact indicate such intent, what should be done about it?

These are the questions that Thomas Gambill, a former security officer with the OSCE, had to wrestle with during his time in Kosovo, in regards to several Islamic NGOs and charities whose stated activities seemed benign, but whose latent motives were more suspicious.According to Gambill, whose whistleblower testimony first came out on Antiwar.com in August, the verdict is not good: in more than one case, UN bosses of the occupied Serbian province "have turned a blind eye" to dangerous charities – including a local branch of an Islamic fundamentalist group that has been linked to terrorist attacks and/or extremism in countries ranging from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to Azerbaijan, Albania, and Bosnia – a group that has, in fact, been partially blacklisted by both the Bush administration and the UN since January 2002.

A Dangerous Disinterest

However, now that the group in question (the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, hereafter RIHS) has become more prominent for trying to spread ultraconservative Saudi Wahhabism and for directly sponsoring terrorist attacks, such as last month’s mass bombings in Bangladesh, UNMIK’s apparent disinterest might be more than just negligent; should the RIHS cement the Balkan foothold it established over a decade ago in Albania, it could steer long-term social trends away from the region’s so-called path of "Western integration." More important in the short term, by ignoring the group’s presence in Kosovo, the international authorities continue to allow a key source of terrorist funding and logistical organization to operate unhindered.

Tom Gambill’s initial revelations were made public in this article, in which the former security chief contended that the majority of his colleagues were interested only in their paychecks, careers, and desire to escape Kosovo unscathed, and thus shrank from confronting any potential source of conflict, no matter how great a danger it might have represented.

"I had this info [about the charities] all the way back in 2001," says Gambill. "But the State Department didn't want to hear about it. And I brought it up at every meeting I went to that included [the U.S.] military, but nada. Many of the American KFOR [Kosovo Force] guys were there for their six months – you know, get the ribbon, do a few good deeds, and go home. And those who confided in me didn't want to rock the boat with their superiors… the thinking was, 'hey, we’re here for only six months – let’s get the job done as assigned and get home."

For the present investigation, Mr. Gambill has obliged by producing official written and photographic testimony to support his case for the RIHS’ presence in Kosovo. He also recalls the generally lukewarm reaction he received from superiors. In fact, this former Marine believes that the OSCE’s decision not to renew his contract last spring owed to a face-saving desire to "bury" the stories he was insisting on telling – something not very surprising, considering that the brazenly irresponsible international administration has gone to great lengths since day one to conceal its monumental failures, in areas ranging from creating a viable economy to protecting vulnerable minority groups.

One might ask, "So what? There are millions of these allegedly 'dangerous’ Islamic charities out there." That was my initial reaction when I first heard of this case. However, after some research, it became clear that far from being just another one of the myriad Islamic NGOs operating in the Balkans, the RIHS was in fact a major player with a distinguished track record and truly global aspirations. If the UN has really allowed it to flourish in Kosovo, this policy would seem to be very foolish, as the following should indicate.

The RIHS: A Quick Overview

The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society is a Kuwait-based charity with branch offices in numerous Muslim-inhabited countries. It was founded in 1992 and, according to the International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law in 2002, established international branches, including even a British one (later registered with the Charity Commission: registration no. 1014888). Quoting a now-defunct Web site, the article stated that the RIHS’ purpose is "to improve the condition of the Muslim community and develop an awareness and understanding of Islam amongst the non-Muslim communities, by concentrating on youth and education."

Indeed, proselytizing among the young and the poor has served as the group’s preliminary method of pushing a more conservative type of worship based on the Saudi Salafi or Wahhabi form of Islam. This invariably has been carried out through large-scale mosque-building, financial incentives for converts, and attempts to alienate the young from the established traditions and political processes of their home countries. As with any cult, they do this in order to present their solutions to complex social problems as the only "true" alternatives – even if the execution of these solutions sometimes involves terrorist activities.

The RIHS’ established pattern of activity indicates a special interest in Islamic or partially Islamic states where a certain level of turbulence prevails, where stagnant economies and governmental corruption can be assailed from a broadly populist viewpoint – and, notably, where there is no historical tradition of Arab Salafi worship. In the wake of 9/11, European investigators found a clear connection between Salafi propagandists and indigenous extremist groups.

