Romania's Private Defense

(This article is from the Balkanlysis.com archive)

classic analysis of Romanian defense from guest author Dr. Sam Vaknin.

Romanian President, Ion Iliescu, contests his homeland's geography. On Monday, at a joint press conference with Bulgaria's President Parvanov, he cast both countries as "central-south European" rather than the derogatory "Balkan". Both polities are well on their way to join NATO and the European Union - though the former expressed reservations after embarrassing leaks of classified military data in both Bucharest and Sofia.Romania - a signatory of a strongly worded letter supporting the war in Iraq - has pledged 278 soldiers within nuclear, biological and chemical decontamination units, medical and engineering corps and military police. Close to 100 of them are already deployed in the Gulf. Romania also opened its airspace and a Black Sea air base near Constanta to 1000 U.S. troops. It shared with the coalition intelligence about Iraqi infrastructure, which it helped construct in communist times.

The United States, peeved by the recalcitrant pacifism of the French and Germans, intends to shift some air bases from Old Europe to east Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. This could signal the revival of the region's moribund defense industries. Potential buyers are taking note.

Colonel-General Safar Abiyev, the Azeri Defense Minister, visited Romania last week to discuss "military cooperation" - mainly training, technology transfer, a scholarship programs and interoperability exercises within NATO's East European program "Partnership for Peace".
Romania's trimmed forces participate in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

Romania's Social Democratic government led by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase was elected in January 2001 and immediately embarked on a revamp of the country's obsolete armed forces. The NATO-compatible Romanian army in 2005 will comprise 112,000 mostly professional elite soldiers and 28,000 civilians - a shadow of its former bloated self. The Ministry of National Defense was further depleted by the transfer of the soon to be privatized armaments industry to the Ministry of Industry and Resources.

The defense budget - at c. $1 billion or one fortieth of gross domestic product - barely covers one quarter of the armed forces' procurement needs. Hence the constant stream of welcome donations: two years ago Germany handed over a Gepard antiaircraft system and the U.S. - four C-130B aircraft, part of an Excess Defense Article transfer. Canada and Norway followed suit. The Defense Ministry resorts to frequency spectrum sales to the private sector to make ends meet.

Still, Romania is investing heavily in a military communications network and in the modernization and upgrading of its antiquated tank and armored vehicles fleets. The defense industry is collaborating with the Israelis to produce ammunition for its antiaircraft artillery and to upgrade its ageing MIG-21 "Lancer" fighters. Air traffic management and air space control are also priorities as are attack helicopters.

Romania's outdated weapons manufacturers used to supply 70 to 85 percent of the country's needs and export some $1 billion annually, mostly to other Warsaw Pact members and to Arab and African clients. More than 200,000 people were employed in the sector. Romania even has its own materiel trade fair - Expomil.

The remnants of the industry reap the benefits of the military's all-pervasive overhaul - but the decrepitude is evident. The Ministry of Industry and Resources explains:

"Starting with 1990, following the structural changes in the world arms market and the politic economic and social transformation in Romania, this sector has entered an increasing decline. The drastic decrease of the demand on the world market and lack of local orders, the low level of technology automation and labour productivity, associated with an improper management were the main factors which have lead to this situation. Privatization was started, with some performing companies sold to private local investors."

The sector is undergoing a wrenching restructuring with non-core activities spun off or closed, employees made redundant as functions are outsourced and 12 companies slated for privatization, including manufacturers of ammunition, vehicles, optoelectronics, electronics, airspace companies and a shipyard.

The remaining 15 firms and a research institute are owned by ROMARM, an opaque and ubiquitous statal holding group. Romania also sports 11 contractors in private hands. They are members of PATROMIL, a non-governmental trade association.

But the sector's only hope of survival is foreign. It is a predicament shared by all post-communist applicants and candidates in Central and East Europe. Joint ventures, co-production, technology transfer, offset programs (promoted by the Offset Law) - allow indigenous makers to leap into NATO's lean and mean, hi-tech 21st century. Eurocopter and DaimlerChrysler, for instance, serve as strategic partners to Romanian production facilities.

Aware of this nascent market, Western companies, backed by the political and pecuniary muscle of their countries, are aggressive bidders. BEA Systems just won a $190 million contract to refit two frigates for the Romanian navy. The deal is insured by the British government's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD). The London offices of Deutsche Bank and ABN Amro Bank tackled the financing.

To its delight, Romania is becoming somewhat of a regional defense hub. The premiers of five other ex-communist states that were invited to join NATO next year (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia) as well as the foreign minister of a sixth (Slovenia), met near Bucharest to discuss their accession.

Together with Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, Romania is a contributor to the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG), established in 1998 by the South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM), an informal group of the area's defense ministers from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and the United States. The United States, Slovenia and Croatia serve as mere observers.

Yet, its growing stature aside, Romania is still besieged by its old ills. According to defense analysts, rogue Romanian arms dealers sold weapons to pariah states such as Iraq. Members of the vicious and discredited security service Securitate permeate the upper echelons of the country's defense establishment.

Last May, when the media published a non-flattering article translated from the "Wall Street Journal", the Ministry of National Defense sent a statement to several Romanian newspapers, reminding journalists that "life is short" and they should not "endanger their health by launching stressful debates". Faced with a storm of protest, a Defense Ministry official, George Christian Maior, dubbed the intimidating passages "satirical."

This article was also published in World in Conflict, Economies inTransition.

Athens Renewed

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Athens- enduring testament to Greece and its classical legacy- is an enticing, exotic European city where past and present coexist in serene yet spirited harmony.

According to myth, the city was named after Athena, Olympian goddess of wisdom, when she endowed it with that ultimate symbol of Greece- the olive tree. Ever since, Athens has been central to the Greek experience. Once the ancient world’s foremost center of culture, learning and the arts, it has existed for over three millennia. Today, almost a quarter of all Greeks call Athens home.While Athens is a large and densely packed city, its most interesting sites are all within close proximity. A major pre-Olympic refurbishment program has also made getting around much easier.

Today, Athens has a new buzz about it, owing to anticipation of the Games and its recent revitalization. It now boasts a new airport, expanded metro, and the steady growth of sophisticated shops, hotels and restaurants to rival those of any other major European city.

Athens is overflowing with history. Its 25 museums, in fact, have proven insufficient to contain it all. Nine years ago, when the Athenians started the metro expansion project, work was halted almost daily because so many unknown archaeological finds kept being discovered. This fortunate annoyance has given the city a new- and underground- museum, right on a metro stop. Amidst the roar of subway trains, travelers can gaze on ancient treasures that until recently had been sleeping peacefully deep within Athens’ storied soil.

This contrast between a serene past and vibrant modern-day life is evident everywhere. In little parks redolent of cypress and pomegranate, one enjoys the shade of a towering, deep-rooted plane tree, and imagines the philosophers who once discoursed beneath it. On the Syntagma road, impatient, mustachioed cabbies honk and gesticulate, right across from where the ceremonial guard executes its measured routine, impervious to the bustle and din of the city.

Of course, a trip to the famed Acropolis should be the first thing on any visitor’s list. Presiding over the city from a craggy hilltop, the Acropolis itself is a complex of ancient buildings hearkening back to Athens’ glorious past. After a short climb to the entrance, one traverses the Panathenaic Way (where sacred rituals, festivals and Athens’ own version of the Olympics were once held), before passing through the Pentelic marble columns of the Parthenon- masterpiece of Doric architecture and sanctuary of the cult of Athena. The nearby Erechtheion, a temple supported famously by statues of cloaked women known as the Caryatids, is along with the Parthenon considered the ultimate expression of 5th Century B.C. greatness.

From high atop the Acropolis, summit of the ancient Athens, one can gaze down upon the fanning tiers of the Theater of Dionysius and the modern city beneath. At sunset, the fading light of day bathes a sea of rooftops in a reddish glow.

After dark, the Acropolis shimmers under the glow of floodlights. This unforgettable view, visible from almost everywhere in the city, brings the ancient Greek achievement vividly to life.
Shaking off this ancient reverie, one can explore the crowded, labyrinthine streets of Athens’ “old town.” Centrally-located Plaka is a remnant of Ottoman times, lined with eateries and innumerable little stores. Throngs of people shop in the outdoor markets of nearby Monastiraki, where the mixed aromas of spices, vegetables and fish fill the air, and the bustle of commerce spills noisily into the street.