Yet despite the group’s presence in England, RIHS activities in places like Azerbaijan and Bangladesh, as well as the Balkans, have been much more important, strategically speaking, for their goal of bringing developing states under their eventual ideological and, ideally, political control.

Furthermore, the RIHS is a founding member of an infamous and now largely disrupted Islamic charity network that includes the banned al-Haramain, Global Relief, and the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, all of which shared the same strategic goals. As a May 2005 report from the Naval Postgraduate School states, "since 1992, in addition to the local orders, the main supporters of Salafi ideas [in Bosnia] were the following relief agencies – High Saudi Committee, al-Haramain Foundation, and the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage (Jam'iyyat Ihya’ al-Turah al-Islami)."

The RIHS Blacklistings

On Jan. 9, 2002, RIHS operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan were blacklisted by the U.S. government. The Bank of England simultaneously followed suit, as did the UN two days later. Announcing the action as part of a global effort to cut off the terrorists’ access to "hard-money countries," then-Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill also mentioned Canada, Luxembourg, and Hong Kong as among the list of places that were enforcing the ban and freezing the group’s assets.

According to the U.S. government, the Pakistani and Afghani branches of the RIHS were run by some real bad apples – or "bad actors," as O’Neill called them – among whom were one Abd al-Mushin al-Libi and Abu Bakr al-Jaziri, "formerly bin Laden’s chief fundraiser."

Based in Peshawar, the latter was serving as the finance chief of the Afghan Support Committee, an Islamic charity connected with al-Qaeda. Al-Libi had been running the Pakistan office of the RIHS while also managing the Afghan Support Committee's office in Peshawar. Stated O'Neill, these groups had been "stealing from widows and orphans to fund al-Qaeda terrorism."

The RIHS staffers in Kuwait are less well known, but even involve enthusiastic female converts from the West. At some point between 2002 and 2004, it seems, the Kuwait headquarters was also blacklisted, as is stated in this Oct. 19, 2004 report from O’Neill’s replacement, John Snow. But this remains somewhat of a mystery, as nothing else has been said about why or how the blacklisting came about. After all, in January 2002, O’Neill had specifically said that there was no evidence that the Kuwait RIHS was aware of the money movements of their Afghan and Pakistani branches. So what happened thereafter? Did evidence present itself? The situation remains murky.

Aside from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the RIHS has been active in other countries, most notably working with Chechen émigré jihadis in Azerbaijan and with indigenous terrorist groups in Bangladesh, in both cases intending to establish a strictly Islamic government through violent upheaval. When the pattern established by these activities is revealed in its full dimensions, the allegations made by investigators such as Tom Gambill regarding the threat to the Balkans acquire a new urgency. We will consider some examples now that illustrate the RIHS’ three-stage strategy for effecting change: securing a presence, fomenting dissent, and finally, engaging in spectacular terrorist attacks to set the stage for an Islamic revolution.

Stage 1: Securing a Presence, Albania

On June 28, 1998, while war was raging between the Yugoslav army and the Albanian paramilitary KLA in Kosovo, two Egyptians were arrested for running a terrorist training camp in the central Albanian town of Elbasan. They had been quietly recruiting young men from the north of the country for the campaign against the Serbs. Citing the Albanian ShIK intelligence service, the linked report claimed that the pair (Maget Mustafa and Muhamed Houda) were seeking "to give a powerful religious character" to the nascent Kosovo war that would end with NATO bombing the following spring.

According to the article, the Egyptians had been active at Elbasan’s el-Hagri Theological Institute. Suspicions of Salafi fundamentalists in the midst had arisen locally "following the arrival of Sudani and Pakistani people" four years earlier.

Indeed, while "rumors" had already been circulating locally regarding the real interests of the detained Egyptians, "their declared activity was of the humanitarian character to help poor families … [they] held posts in [the] 'Revival of Islamic Heritage’ association operating in Albania."

It is well known that Osama bin Laden sought to break in to post-Communist Albania in 1994 by offering humanitarian assistance through Islamic charities to the impoverished nation. Of course, this was merely a front for importing Islamic radicals and terrorists. Some seemed to have been reporting to Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad since 1991, and later bin Laden’s right-hand man. In a short report of June 2, 2004, the U.S. Treasury claimed that Osama bin Laden himself founded al-Haramain in Albania, and that "in 1998, the head of Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Albania was reportedly also a financial official for AHF in Albania."

Finally, "in late 2000, a close associate of a UBL operative moved to Albania and was running an unnamed AHF subsidiary." Which "subsidiary" could it have been?

While this question is not answered in this fascinating July 2005 article from the Chicago Tribune on the CIA’s rather lavish 2003 kidnapping of Egyptian-born Imam Abu Omar in Italy, it does clarify the Egyptian connection with the RIHS in Albania.

Several years before turning into an anti-American firebrand in late 2001, Abu Omar had been a valuable informant in Albania for the ShIK and thus, ultimately, the CIA. The article recounts that on Aug. 27, 1995, the then-unknown Abu Omar was taken in for questioning by the Albanian authorities, together with several known members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and another Egyptian terrorist group, the Jamaat al-Islamiya. The ShIK had received a tip from the CIA that this group was planning to assassinate the visiting Egyptian foreign minister, Amr Moussa. In fact, only two months earlier, Jamaat al-Islamiya had tried to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. So given the circumstances, the CIA’s concerns were understandable.

Under questioning, Abu Omar admitted having fled Egypt "because he belonged to Jamaat al-Islamiya." But he denied any assassination plot, since "such a move would have cost Jamaat its [safe] haven. … Abu Omar told the ShIK agents that, for Jamaat members like him, Albania was a 'safe hotel’ – a country where fundamentalist Muslims believed they could live without fear of political repression."

At the same time, Omar claimed that the Egyptian terrorist group "had about 10 people working for three Islamic charities in Albania, including al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society."
Although Abu Omar vanished mysteriously weeks later, only to resurface in Italy as a radical, he didn’t sever his ties to foreign terrorist groups based in Albania. Indeed, as a conversation of June 6, 2002 taped by the Italian police makes clear, he was very much aware of ongoing operations. The Chicago Tribune article transcribes the relevant fragment:
"[A]bu Omar is overheard speaking with an unidentified South African man who seems to be talking about car bombs.

"'Who has made them?’ Abu Omar asks. 'Who? Who?’

"'One of the Palestinian brothers,’ replies the South African."’The Palestinian?’ Abu Omar asks.

"'Yes,’ the man answers. 'The one who is called the machine … the one who is in Albania.’"

This is interesting, because there is scant information regarding current activities of the RIHS and similar groups in Albania. They seem to have dropped off the radar. But it is notable that the branch has not been put on the U.S. blacklist, as were the Afghan and Pakistani branches. Why? Have their activities been suspended, voluntarily or involuntarily? Or has the U.S. been treading lightly in the country for some reason? There is simply no way of knowing.

Essentially, however, what is important to note here is the RIHS’ attested means of infiltration and clandestine operations, which are incontestably displayed in the Abu Omar case and other events discussed above.

Stage 2: Transforming the State, Azerbaijan

With its substantial oil and gas deposits and headship of the new Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Azerbaijan is a strategically vital country to the United States – as well as to Islamist "reformers" such as the RIHS. The proximity of this Caucasus country to trouble spots like Chechnya, Dagestan, and Nagorno-Karabakh, not to mention its key relationships with neighbors such as Turkey and Iran, have led American policymakers to watch developments in the country closely. But have they been missing something?

A compelling July 2005 article from the Jamestown Foundation recounts the post-USSR arrival of Salafi missionaries in Azerbaijan, a phenomenon that accelerated with the first war in Chechnya in 1994. In fact, the first Salafi missionaries arrived directly from this bitterly contested war zone: "the majority of them came from Chechnya and Dagestan where the Salafis had some influence, in large measure due to the Russian-Chechen wars."

A few years later, however, "missionaries from the Persian Gulf countries dramatically increased their activities in Azerbaijan." According to the article, the current number of Salafi worshippers in Baku alone numbers around 15,000, despite there having been no tradition of this Saudi form of Islam before. This worries the Azeri government, and perhaps with good reason: "alarmingly for the Azeri establishment, Salafis do not make a secret of their aspirations to acquire political power in Azerbaijan."