For all that, Athens can be quite intimate, too. Down quiet, cobblestoned alleys, one might find a traditional kafeneio, where old men flip their worry beads and sip Greek coffee in the idle morning hours. Unassuming Byzantine churches dot the city, their rounded domes hidden by larger modern buildings. Elegant neo-classical mansions stand on tree-lined avenues, while a stroll up the pine-scented Hill of the Muses provides the best view of the Saronic Gulf, Athens’s gateway to the Aegean.

The feisty, energetic Athenians have long made a priority out of enjoying life. No doubt, their city doesn’t lack for entertainment. At night, when the air is sultry and cool, Athens really comes to life. Greeks typically enjoy late dinners in a crowded restaurant, before passing on to chic bars for a drink. Every night of the year one can find live music of all kinds, as well as dancing, theatre, sporting events and more.

No visit to Athens would be complete without a night in an authentic Greek taverna. The best ones are always busy; in some, the chefs invite diners to choose directly from steaming pots in the kitchen. Under a flowering trellis, guests are seated at a sturdy wooden table, often adorned with a blue checkered tablecloth. Hungry or not, Greek hosts take no chances. The table swiftly becomes laden down with mezedes (assorted appetizers) such as stuffed red peppers, flaky feta cheese pies, grilled octopus, Greek meatballs and the ubiquitous tzadziki (a tangy sauce made of yoghurt, cucumber and garlic). Invariably, house hospitality also includes downing a shot or two of ouzo, a cloudy Greek firewater flavored with anisette. Oftentimes, the atmosphere becomes more raucous still when the exotic strains of the bouzouki start up. When the music really gets going, a simple dinner can become an all-night affair.

Investing in Macedonian Tourism: an Unknown Commodity with Potential

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

A strangely captivating land of mountains and lakes, Macedonia slips beneath the radar of most businessmen and expats. This is a shame, because the little country has a lot to offer for the persistent and committed investor. While it does have problems commonly found in all post-Socialistic Balkan states, the lack of competition and generally poor efforts made so far mean that the savvy Western investor with imagination can easily capitalize on this largely undeveloped market.However, this will require a certain type of investor. Capacity for large hotels is oversaturated already, and limited to the realistically profitable areas (Lake Ohrid and Mavrovo ski resort). Further, package tourism won’t work in this land-locked country. Nor is it desired by the locals, who’ve seen what has happened to neighboring countries because of large-scale tourism.

So what kind of investor will succeed in Macedonia? Most likely, the kind who is willing to tap into the growing worldwide industry of eco-tourism, cultural tours, and mind/body tourism. Here, Macedonia is ideal. The little country of 2 million inhabitants is made up of pristine, high-quality real estate- vast stretches of mountain wilderness, lakes large and small, river gorges and a bona fide “wine country.”

In addition, producers of mineral water, mountain teas and holistic herbal medicines can succeed. Western investors have a considerable edge here because the locals seem unaware of the possibilities, and have completely failed to promote their products and market them to Western tastes. With even a little clever marketing aimed at the natural health crowd in the West, foreign investors can create and control these industries.

Macedonia could also be a major cultural/historical draw, though this aspect of the country is mostly unknown. The landscape is dotted with scores of Byzantine churches, Ottoman castles, Greco-Roman ruins and more. American and other tourists are already willing to spend money to go on archaeological tours and other historical tours. There is a proven track record of this kind of tourism working in more developed countries such as Greece and Italy. In fact, such a program worked very successfully in Macedonia in the 1990’s, and could easily be restored.

However, there remain some misconceptions. Westerners tend to think of Macedonia- when they think about it at all- as a murky land of instability. Macedonia’s bad image is a relic of 2001’s brief Albanian uprising. Although the peace has long been re-established, there is sporadic troublemaking from a small minority of the Albanian minority. Isolated border villages respect their own laws and can be havens for smuggling. However, such areas endanger Macedonian Army border patrols- not tourists. Nine-tenths of the country is perfectly safe.

There are other problems to be addressed, of course. Infrastructure problems (mostly highways, signs and facility repair) abound. However, improvements seem to be continuing. The largest remaining project, Corridor 8, connects Bulgaria and Albania via Macedonia. On the route are projected a highway, railroad and oil pipeline. New EU honorary president Italy has pledged to finance 960 km of railway and over 270 km of roads. Other ongoing European investments in Macedonia’s telecommunications, media and food industries indicate renewed optimism for future stability.

Transport is a mixed bag. Skopje is not a major air route and has no direct flights to the US. Trains are slow, but cheap, and connect Macedonia to Greece in the south and Serbia in the north. Buses are frequent to all points in the country, and offer cheap fares to international destinations- around $30 return to Thessaloniki, Greece, and $70 return to Istanbul, Turkey.
US and EU citizens do not need a visa in Macedonia, nor in Greece. Serbia, which used to charge for a two-week visa, recently waived all fees due to international pressure.

Financing problems exist- but these are more problematic for internal investors lacking access to Western capital. The commercial banks charge high interest rates, and nepotism and cronyism sometimes affect loan policy.

For its part, the government has moved disastrously slow on tourism reforms. Macedonia has no official tourism ministry (just an “office”), and no preparations have been made to try and seduce residual tourists from next year’s Olympic Games in neighboring Greece.

In fairness, however, the state currently lacks the money needed to really fund the tourism sector. Yet the inside word is that changes are on the way- ones which should facilitate public-private sector cooperation. Modifications in the tourist tax should provide a greater capital base for the government to fund basic projects, such as infrastructure repair and promotion. Also, an investment fund has been suggested, whereby European donor funds would be channeled through the government and commercial banks and finally be awarded to investors, at lower rates set by the donors.

Perhaps most importantly, the Finance Ministry in June announced new tax incentives for foreign companies investing in Macedonia. Those investing below 100,000 euros won’t pay any tax on profit, while those investing over 100,000 euros will pay 30 percent less.

Today’s individualized Western tourists are seeking something unique, whether it be a yoga retreat, wine-tasting tour or wilderness sports adventure. Such tourists have disposable incomes and prefer small, exclusive accommodations to traditional-style hotels. Macedonia abounds with “ghost villages”- abandoned or near abandoned traditional villages set in breathtaking nature. The cost of renovating the kind of “authentic” traditional house found in such villages numbers in the tens of thousands of dollars, not the hundreds of thousands.

Compare this with the amount being spent currently to build such houses from scratch in a brand new five-star hotel- $230,000 each. For this cost, an investor might be able to restore an entire traditional village. The rest is up to the investor’s skill at promotion, marketing and imagination.

Indeed, this is perhaps the most important edge Western investors have in Macedonia. Local tourism entrepreneurs have failed to market themselves abroad as much as they should. In fact, when asked they often can’t produce even basic statistics about their operation or offer clever and compelling reasons why visitors should come. Good marketing is relatively cheap, compared to construction costs. Western investors, who know how to do more with less anyway, can easily clean up on the marketing front, and therefore on the cash return front as well.

The locals, it seems, are having trouble adapting to the reality of having a new, unlimited world market at their fingertips. They often continue to operate as if they were still promoting Macedonia exclusively to the closed Yugoslav market of yesteryear. Since the logistics, bureaucratic and infrastructural problems are eminently surmountable, Western investors- armed with foreign capital and marketing savvy- can create a multi-faceted and profitable Macedonian tourism industry, ex nihilo.

Explore the ancient legacy of an ancient land. Buy Robert Lane Fox’s Alexander the Great and Peter Green’s Alexander of Macedon today!

Myths of Yugoslavia

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Guest author Dr. Sam Vaknin debunks commonly-held myths about Yugoslavia in this article from April 2000.

I have spent the last decade reading books and articles written about Yugoslavia by luminaries from East and West alike. I wonder if there ever was a subject so enshrouded by myths and inexactitudes, platitudes and wrongs, errors and omissions, lies and distortions. This is a list of the more common of these, organized in chronological order.1. The Balkans was entirely under the domination of a crumbling and venal Byzantine Empire.

The Byzantine Empire was a well organized, highly structured and intricate urban bureaucracy which gradually diverged from Rome. The latter -the Western remnant of the former unified empire- did indeed crumble under the weight of internecine warfare, nepotism, cronyism, corruption and capriciously murderous dictatorships. Byzantium, though, continued to flourish for another millennium. In any case, only a part of the Balkans was incorporated into the Byzantine reign, and the border between Byzantium and Rome still exists today - it is the contemporary line demarcating Serbia from Croatia.