Considering that some 65-70 percent of Azeris are Shi'ite Muslims, the inroads Salafis are making also concerns neighboring Iran, the perceived "archrival" of this Sunni Arab movement. This factor leads the author to speculate that if the proselytizers make problems for the Shi'ite majority, it could "provoke some form of Iranian intervention," and that ultimately, "the proliferation of Salafi ideas among religious and ethnic minorities could create powerful centrifugal forces that will in due course threaten the national unity of Azerbaijan."

Interestingly enough, the RIHS has been a key player in promoting the ideas that could lead to such a destabilization. So why hasn’t the U.S. blacklisted it here, as it did in Afghanistan and Pakistan? States the article:
"[B]y 2003, 65 new Salafi-controlled mosques had been established in Azerbaijan. One of the largest Salafi mosques in the country is the Abu Bakr mosque. Built in 1997 in Baku by the Azeri branch of the Kuwaiti society Revival of Islamic Heritage, Abu Bakr became one of the most successful mosques in Azerbaijan.

"While on average the Shi’a or Sunni mosques are able to attract approximately 300 people for Friday prayers, the number of people visiting the Abu Bakr mosque typically reaches 5,000 to 7,000 people. [2] The Imam of the Abu Bakr mosque is Gammet Suleymanov, a graduate of the World Islamic University of Medina that is a leading center for the study and export of Salafism."

According to the article, a spring 2001 trial of aspiring mujahedin for the Chechnya campaign led to the summoning of Suleymanov, since the accused had been "frequent visitors" to his mosque and had in fact been recruited there by Chechen leaders. In another trial, Suleymanov’s Abu Bakr mosque was also singled out as a refuge for members of the Pan-Islamic Hizb-ut Tahrir organization. Finally, in May 2002, deputy minister of national security Tofiq Babayev attested that

"[A] number of Arab countries were interested in spreading radical Wahhabism in Azerbaijan. According to Babayev, over 300 Azeris had been trained in Wahhabi centers in Dagestan. The deputy minister identified three stages in the effort to make Wahhabism a grassroots movement in Azerbaijan. First there is the spread of Wahhabi literature and the provision of financial assistance to potential activists. The second stage involves the efficient training of the activists, and the final stage deals with the mobilization of active members for acts of terrorism designed to destabilize the state. [5]"

All things considered, it seems surprising that the U.S. apparently hasn’t moved to shut down the RIHS branch in Azerbaijan. As the above testimony implies, things could eventually progress to the point where national stability becomes a real concern; the third stage of the extremist plan could then unfold.

Stage 3: Destabilization Through Terror, Bangladesh

On Aug. 17, a coordinated bombing campaign was conducted in 63 out of 64 districts of Bangladesh. Almost 500 small but nearly simultaneous explosions killed three and injured at least 150. The attacks were meant to be a show of force, to intimidate rather than kill – and to show the country what the terrorists were capable of doing.

Last week, the government charged that the main suspect in the attacks – local terrorist group, Jama'atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) – had been heavily funded and assisted by the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, along with a mysterious imam from the UK and several other organizations and front groups.

These groups had illegally employed foreign Islamists visiting Bangladesh on tourist visas, as well as several veterans of the notorious al-Haramain, reported the New Kerala on Sept. 8. Thus, while it likes to present itself as having shattered the terrorist-supporting Islamist charities, the Bush administration has merely scattered them. They can and do easily regroup, under different umbrella groups and names.

With the pressure on following the ensuing police crackdown, the RIHS sought to lower its profile drastically. According to the article, "the Heritage Society's front organization, the Higher Islamic Education Institute, in the capital was closed down last week. It has started trimming manpower in other affiliated institutions as part of the wrapping-up process."

Only four days after the explosions, a high official of the RIHS from Kuwait, Abdul Aziz Khalaf Malullah, cut short his month-long visit and left Bangladesh. What really raises eyebrows about this sudden departure was the fact that Malullah had apparently planned his trip "with the express mission to ensure continuation of the RIHS activities in the country," according to South Asian Media Net on Aug. 22. But since the Kuwaiti had arrived just days before the blasts, was he not probably aware that they would take place – and thus necessitate the immediate presence of someone to lobby the government on the group’s behalf? And especially considering that the preparations for the complex series of bombings began way back in April, and required much coordination with the RIHS?

In any case, Malullah "failed to manage a positive response from the government," and left on Aug. 21. He is one of the only officials of the RIHS known by name.

The RIHS, however, could not hog all the limelight. The New Kerala article adds that "more than 100 foreigners … from different Middle East and African countries" had been illegally employed in nine other Islamic charities as well. In addition, four charity officials suspected of terrorist involvement had been among the 14 who worked for al-Haramain, but who left the country when the group was banned in 2004. However, they "returned several months later and joined the Heritage Society [RIHS] without the knowledge of intelligence agencies."

Further, local investigators following the money trail have arrived at the RIHS’ door, says the article:
"[A]n intelligence report recently submitted to the government said that the Kuwait-based organization used to channel funds for [extremist group] Ahle Hadith Andolon's leader, Asadullah al-Ghalib, also a university professor, who was arrested last February for exploding bombs at NGOs' offices and cultural functions in the northern part of the country.

"Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh, blamed for the Aug. 17 chain of bomb blasts, has been getting foreign funds for its militant activities through Ghalib."

And, according to the Asia News Network on Sept. 3, "Bangladesh intelligence agencies have recently recommended banning RIHS for financing Islamist militants in the country … claiming that it seems to be more concerned with promoting militancy rather than protecting Islamic heritage, said an intelligence source."

According to the report, the RIHS had provided funds to two related organizations, the Tawhid Trust and the Hadith Foundation, both of which had been "founded by militant kingpin Asadullah al-Galib."

In a follow-up article which sought to explain the problem of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Bangladeshi government "is working with the country's banks to identify suspicious accounts and transactions, some possibly originating abroad. 'They've received monetary help from Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Pakistan,’ says a retired police investigator, who spoke on condition of anonymity. 'They first started in 1989 during the Afghan war.'"

This apparent show of diligence is no doubt meant to keep one optimistic regarding the ability of international police to freeze accounts and put terrorists in the poorhouse. However, as another recent article which discusses huge foreign funding for Bangladesh’s 34 registered Islamic NGOs makes clear, we shouldn’t deceive ourselves:
"[T]his money has no official records as it does not come through official channels. The persons concerned themselves carry the money or send it through unofficial channels like hundi. Some exporters and importers in Dhaka and Chittagong also help transferring the money. The foreign funds that are channeled through businessmen mainly come via Bangkok and Singapore, the sources pointed out.

"This is one of the major sources of funds for the local Islamic NGOs and Qawmi madrassas which do not have government recognition. The income and expenditure of these madrassas are not accounted for properly as they are not accountable to any government body."

That said, the CSM does point out how the fundamentalists have used a well-rehearsed plan – exploiting social and economic crises – to gain influence, as was specified in the beginning of this article as being a major strategy:
"[I]slamist militant groups have taken firm root here, demonstrating a widespread, highly coordinated, and well-funded network … homegrown militancy, invigorated by foreign funds and leadership radicalized in Afghanistan, has flourished here because of growing economic inequalities and acrimonious politics that have crippled the functioning of democracy."

Outlook India cited an intelligence source as claiming the "JMB militants through Galib have utilized the facilities of some 700 mosques built across the country by the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS)." The CSM report states that altogether the RIHS has funded 1,000 mosques in Bangladesh, as well as 10 new madrassas.

Finally, as retired Brigadier General Shahed Anam Khan told the paper, "the organization behind Aug. 17 was extremely sophisticated and networked. It's clear that at least 500 people were used to place the bombs; their strategy was classic – send in men who don't know the core group which had planned and assembled the bombs. This is something which we never encountered in the past."

A Shocking Disinterest

Taken cumulatively, shouldn’t all of the dubious partnerships and destructive activities of the RIHS have set off alarm bells for international authorities in Kosovo, where the charity’s presence was evidenced long ago? According to Tom Gambill, even when confronted with proof of the RHIS’ existence in the occupied province, UN and American officials alike seemed rather unimpressed.