The Balkans were organized in a strictly feudal system, and the Slavic tribes that descended from the north during the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries AD fit nicely into this hierarchical scheme. Still, feudalism was much less rigid than it was made out to be. Certain regions, such as Dalmatia and Slavonia in Croatia and Herzegovina in Bosnia, maintained a degree of autonomy comparable to that of Kosovo under the Tito-era constitution. Balkan feudalism, in other words, was not a replica of the Western variant. It was, rather, a "federal" approach, a compact between indigenous lords and their nominal superiors.

2. The Croats were always pro-Germanic

When Rome imploded, it left a black hole of stupendous proportions. Both Croatia and Slovenia hurried to declare their independence and to assume a growing degree of sovereignty. The "Croatia" and "Slovenia" of that time were not the modern nation-states they are today, but were the rough equivalents of fiefdoms, extended estates of local (and imported) aristocracy - feudal lots. The sovereignty of that era is equivalent to the autonomy enjoyed today by states within the United States of America.

Still, the unilateral actions of Croatia and Slovenia were at least evolutionary if, indeed, not revolutionary. They constituted a loosening and new exegesis of the feudal code. Asserting their new standing among other political units, both Croatia and Slovenia fought-off numerous invasions and attempted invasions by Magyar (Hungarian) tribes. It was only when the sustained pressure became unbearable, and further defense of the realms untenable, that they (very reluctantly) turned to the Germans - Charlemagne's Franks, at that time.

The Serbs -the contemporary epitome of ultra-nationalism- were the ones who, quiescently, accepted Byzantine rule, as did Bulgaria (which included today's Macedonia), Montenegro and Dalmatia. A few enclaves remained independent, but these were encouraged by Byzantine rulers, mainly for economic and trade reasons. Thus, Ragusa (later renamed Dubrovnik) continued, uninterrupted by the tectonic political shifts around it, to trade with Italy, becoming the "Hong Kong of the Balkans" for centuries after.

Inevitably, Slovenia and Croatia became Roman Catholic, while Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia became Eastern Orthodox; religion in the Balkans, as we shall see, is often a matter of expediency. Religious convictions were the result of granted concessions, economic prowess, brutal repression or political calculations. The right religion, like the right party affiliation years henceforth, guaranteed speedy access to the bureaucracy, a decent living, education and tolerable safety. Being political-economic juggernauts, all religions in the region were zealously missionary: they all proselytized in rich Dalmatia, for instance.

3. The Bosnians were good (Orthodox) Christians before they were forced to convert to Islam

Bosnia was always considered to be a lowly and primitive place by the other inhabitants of the Balkans - sort of the poor, always needy relative. Tucked between Croatia and Serbia, mountainous and endowed with a prelapsarian nature, Bosnia was almost psychedelic or surreal.
It was here that one of the most doctrinally severe heresies developed among Christians, as Bogomilism engulfed the entire destitute populace in no time. It was a powerful, populist and rebellious rhetoric, and the subversive Bogomil message threatened both the Church and the (feudal) state, bearing an uncanny resemblance to both the Reformation and Communism. It looked ominously unstoppable.

All Bosnians were officially branded "heretics" and Catholic powers were encouraged to exterminate them on sight. The Bogomils were largely the ones who later converted to Islam - mostly willingly and for reasons of convenience, as upon conversion they could buy land and obtain positions in the Ottoman administration. The rest of the population, having remained Catholic, joined forces with the predominantly Catholic Croats and, as centuries passed, these Bosniacs came to regard themselves as perfect Croats, just as Orthodox Bosniacs identified themselves as Serbs. Neither, however, were Croats or Serbs in the first instance.

During the 12th century, Rome was forced to collaborate with Hungary against the Bogomils, enhancing Hungary's stature considerably. Rome repaid Hungary's kindness with the territories of Croatia and Bosnia. Thus, Christian heretics in Bosnia "helped" introduce Hungary into the region as an uncontested superpower, though not for long. The Hungarians even supported a rump Serb kingdom following the apocalyptic defeat of the Serbs at the hands of the Turks in Kosovo in 1389, though the Serb kingdom lingered on for 70 more years before surrendering to the Ottomans.

The only ones to constantly, consistently and continuously rebel against the Hungarian occupation were Bosnian peasants (mostly Bogomils). The Ottomans assisted them in this worthy (from the Turkish point of view) endeavor and later, when the Bosnian forces were depleted, annexed the territory themselves. The first seeds of conflict were thus sown. The Bosnians welcomed the Turks, converted to Islam, joined their administration and owned land. True, they were Slavs but their religious heresy (first Bogomilism, then Islam) was further compounded by their national betrayal. The Serbs hated the Turks, and had no intention of remaining Turkish subjects for long.

4. The Serbs were never welcome in Croatia; they were always an alien body

There were almost no Serbs in Croatia until the Austrian occupation. The Austrians and the local Croat population were terrified by the possibility of a renewed Turkish invasion. To fend-off Turkish troops, Croatia called upon Serbs, mortal enemies of the Ottomans, to come and settle its border zones. The Serbs agreed, settling in today's Krajina, forming rather ferocious, well-armed paramilitary militias and declaring their settlements autonomous "(martial) camps or zones" within Croatia.

Their role was not only defensive, as they joined the Austrian army in its invasion of Ottoman-controlled regions, including Macedonia, in 1689. When the Austrians were defeated, Serbs throughout the Ottoman empire, by now considered traitors, fled. A sizable group of Serbs emigrated from the heartland of the ancient Serb Kingdom, a wind-swept plateau called "Kosovo". The Albanians, relegated to Albania's mountains by superior Serb forces three centuries earlier, hurried back. The Turks encouraged them to convert to Islam and they became close allies of the Ottoman administration (see Sam Vaknin's article The Myth of Greater Albania).

5. There is a religious and cultural affinity between the Greeks and the Serbs

It goes deeper than that. The Greeks, Russians, Bulgarians and Serbs collaborated in two Balkan Wars against the Ottoman Empire in an effort to re-carve the map of the Balkans.

The idea, in 1912 was to "liberate" Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania and to punish the collaborationist and separatist Albanians in Kosovo and Western Macedonia. This the invading Serbs did with a vengeance, burning villages and crops, looting and killing. This precipitated a nationalist movement in Albania proper. Fearful of being conquered and annexed by Serbia and Greece, the Albanians declared independence. The leaders of the independence movement were, inevitably, Muslim.

In the meantime, everyone ganged up on Bulgaria and, in the skirmish that ensued, Serbia won both Macedonia and Kosovo. With the Sick Man of Europe thoroughly defeated, the Serbs a regional superpower once again and Russian influence steadily growing, the Habsburgs, as the only remaining imperial power, became the next logical target.

6. Serbs were always anti-Western and the USA was first involved militarily in the Balkans during the Kosovo Crisis

The First World War pitted the most unlikely enemies against one another. Austria - Turkey's most avowed enemy - attacked Turkey's other mortal foe, Serbia. Bulgaria, which collaborated with Serbia, Russia and Greece against the Ottomans in the First Balkan War, joined the Turks against its former allies. The Albanians collaborated enthusiastically with Turkey's adversary, Austria, against the Serbs, and were rewarded handsomely. The Austrians made Albanian an official language and integrated Albanian nationals into their administration.

The United Kingdom and France supported Russia against the Ottoman Empire which, hitherto, they had done everything they could to heal and stabilize. The Croats and the Slovenes, as conscripts in an Austrian army they had regarded as an occupier, fought their Slav brethren, the Serbs. Actually, American forces joined Britain and France and landed in Greece to aid the Serb army against the German-Austrian-Bulgarian-Turkish axis.

The seeds of the Second World War were thus sown and the USA was inextricably intertwined in this intractable region. America intervened a second time in the Balkans when it sent troops to back up an Italian claim for the small enclave of Zara on the Dalmatian coast in Croatia in 1919.

7. Vojvodina is a Hungarian province that was given to Serbia as spoils of war

The rich and fertile region of Vojvodina did, indeed, form an administrative unit within Hungary, yet it always maintained a unique status. It was a duchy. It was always Serb. And its autonomy was granted by the Habsburg emperor himself (or herself). Thus, it answered directly to Vienna.

8. Yugoslavia has been in existence between 1918 and 1990

There is a very tenuous connection between the blatantly pro-Serb and anti-everyone-else dictatorship of King Alexandar and the Tito Federation. The first federation was a toned down version of the Serb Empire of yore. The national entities within Yugoslavia were abolished a decade after the country had been established, and the internal borders were redrawn to shatter the contiguity of other nationalities and to cohere Serb domination.

While the "First Yugoslavia" existed on paper until 1941, it had, in reality, ceased to function at least a decade before. The King was murdered by an Ustaљ (a member of the Croatian nationalist organization, the Ustaљas) in 1934. Mussolini's Italy was in cahoots with the Ustaљas, and had more influence in Croatia than Belgrade itself. The Regency council that replaced the assassinated monarch merely formalized reality by granting Croatia extensive autonomy. When the Regents signed a Stalinesque pact with Hitler, all hell broke loose in the form of a British sponsored coup. The Nazis invaded, bombed Belgrade and pacified the country. It was the death certificate for a long-festering corpse.

9. The Yugoslavs of all nationalities fought the Nazis tooth and nail

The truth, alas, is much less heroic. Pro-Nazi governments were installed in Serbia and Croatia. The Serb government was supported by the ancien regime and by a sizable part of the population. Fond stories of the Nazi occupation still abound in many of the republics of former Yugoslavia.

The Nazis were Germans, the living emblems of civilization, the blond, Aryan, chocolate- and gum-dispensing gods. In Croatia they were positively adored. Macedonians were patiently amused with them and with their Bulgarian proxies, although they grew impatient with Albanian collaborators. Serbs, ever pragmatic, collaborated. Vojvodina was happily reunited with Hungary.

Kosovars acted cruelly against their own in a Greater Albania within the framework of an Italian installed government with the ever-menacing Deva as Minister of the Interior. The Albanians were sufficiently grateful, though, to form militias and join the military effort - on behalf of the Axis, of course. So did the Bosnians, who even yielded an SS division of their own.

Death camps operated in Croatia in which Serbs, Jews and Roma were indiscriminately maltreated. Serbs, Bulgarians and Croats deported Jews, mostly to Auschwitz. Serb military formations of independent views were sent, by their own government, to German lagers.
Two isolated resistance movements operated in the areas of the First Yugoslavia. The Croat Partisans, a Communist guerrilla force, wanted to restore Yugoslavia to its former glory, while Serb Četniks wanted nothing to do with other Yugoslavs.

With the exception of a few months during 1941-2, everyone supported the Communists. The Četniks, therefore, joined forces with the Nazi and Fascist occupation forces against their "comrades," the Partisans. Thus, the end result was that Croat Ustaљas and Serb Četniks fought -in the name of post-war separatism and self-definition- against Communist Partisans. History records that the latter emerged from the war so strengthened and victorious that they tried to annex Trieste from Italy. Only an intervention by the West prevented it.

But it didn't take long before Tito turned on his Soviet benefactors. Yugoslavia was the first country in the Soviet bloc to encourage foreign knowledge and foreign investment in some of its industries, including strategic defense. It was the first to implement an IMF austerity plan following years of IMF lending in the 1960s.

It was also the only one to keep its borders open, with its people free to come and go, while instituting a functioning market mechanism through the hybrid known as "social ownership" and "self-management." No wonder Stalin issued a contract hit on Tito's head.
Albania also went its own way with the reclusive and paranoid Hoxha - but Tito's strategy was not the result of a clear mental disorder.

10. The Serbs were discriminated against in the Croat Tito's federation

A pillar of Tito's strategy was to ruthlessly dismantle nationalist projects, replacing them with viable multi-ethnic alternatives.

Bosnia was the laboratory in which inter-ethnic marriage and economic collaboration were tested, while in Kosovo Tito encouraged the Albanian population to stay put or to move in. In Croatia, he devolved power to Serb municipalities.

Statistically, though, Serbs dominated the two most important power structures in Yugoslavia: the Communist Party and the JNA (Yugoslav National Army). The latter was Tito's only guarantee against Russian (and perhaps Western) invasion, as well as against the kind of disintegration that took place a decade after his death.

Bosnia became the largest defence industry centre in former Yugoslavia (quite contrary to its rustic image), and Slovenia and Croatia were transformed into civilian industrial centers and concentrations of heavy industry.

11. Yugoslavia was an open society and Tito succeeded in holding it together by the sheer power of his personality

Yugoslavs were the only ones in the East Bloc to carry their own passports and to travel abroad freely. Yet freedom of expression, especially concerning nationalistic matters, was very restricted.

Social unrest and nationalistic stirrings were very prevalent. The decade of the 1960s saw brutally suppressed demonstrations in both Belgrade and Priљtina, and the early 70s witnessed the "Croat Spring," which led to mass detentions and the opening-up of Stalinist gulag camps throughout the country.

The pressure was so intense, that, in 1974 -clearly fearing disintegration- Tito purged the old guard, his onetime comrades in arms, and unveiled a new constitution. It granted limited autonomy to the republics and to Vojvodina and Kosovo, while a posthumous rotating federal presidency was supposed to assuage any feelings of bias and discrimination at the top.

This, evidently, was too little and too late. Kosovo continued to erupt periodically. In 1981, for example, the police killed 11 students and arrested thousands in one day of demonstrations. But the truth is that Yugoslavia was held together by the oldest glue of all - money. It borrowed USD 20 billion to finance its improbable transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one, and was among the IMF's heaviest borrowers during the 1960s.

When the IMF called its loans, Yugoslavia was exposed for what it was: a basket case. As long as all the republics shared the loot, there was little incentive for them to disengage. But the structural imbalances of contributions versus rewards pitted affluent Croatia and positively rich Slovenia against dirt-poor Macedonia and relatively poor Serbia and Montenegro. They simply refused to continue to cough-up the money.

At its beginning, protest was channeled to "safer" arenas: an anti-nuclear movement in Slovenia and a pacifist movement in Croatia, for instance. But not much later on, the masks fell and the true nationalist faces underneath were exposed.
The JNA was there to tackle precisely such a situation. Composed of all nationalities, but commanded by Serbs, it intervened.

12. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was inevitable

Slobodan Miloљević came to power (1987-9) on waves of popular support for his rabid nationalism and fake anti-establishment credentials. His first actions were directed at the Kosovo Albanians, as he revoked their autonomy by altering the constitution and proceeded to demolish the educational and legal infrastructure of the region.

He also applied bloody force to suppress street protests. Combined with the IMF's pressure to repay maturing loans, the other republics watched the phoenix of Serb dominion with horror and indignation. Kosovo was the undoing of Yugoslavia a few times over its long history - and it lived up to its historical reputation.

Hitherto fringe nationalist parties emerged as viable alternatives in both Slovenia and Croatia as a direct result of the suppression of Kosovo. The "shock therapy" of 1990 (composed of a wage freeze and a hike in the general price level), the cut-off of American aid pending republic-specific elections and the populist, grievances-orientated electoral campaigns that ensued -combined to seal Yugoslavia's fate.

When Franjo Tuđman, running on a neo-Ustaљa platform with Ustaљa symbology, won a two-thirds majority in the elections of April 1990 and a 94% vote in favour of independence in a May 1991 plebiscite, the Croatian Serbs prepared for war. Cordoning-off their regions and refusing to allow ballot boxes in, they began to arm (the JNA was helpful in this) and teamed up with Miloљević, who had his own Greater Serbia (and even greater personal profit) in mind.

The US - as it is wont to do - inadvertently stoked the flames by pleading with all parties to maintain "territorial integrity." This conflicted directly with both German views on the matter and with weighty German investments in the region, as Germany urged the EU to recognize the breakaway republics. It would not be the last time the West spoke in (at least) two voices.
Technically, though, the Serbs started the war everywhere.

The JNA invaded Slovenia immediately after it declared its independence, only to suffer heavy and disgracing losses at the hand of hastily organized Slovene militias. Next, following the Croatian declaration of independence, the Serbs in the Krajina expelled their Croat neighbours. The JNA then invaded eastern Croatia, as Serb artillery demolished Vukovar. These were undoubtedly the first acts of war.