While there were some "motivated" American security officials who "wanted a piece of the action," says Gambill, "they were held back in some cases by orders from those higher up in the pecking order. This was much to the disgruntlement of the lower echelons – lieutenants, captains, some majors … the same thing with the CivPol [UN Police]."

However, he adds, the authorities in Kosovo were generally indifferent to the RIHS’ presence and what it could mean for the future. When Gambill raised the issue at another Camp Bondsteel meeting, showing photographic proof and citing the UN Mandate outlawing the group, he got a somewhat "peeved" reaction from the FBI’s representative in Kosovo: "It seemed like he knew nothing [about the group] – go figure!"

Naysayers and Defenders in the UN and US Military

Yet the aspiring whistleblower was not just a nuisance; through his arguments and frequent e-mails to UNMIK and U.S. security officials in Kosovo, he was rocking the boat – essentially, the last thing the "I’m OK, you’re OK" international administration wanted to see happen. And this led certain individuals to get flustered unduly.

States Gambill:

"In another case, I was verbally attacked via e-mail by an American major. … He said that I was not qualified to make comments, and that neither my information nor comments were accurate. However, the comments he was making were erroneous … and completely unwarranted. After forwarding his comments to my point of contact on the American base, he (another major) was taken back at this kind of behavior.

"Later, in early 2003, one member, an American assigned to the OSCE who was on my e-mail list, complained to my Division Head that I was sending out information contained in OSCE classified reports, which was incorrect. I got my information from non-classified sources and correctly triangulated my information before writing anything and distributing. In other words, I always obtained the same information from at least three different sources that were unrelated but consistent. This then qualified as reliable information. I also used a disclaimer, just in case. So his complaint was inaccurate and made for personal reasons, as I learned after I confronted my manager about the report and source."

But the biggest group of naysayers was not made up of hotheads, but rather cynics who, Gambill claims, claimed to be experts – though they visited Kosovo only once or twice a year:

"The ones who did not believe my reports were many internationals who argued that these things [Salafi penetration, etc.] didn't occur in Bosnia, and that therefore the Islamic fundamentalists were not a threat. They claimed that there were no organized efforts on the part of the Islamic fundamentalists and that the [Albanian] rebel groups causing trouble were not a significant concern. That line came from many of the US military commanders who came through the region once every six months. There was no continuity in the passing of intelligence from one unit to another – ever."

But all reactions were not hostile, says Gambill. Other security officials more keen on fighting the "war on terror" were impressed by his tenacity and commitment to rooting out hostile elements. He recounts:

"In several meetings of the combined group (U.S. military, UN, and CivPol), just as many commended me for the information that I brought to the table. I was told that my sources and reports were 90 percent accurate and were appreciated. In one case, a commander came to me after a meeting and commended me on my participation in all his meetings and gave me a unit coin for my contributions. It was done quietly, of course."In fact, certain of the security officers who appreciated Gambill’s input in turn provided him with further "accurate reports and bits of info that helped to substantiate the info that I was putting out."

RIHS in Kosovo: The Proof

Tom Gambill admits that having left Kosovo over a year ago, he can’t state with certainty what is happening there now on a day-to-day basis. However, he does provide compelling evidence that proves the UN authorities in Kosovo, through mid-2004 at least, were tolerating the presence of an Islamic group (the RIHS) that had been banned elsewhere a year and a half earlier.

To buttress his claim, Gambill presents two internal UNMIK police documents and a photo that attest to a RIHS presence in Kosovo – and that disclose the same activity patterns demonstrated by the group in the countries discussed above.

"In one security meeting at [U.S. military base Camp] Bondsteel," recounts Gambill, "a sympathetic American [agency deleted] officer slipped me a photo of their vehicles, with 'RHIS/P’ spray-painted on the side in big bold black letters and parked on the street in Malishevo [near the southwestern town of Prizren]. They ran around freely; this picture was taken in 2003 or early 2004."