But atrocities against both warriors and civilians were committed by all parties involved. Serbs, Croats and Muslim Bosnians all engaged in mass expulsions, slaughters, rapes and executions with fervour, zeal and glee. The Serbs did so more visibly and their actions were, perhaps, more numerous, but the guilt is shared.

The demonization of the Serbs only served to alienate them further and enhanced their paranoiac siege mentality. It was not conducive to making peace and it may have prolonged the war unnecessarily.

13. The West acted too late and too hesitantly

The West may have acted ignorantly once the war started- but definitely not too late or too hesitantly. The European Community held a peace conference in the Hague as early as September 1991, though it failed because Miloљević insisted on his dream of a Greater Serbia. With the entire might of the JNA behind him, he may have felt invincible.

Then, between October 1991 and February 1992, international mediators, both European and American, secured a total of 15 cease-fires, though admittedly none of them was too effective. The last one, organized by the eminence grise Cyrus Vance, involved UN troops. Unfortunately, these valiant efforts were coupled with some pretty dumb moves, such as recognizing Croatia in December 1991, thus incensing Serbia to insanity. This was German finesse at its apex.

In June 1992 this insult was coupled to the injury of a UN-imposed unilateral embargo on Serbia, though an arms embargo applied to all parties equally - thus preserving Serb superiority in weapons.

14. The Bosnians were the fiercest enemies of the Serbs, and Serbia suffered its worst defeat there

When it all began, the Bosnians actually opted to remain within a Yugoslav Federation. They were the only ones -together with the Macedonians - who seemed to have no design on independence. Negotiations commenced between Belgrade, and the local Serbs, Muslims and Croats.

These negotiations were interrupted by a referendum in which Muslim and Croat Bosnians voted for secession while the Serbs abstained en masse. The leadership of Bosnia did not want to hold the plebiscite, but was forced to do so in emulation of Croatia and Slovenia and in response to the growing rumble of street protest. The lines of the emerging war coalitions were already clearly visible.

Alija Izetbegović's first post-election government actually included Serbs, but Miloљević was fanning the flames. He regarded Bosnia as easy prey and an integral part of Serbia, and he intended to use the local Serb populace as pawns on his ever more bloodied board. Izetbegović's Muslim-nationalist past did not help.

The Serbs clearly won the ensuing war. The army of the emerging Republika Srpska incorporated JNA units, complete with their heavy armour, and were supported with food and supplies from Belgrade. At their height, they controlled an ethnically cleansed swathe of Bosnia equal to 70% of its surface area. Moreover, they linked to Serb-dominated zones in Croatia. The West (notably, President Bush) seemed to acquiesce despite Serb atrocities committed in dedicated rape camps and execution sites.

Even Mate Boban's Croat forces did not succeed in reversing this uninterrupted streak of luck and success. They fought a few successful but rather meaningless battles before the Vance-Owen partition peace plan was introduced and accepted by them and the Muslims. The Serbs rejected it in their makeshift parliament.

The Croats then turned on their Muslim collaborators in places like Mostar, hoping to secure a larger Croat space and the Serbs seemed to comply by standing aside. Conspiracy theories abounded among the Muslims, but the reality was a division of Bosnia between Serbs and Croats, even as fighting broke out between the compatriots of these new-found allies on Croatian soil.

15. The war brought to power the most extremist and radical leaders in each of the countries involved

Miloљević was not the most radical Serb politician. He was very often criticized by the likes of Vojislav Љeљelj for betraying the Serb cause. Extremist parties won handsomely in Serb elections and held many seats in the national parliament of Serbia.

The same can be said about Croatia. Franjo Tuđman - while an authoritarian Ustaљa sympathizer- had nothing near the neo-Nazi nostalgia of Dobroslav Paraga.
Both Љeљelj and Paraga had their own paramilitary formations which fought each other in Bosnia.

Izetbegović, for this part, did publish an "Islamic Declaration," for which he was jailed in 1983, but he was no Muslim fanatic or fundamentalist.

All sides were bound by shady dealings in drugs and weapons. The real conviction and vocation of all the leaders of the region was -and still is- crime.

16. The Kosovo conflict was a direct result of Serb suppression

In general, this is true. The Albanian population -especially the young and the educated- felt at a dead-end. But the direct trigger was the fact that the Dayton accords, which regulated the relationship between Yugoslavia (Serbia), Croatia and Bosnia, failed to mention Kosovo even once, let alone relate to its specific problems.

Pacifists and pro-Westerners like Ibrahim Rugova lost their clout and authority overnight. The resulting vacuum was filled by the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) - a guerrilla-cum-drugs group which embarked upon the path of armed resistance by killing policemen and blowing up their police stations all over Kosovo. There is no doubt who started the Kosovo ball rolling, technically speaking.

But one must never forget that it was Serb oppression that led to the formation of the KLA in the first place. The Serbs retaliated by torturing and "disappearing" Albanian prisoners. Following an attack by the KLA in February 1998 (in which 4 officers died), the Serbs embarked on a scorched earth and ethnic cleansing policy. The rest is history.

17. The Rambouillet Accord

Not a myth this time. It called for Serb capitulation on various issues including free passage in Serbia of foreign soldiers and airborne vehicles and a referendum to decide the secession of Kosovo in three years' time.

Miloљević could have never accepted this. The West knew it but believed that he would surrender to a threat of force - the same force used in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995.
This article was also published in World in Conflict, Economies inTransition.

Dubious Mandate

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

By Phillip Corwin

(Duke University Press, 1999)

Reviewed by Nebojsa Malic

Philip Corwin is not a professional apologist, advocacy journalist, propagandist or self-aggrandizing Imperial shill, the kind one would expect writing a book about Bosnia. Corwin, an American in UN service, was the head of UNPROFOR Civil Affairs in Sarajevo during those crucial months of 1995 when the UN became NATO’s handmaiden. As a result, he is a disillusioned, embittered witness to Imperial ascendance.

Personal memoirs coming out of the Balkans are usually a very suspicious affair. They either glorify their authors’ actions, or defend them from bad public opinion. Corwin is not a media personality, though, nor is he a major political player on the international stage. One gets the impression after reading this book that he could not have been, not with the people who have run world affairs since. Lacking a hidden agenda, Dubious Mandate is remarkably honest and direct, a refreshing read in the age of complex and deliberate lies.

Right from its very title, Dubious Mandate gets to the heart of the matter. As the Bosnian War unravels, so does the UN peacekeeper mission, whose mandate is self-contradictory, ill-defined, and under constant political and military pressure. From his position in Sarajevo, Corwin witnessed the disintegration of the last shreds of UN credibility and impartiality. His journal entries read like a Greek tragedy, with growing awareness of the impending disaster literally rolling in over the hills.

Arguably the best features of the book are Corwin’s “hindsight” notes. Unlike other memoirs, Dubious Mandate contains the author’s reflections alongside the original writing, clearly marked to avoid confusion. This provides the readers with an insight into how Corwin thought then, and how subsequent events and understandings impacted his earlier opinions. It is exceptionally difficult to write an honest memoir, avoiding the temptation to spruce up the original notes with hindsight. Dubious Mandate has found a way, and it works extraordinarily well.

Corwin does not mince words. He is not anti- or pro- anyone, often describing the local Balkans leaders as “thugs in suits.” But his insistence that there were legitimate concerns among the Serbs (even though their methods were reprehensible) and that the Sarajevo Muslims were far from angels, earns Corwin the undying hatred of the international diplomats, western Press, and, of course, the Izetbegovic regime.

This ferocity of his critics’ denouncements lends Corwin even more credibility, together with the fact that his book has not been widely publicized. For though he does not absolve the Serbs from a single shred of responsibility for the horrors of the Bosnian war, by giving them a voice at all he consciously risked vitriolic condemnation by various Muslim partisans, among whom one can find some familiar names...

No one is exonerated from wartime atrocities in Dubious Mandate. On the other hand, the book does explain much of the context underneath the savagery – things that were known, but never revealed by the international observers, military, and the media.

Once you are done with this book, a wider context of the Yugoslav wars becomes apparent. You will have seen how the UN had become resigned to playing mercenaries to the government in Sarajevo, harassed by the cheerleading international press, pushed around by Washington, and held hostage by the local warlords. Corwin describes in horrifying detail how the mission degenerated from a supposedly good-faith, impartial peacekeeping effort into open intervention against one side. NATO’s enormous pressure to meddle, UNPROFOR’s crippling internal squabbles, and power politics from behind the scenes paint an unflattering picture of an international “peace” effort aimed at promoting war.

If one is looking for a definitive work on the Bosnian War, this is not it. There really isn’t one, just yet. What it does is shed light on the role of the UN in its last days, and is a great companion to Canadian General Lewis McKenzie’s Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo.
Dubious Mandate is, without a doubt, a worthy addition to any Balkan history buff’s library collection. Buy Dubious Mandate now

Making a Buck in Istanbul

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

As I was helping the stroller-pushing mom carry her two-ton sack of clothes into the laundromat that day, a ludicrous thought struck me: what if this were Turkey? When the thankful woman blurted out her gratitude, I wanted to reply with “good service, good service?” and the expectant, hound-dog eyes of a “helpful” Turk hungry for tips. Yet I wasn’t in a hamam, or with the shoeshine boy- and so I settled for the reward of a “merry Christmas.” ‘Be careful,’ people would say, ‘those Turks are such scam artists.’

Inundated by such cautions before my first trip to Istanbul, I have now come to view the subject as more comic than tragic. Sure, there are cases of rough mistreatment, like the English lad I met who had been given a syringe-injected Coke and later woke up in a warehouse, stripped of his belongings; or the oft-repeated tale of the lamentable visiting Romeo, who is forced to pay for the drinks for a whole table of Turkish vixens who, however suspiciously, seemed rather friendly in the beginning. (And this is not to mention the inevitable heckling suffered by all blonde foreign females). Yet in most cases, unless one is a soccer hooligan, defaming Attaturk, or trespassing on military property, finding real trouble in Turkey is difficult. The following anecdotes, which confirm that the entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well in Istanbul, show the typically harmless (and humorous) nature of Turkish scheming. All roads, of course, lead to the rug store

In all of Istanbul, there is no merchant more clever than the carpet salesman. Dripping with handshakes, “good prices,” and free beverages, purveyors of rugs also maintain what may be the world’s most extensive networks of commission-earning, tax-free laborers. I learned this almost immediately on my first visit to the city in April, 1999.

I was making the rounds of the Istanbul historical sites with a Greek friend, a fellow historian. Crossing through the historical heart of Istanbul, Sultanahmet, we stopped to read the sign for the Mosaic Museum. Out of nowhere emerged a well-dressed fellow of about thirty-five. He asked if we were looking for the museum, an understandable enough question, all things considered. Our new friend was courteous, and apparently learned. He provided the historical commentary for a whole hour as we strolled through the museum. We wondered to what we deserved this honor, but chalked it up to a common love of history.

Yet just after exiting the museum, our unsolicited guide paused, and began his persuasions. There was an excellent carpet store, not too far away, and really we must buy a carpet before leaving Turkey. My cohort and I certainly did not look like the type to buy anything in the way of souvenirs; but the man was so unfailingly polite that we suffered his invitation with good humor. Besides, we felt a little bit guilty: he had given us a guided tour of the museum, after all, and some of the historical facts he told us might have even been true. Upon reaching the carpet store, our guide urged us inside. I pretended not to notice the brief eye signal he had given his cohort at the door, and we were led into a slightly musty world of hanging carpets. It was all laughably predictable, what with four Turkish men reclining on couches, surrounded by teapots, carpets, and colorful brochures chronicling the ancient Turkish traditions of warp and weave with photos of Anatolian crones at their looms. But, I realized, as I watched the old American ladies gabbing happily on the sofa, it worked.

This, I decided, was the bottom line: Turkish rug sellers make money for the same reason that Bambi gets shot. In other words, if you feed a wild animal enough, it will eventually lose its fear of humans; and if you ply elderly American tourists with enough cups of sweetened tea, they will eventually buy a carpet. “Oh, look at this one, Ethel!” crooned one blue-haired lady. “It’s so- nice! And what wonderful tea!” Not long after, with the register singing melodically behind us, we were back out on the street- and thankfully empty-handed.

The Juice Boy, and too many zeros

The same trip that introduced me to the magic of carpets also introduced me to the Juice Boy. We encountered him on an open, paved plateau, near the run-down pit of commerce that is Aksaray. At lunchtime there we had decimated the carcass of a whole chicken, surrounded by mustachioed men with furtive eyes and faded, mean-looking suits. Their presence I equated with the derelict buildings down every lane that read “cargo” or “import-export.” Across the crowded streets hustled men and boys bent double under the weight of bulky packages or overstuffed trash bags tied onto their backs. In this atmosphere of endeavor, dust and transience, the Juice Boy fit right in.

He had a poker face and an enormous silver tankard strapped to his back. The Juice Boy was rather overweight, and he didn’t speak much English. “Juice, juice,” he peddled. “How much?” inquired my friend, for fun. Raising five chubby fingers, he replied in monotone: “five-hundred.” Taking the initiative, the Juice Boy disentangled the snaking tube from which flowed an odd purplish liquid. He filled two two papers cups with the juice, though we hadn’t asked for even one. With a sigh, my friend fished for his wallet. “One million,” said the Juice Boy. The Greek sifted through the endless wad of Turkish paper money for the right bill. The Juice Boy decided to help speed up the process.

“That one, that one,” he said, pointing to a crisp 10,000,000 lira note. My friend looked up with a wry smile. “That one,” protested the Juice Boy. “One million.” But we were wise to the scheme. Although too many zeros had no doubt fattened the Juice Boy’s takings in the past, we weren’t going to be fooled this time. We had carefully studied our lira on the first day; and so the hyperinflation that drove Aksaray’s frantic peddling, and which was depicted pictorially on the bills, would not trip us up. We left the Juice Boy to stoically make his rounds, searching for less zero-savvy tourists. We walked on, passing the bazaars of cheap shoes and leather jackets. The juice, though kind of bland, was not that bad. But was it worth a whole one million lira? Being the high rollers that we were, we let it go.Planning to visit Turkey? You’ll want to bring along Lonely Planet’s guide to Turkey and Tom Brosnahan’s guide to Istanbul.

Ethical travelers in the global age

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Today, a popular movement is growing in the United States, among travelers and others interested in foreign cultures. This now-widespread sentiment states that America's global hegemony (military, economic and cultural) is misguided, socially unjust and also quite dangerous. Thus a certain overlap between the "ethical traveler" and the environmentalists, anti-globalization crowd, and others who would generally describe themselves as being on the Left.

Today, both conservatives and liberals believe that it is good and righteous for American democracy to reign supreme — the former, as a guarantor of security against terrorism, the latter as a cure-all for social and economic ills in developing countries. The nation-building enterprise itself, however, is rife with inconsistencies and problems. At what point does one safely say that "democracy" has arrived? And what if it fails — as it has in Kosovo, the new black hole of Europe?

While Iraq has greater resources than Kosovo, it is unlikely that colonial rule will achieve better results. The scary thing about the rhetoric of both the Bush administration and its challengers is that empire is now presupposed as a necessity — as if America had no other course than to impose its political and social system worldwide.

Second, equating the United States with an evil globalization process is not tenable. Protesters outside World Trade Organization meetings forget that the WTO often rules against the US — as it recently did over steel tariffs and agricultural subsidies. In fact, populists on the right (Pat Buchanan) and on the left (Howard Dean) both blame American economic losses on the last decade's pro-global trade agreements.

What, then, should characterize America's involvement with the outside world? This question is of special interest to the ethical traveler, however he or she chooses to define the appellation. But can a definitive consensus be reached among travelers? And would one even be desirable?

Travelers should retain their independence of mind and of speech. They should embrace cultural difference, even if they don't always agree with specific examples of it. The world is big and operates under mysterious rules of its own devising. From our limited, individual viewpoint, it is often hard to see why things happen. Acting without serious prior contemplation often worsens problems. Doing so on a group level, whether through an organization or a government, increases this danger exponentially.

Understanding difference means accepting that the world is filled with a variety of people, practices and intellectual values, all of which can only be preferred or disdained on a subjective basis.

The globalizing world is simultaneously becoming a bigger place and a smaller one. While we are bombarded with information and voices from all over the globe, the wonders of technology and economy also mean that transportation can be extremely affordable, and that worldwide communications are instantaneous and powerful. Despite the many complaints against the perceived social injustices of the global economy, the truth is that globalization is not all bad. Travelers should exploit the communication and travel technologies available, so as to travel more and travel smarter.