As for the documents, the first (dated July 26, 2003) covers this incident in Malishevo. UNMIK police there observed a white Toyota with Tirana registration and the name RHIS/P printed along the side panel. The vehicle was parked in the town for two hours, but when its occupants returned, the police stopped them and learned that the driver was a Kosovo Albanian, and the passenger, a Kuwaiti.

Both had UNMIK ID cards; the car was registered to a Tirana-based NGO. When questioned, the pair stated that they were employees of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society:

"[A]ccording to them this is a humanitarian organization and they have representative offices in many cities in Kosovo and they visited an Islamic office in Malishevo. The purpose of this organization is to take care [of] orphans in Kosovo."

This is a very interesting admission because, if true, it reaffirms the RIHS’ time-honored preliminary tactic of "educating" the youth. And indeed, what easier youth are there to educate than those without parents? Such activities have already been used by (secular enough) Kosovo Albanians in creating "front lines" protesters who can be easily indoctrinated toward a militant "liberation" cause. Numerous sources in Kosovo stated last year that a special group of war orphans, whose families had been killed in the 1999 war, were cynically being located at the front at various protests (including the early stages of the March 2004 riots), specifically because of the bad PR that would be generated were children to be harmed or killed by UN police.

The other major strategy employed by RIHS during stage one – mosque-building – is attested in the second document shared by Gambill. In an "assessment" report of Sept. 20, 2003, also from the Malishevo UN police, it is stated that another RIHS vehicle (this one a Kosovo-registered, dark green Opel Frontera) had been spotted twice in the nearby town of Orahovac, driven by a bearded Arab. More importantly, the police report states that the RIHS had "asked" an Emirates-based NGO, Human Appeal International, to fund and build a mosque in the town – "the third mosque they [HAI] have constructed in Kosovo." The HAI, it turns out, is also heavily involved with orphan services in countries including Kosovo.

This tactic of keeping beneath the radar by working indirectly through an Islamic NGO (so far) untainted by terrorist links shows that the RIHS is prepared to work slowly and in stages to attain its key goal of increasing the Salafi head count in Kosovo. It is frequently declared by Kosovo Albanian leaders and KLA war veterans that theirs is a secular, pro-Western society that can never fall under the influence of foreign Islamists, and that the KLA has always refused their help. While this is no doubt true for a large section of the former KLA, the splintering of the organization that began after the war has led different factions to explore new partnerships. Thus, adds Gambill, "right now, I have evidence from good sources who are reporting that a branch of the AKSH [an Albanian nationalist militant group] has hooked up with the fundies [Islamic fundamentalists] in the southern tip of Kosovo, the Dragash area between Albania and Macedonia."

Moreover, leaving this argument aside for the moment, we should also remember that terrorists never require a majority to operate in any given country; indeed, it would be almost antithetical to their purposes. In the absence of a majority population sympathetic to their cause, all that groups like the RIHS need is a place to take cover while they quietly plan – a "safe hotel," as Abu Omar memorably dubbed Albania back in 1995.

The Balkan Black Hole – and Beyond

Unfortunately, Albania remains such a place today, as do Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Riddled with Islamist sympathizers, Bosnia is the most amenable of the four, a place where "fitting in" is not difficult (especially in the Zenica area). In Kosovo, the UN’s fear and feebleness, as well as its intelligence shortcomings, have made it impossible to really crack down on groups that are transient, resilient, and well-funded. And in the last, poor Macedonia, the complete lack of a government agency or even individual to regulate the activities and finances of the NGO sector makes the motives and finances of suspicious charities almost impossible to ascertain, while the preponderance of heavily guarded militant villages make it very dangerous for police to investigate what’s going on in local Islamic communities and isolated mountains.

Of course, as Tom Gambill concedes, "It’s always true that more [counter-terrorist investigative work] might be going on behind the scenes than we know about." The U.S. and its allies might simply be playing a waiting game with the Islamists, or working with a very select staff, or both.

Nevertheless, real concerns remain. Indeed, given the absence of any visible proactive and public governmental actions when it comes to cracking down on groups like the RIHS (and not only in the Balkans) how can one not conclude that the U.S. and its allies are demonstrating a dangerous negligence in the face of a clearly demonstrated threat to Western security?