We should not achieve too much consensus regarding what is "ethical," considering that this is a loaded and subjective question. Perhaps the best thing is to simply provoke an awareness of the issue, provide a context for its discussion, and to generate a debate. Independence of mind goes naturally with independence of travel.

Simply by traveling, observing and making personal connections, the independent, ethical traveler can help improve the perception of America abroad. This because the ethical traveler, unlike government diplomats constrained by protocol and damage control necessities, are able to enjoy the basic freedoms of speech and movement, and the independence of mind that have historically made America a great country. In a time when the government has despaired of it, they can set an example of what Americans truly value.

Finally, we must consider the word 'ethical.' How should it be defined in this context? Perhaps it's best to say that the ethical traveler is one who understands that enjoying such freedoms necessarily brings with it social responsibilities — no matter how these are understood by each individual. This might be as good a basis as any to start from for those who consider themselves to be ethical travelers. This article was originally published by Jeff Greenwald’s Ethical Traveler.

The Empire Strikes Out: Scott Taylor reports from Iraq

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Canada's top war reporter, Scott Taylor has long experience covering conflicts in the Balkans and Iraq. His inside stories from the field have appeared often on Antiwar.com, as well as in Canadian newspapers and in his own monthly magazine, Esprit de Corps. The award-winning author is best-known for his Inat (about the Kosovo conflict) and Diary of an Uncivil War (on Macedonia's 2001 war). Taylor's latest book, Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War Against Iraq, is the cumulative result of more than a dozen visits to Iraq.

Just days before this new release, Scott was back in the thick of things in Iraq. The following testimony from his 15th trip to the country comes as a troubling reminder that the situation there remains dangerous and highly volatile.

The Latest

Chris Deliso: On this latest foray into Iraq, when did you arrive, where did you go and for how long?

Scott Taylor: I entered Northern Iraq on 22 November, spending seven days in the country, and managed to cover Zakho, Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Baghdad and Fallujah. I must say that of all my trips into Iraq, this one was by far the most dangerous. The security situation has been steadily declining since the US occupation began seven months ago.

CD: To what degree are Iraqis enjoying a normal life? Are schools, public transport etc. running normally yet?

ST: The US propaganda machine has been trying to make a big deal over the fact that some Iraqi institutions have been successfully re-opened in recent weeks. However, the fact remains that the Americans have yet to provide anything close to a secure environment (even for their own troops). The basic utilities, such as electricity and phones remain worse than in pre-war times, and there is now something like eighty percent unemployment in Iraq, since the new US governing council's decision to disband the entire Iraqi bureaucracy as well as the army and police forces.

The other bizarre development is that without the refineries restored to full production and due to the tremendous fuel consumption of the occupying coalition forces, Iraq is now almost out of gas. Citizens have to wait up to four days in line to collect their ration allotment, which they then sell on the black market at one hundred percent markup to taxis and bus drivers who cannot afford to wait in queue. This has really restricted movement within Iraq for the average citizen.
'No Plausible Exit Strategy' for the Empire

CD: In the past, you have predicted a quagmire for the occupying US troops, one that would hasten the transfer of power to a UN force so as to lessen the bodybag syndrome for President Bush before the US presidential elections. From what you saw, is this happening as quickly as you had anticipated?

ST: At the moment, Bush and his administration 'heavies' (Powell, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) are all making a tremendous effort to 'sell' the international community on committing more resources to the Iraq quagmire. I think the slogan could be best summed up as "anybody but Americans" should be added to the future casualty count.

Unfortunately for Bush and Company, the rest of the world is not so quick to jump on their bandwagon – and with good reason. In Iraq, there is no plausible exit strategy which does not involve additional violence.

CD: What about the ethnic and religious divides in the country? Have these been over-hyped, or do you still believe a civil war is possible?

ST: Anyone who can't foresee the potential for a civil war in Iraq is either willfully blind or a complete moron. Everywhere in the north, there are still the two private Kurdish peshmerga (militia) armies, as well as newly formed Turkmen, Arab and Christian militias. In the predominantly Shiite south, there are a number of armed factions, the most formidable being the estimated 5000-strong Al Badr Brigade.

The potential for inter-ethnic strife remains a serious concern, and at this point it would appear to be a matter more of determining "when" rather than "if" such a struggle will begin.
Trouble Ahead, Trouble Behind

CD: The White House has consistently said that worries over the security situation in Iraq are overblown, because the majority of attacks have been occurring within a relatively small and contained area of the country.

ST: The fact that the "Sunni Triangle" has been the central point of the resistance thus far is perhaps misleading Bush and his speechwriters a little. It is here that the Americans are actually confronting the resistance, whereas elsewhere they are simply turning a blind eye to the fact the local Iraqi leaders have no regard for the US appointed administration in Baghdad. I don't think that Donald Rumsfeld went to war in Iraq to create either an independent Kurdistan in the north, or a Shiite fundamentalist state in the south. At some point the US coalition will have to try to bring the various warlords and clerics to heel under one central authority, but this will not happen without additional violence.

CD: A recent report, quoting US military brass, stated that the arena of resistance is spreading east and west of the so-called 'Sunni Triangle.' Do you agree?

ST: US Intelligence officials in Kirkuk actually believe that the American military crackdown in the Sunni Triangle is forcing the resistance to seek softer targets further afield. However, the anti-American sentiment which is now prevalent all across Iraq has assisted the resistance fighters in finding new support bases. It was revealing to see the crowds on the streets of Mosul cheering and dragging bodies of American soldiers after they had been ambushed and killed. Mosul was considered to be relatively "safe" by US officials prior to last month's attack.

CD: The same report called Basra a "relatively pro-American city." Is this accurate?
ST: The people I interviewed before the war in Basra all expressed that they had no love for Saddam. However, they also had said that if the Americans came, they could topple Saddam, but then they must leave. As a predominantly fundamentalist Shiite region, they wish to establish their own separate state. And they know that this objective runs counter to the American ideal for a new Iraq.

Fallujah: Given Over to the Resistance

CD: What would you say is now the most dangerous place in Iraq?

ST: Without a doubt, the "hottest" spot in Iraq is the town of Fallujah, about one hundred kilometres from Baghdad.

For starters, no one warned us that the US forces have withdrawn from Fallujah. When journalists asked to be embedded with the 82nd Airborne there, the official response was that it was unsafe at the moment. The fact is that the resistance now completely controls Fallujah. The Americans have literally put a lock on the front gate of their Forward Operating Base Volturno, and bugged out. So we were driving around this city, noting the unfriendly faces as our driver-translator read out all the Arabic graffiti calling on the residents of Fallujah to "kill Americans" and "restore Saddam to power." Realizing that they probably wouldn't be able to discern between Americans and Canadians until it was too late, we got out quickly ourselves.

CD: So the resistance controls the city? Can you explain exactly who comprises the resistance? After all, the same government that downplays the attacks maintains that "Saddam loyalists" are behind them, or perhaps al Qaeda. What's the story?

ST: There are all sorts of different factions operating in Iraq right now. You have some sophisticated al Qaeda-type car bombings and assassinations being carried out, and then you have the low-level people's resistance such as the group in Fallujah.

However, scary as Fallujah was, my most dangerous experience was ironically enough a near-death experience with some terrified Yanks.

Friendly Fire Almost Takes Out Taylor

ST: We were heading south on the highway from Tikrit to Baghdad when we got stuck behind a slow-moving US convoy. Normally the Iraqis travel about 170 km per hour, but the US troops were doing just 40 km, and their armored Humvee escort made sure no one could pass on either side. With nothing else to do, and with my blood pressure boiling over, I had my driver pull up about 20 meters behind the American Hummer. I then put my camera out the window, so that the gunner would not mistake it for an RPG. I snapped a couple of photos, and the gunner dropped down inside his cupola to pass along the news to his driver.

Mistakenly, as it turned out, I assumed that all was well. Ten minutes later the Hummer braked to a sudden halt and two soldiers came running at our car screaming, "…where is the camera? Where is the f**king camera?" The one US soldier jammed the barrel of his pistol against my terrified driver's head, while an M16 was pointed into my face. All traffic had stopped, and other US soldiers had moved into position behind our car. The other Iraqis must have thought that the Yanks had found Saddam!

I was asked, "…why were you taking our photo?" and replied that I was a journalist. "Where is your ID?" screamed an obviously terrified sergeant. When I reached for my briefcase to get it, all I could hear was the clicking of rifles as they flipped the safety switches, and the gunner in the Hummer cocked his grenade launcher, which remained aimed at our windshield. "What the f**k are you doing?" screamed the sergeant again. I then asked how was I to get my credentials out without moving – and was told to keep my right hand in the air while I searched blindly with my left… no easy feat.

All this time, my petrified driver still had the loaded pistol pressed against his head. Only once my ID was finally found and the US sergeant satisfied did the Americans let down their guard. My driver slumped over the steering wheel crying tears of joy and praising Allah.
Update on Another Downturn in Morale

CD: In the past you have especially noted the poor morale of US soldiers on the ground. Is morale getting better or worse, in your opinion? And did Bush's much-hyped Thanksgiving visit raise spirits as much as the media said it did?

ST: Every American soldier would have known instantly that the Bush visit was a pile of stage-managed crap. At even the best protected US headquarters, the troops are required to take their weapons and webbing everywhere. You won't see them head to the toilet without a rifle.

But at Bush's turkey slicing, there wasn't a weapon in sight. Obviously it would have sent a different message to the US public to see their soldiers hunkered down in fear as they are in reality. If Bush indeed was even really at the Baghdad airport, his plane must have departed a long time before they released the "live" footage of Bush's speech. (My Iraqi driver lives very near the airport).

For the average Iraqi citizen, the content of Bush's speech was very symbolic. "This means the US is now claiming to be still winning the war that it claimed to have won back in May" was how Lela Al Saadi (my driver's wife) summed it up.

CD: Did any soldiers comment specifically on Bush's visit?

ST: One comment that I got from a US soldier about Bush was in regards to the 21 November peace rally in London, England. "If I could have been there I would have helped pull down that (mock) statue myself," said Sergeant Nystrom, a 24 year-old serving with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Kirkuk. It is interesting to note that every one of the dozens of US personnel I spoke with claimed they were going to get out of the Army as soon as possible. One female Military Policewoman even asked if Canada would accept AWOL US troops as "refugees" from the war.

…While the Homegrown Police Hope to Survive until their Next $54

CD: Now that Spanish, Italian, Japanese and other coalition countries are being targeted, are these troops starting to have misgivings about having joined up for America's war?

ST: I think that the targeting of the Spanish Intelligence operatives is probably the best example of the international coalition's collective resolve in this affair. At the outset, it was the Spanish, along with the US and UK that took the strongest stance for an armed intervention in Iraq. Although the Spanish did not contribute any combat troops for the actual fighting, they do now have a significant number of soldiers in the occupation force. However, even as their ten intelligence operatives were being mourned at a state funeral, the Spanish parliament was re-opening the debate on maintaining a continued presence in Iraq. In virtually all of the so-called "coalition" countries, there is tremendous public resentment towards the war, and each fresh casualty only intensifies the domestic political pressure.

CD: Did you get a chance to talk to any of the newly-trained Iraqi police or army staff? Do they have any confidence at all in the future of Paul Bremer's new Iraq?

ST: Those few Iraqi police that we managed to talk to were basically scared shitless, and any attempt to initiate a discussion on broad scale politics was pointless. They did not see themselves serving any greater purpose at the moment than surviving long enough to collect their next $54 monthly paycheck.

CD: The last month or so has seen increasingly high numbers of Iraqi civilian and police deaths as a result of terrorist attacks. Is this making the average Iraqi less sympathetic to the resistance fighters' cause?

ST: Actually, given the level of discontent among the average Iraqi, the resistance is taking on almost mythical qualities. They have certainly captured the imagination of most Iraqis, whereas those who have joined the US sponsored police are viewed as traitors.

CD: Your new book, Spinning on the Axis of Evil: America's War Against Iraq, has just come out. Briefly, what is your main thesis, and what do you feel the average reader would find most interesting?

ST: I think the most informative thing about the book is that it provides a lot of background information and a continuous timeline. Most of the western media became interested in the Iraqi situation only when it became evident that war was unavoidable. Few of the major media outlets bothered to uncover the ravages of 12 years of economic sanctions and the deadly effects of long range exposure to depleted uranium. If more Americans were aware of the scale of genocide which US foreign policy had inflicted upon the people of Iraq, it would not have come as such a surprise that their soldiers have not been greeted as liberators.

Of course, the book is certainly not a promotion of Saddam Hussein's regime. Hell, his Mukhabarat (secret service) accused me of being a Mossad spy, and kicked me out of Baghdad on the eve of the war. However, it is important to know that the US also had a lot of blood on their hands in this whole affair. While Bush, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld all predicted a virtually bloodless intervention and a hasty withdrawal of coalition forces, the Iraqi people themselves were not so naive. They had accurately predicted, and feared, the post-war violence and anti-US resistance.

As a selling point, I should point out that this book is also written in the first person. There are a lot of little adventure stories to keep a reader's interest: Trekking about Saddam's Iraq with an alcoholic driver and no official permission, running afoul of trigger-happy American soldiers, being detailed by nervous Iraqi conscripts with guns cocked and loaded, and an attempt to cross a border minefield at night. It's all in there.

CD: Thanks, Scott, it's been informative as always.0

ST: Thank you, Chris. "

Foreign Direct Investment in Central and East Europe

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

A classic analysis of FDI flow in the East from guest author Dr. Sam Vaknin.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Lithuania is projected to have grown by at least 15 percent this year. Its FDI stock - accumulated in its decade of independence - reached c. $4 billion, or c. $1000 per capita. Pace has picked up dramatically in the past four years in many second-tier investment destinations in central and east Europe, including Slovakia, and formerly war-torn Macedonia and Armenia. Of the latter's $600 million in post-communist foreign inflows - two thirds have been placed since 1999.

Prime investment locales, like the Czech Republic, or Hungary, are still attracting enthusiastic fund managers, multinationals and bankers from all over the world. In a startling inversion of roles, Russia became a net exporter of FDI. According to official figures - which are thought to under-report the facts by half - Russia invested abroad more than $3 billion every single year since 2000. This is double the figure in 1999 and translates into $300-500 million in annual net outflows of foreign direct investment. Moreover, the bulk of Russian capital spending abroad is directed at rich, industrialized countries. The republics of the former Soviet Union see very little of it, though Russian stakes there have been growing by 25 percent annually ever since the 1998 meltdown. Russia's energy behemoths compete, for instance, with western mineral and oil extraction companies in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

Levels of worldwide FDI declined by more than 50 percent - to c. $730 billion - between 2000 and 2001. Yet, astoundingly, the major downturn in emerging markets FDI in the last three years has hitherto largely bypassed the region. Net private capital flows - both FDI and portfolio investment - shot up six-fold from $1 billion in 2000 to $6 billion a year later. Most of the surge occurred in the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in its latest Transition Report Update, the region grew by 4.3 percent in 2001 and by 3.3 percent last year.

This is way more than most developed and emerging markets managed. Eight countries in central and east Europe drew rating upgrades, only two (Moldova and Poland) were downgraded.

But all this may be changing. The global recession is already one of the most prolonged, trenchant and all-pervasive in history. Its effect on the region's traditional export markets is pernicious.

Central and east Europe were spared the first phase of financial gloom which affected mainly mergers, acquisitions and initial public offerings. But now that multinationals are scrapping projects, scaling back overseas expansion and canceling long-planned investments, the countries in transition are bound to hurt.

According to the latest report by the Vienna Institute of Economic Studies, FDI flows to the countries of central Europe were halved in the first quarter of last year, despite their looming membership in the European Union in May 2004. Export transactions were frequently delayed and privatizations attracted scant interest.

The Vienna Institute predicts a particularly bleak year for Poland and a Czech economy redeemed only by sales of state assets in the energy sector. Still, the statistics do not cover reinvested profits. These amount to $1.5-2 billion in Hungary alone - equal to its average annual FDI.

The picture is mixed. Forecasts prepared in November 2002 by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) showed marked declines in FDI in Moldova, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Macedonia and Ukraine. Flows should rise in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, and remain unchanged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Romania and Russia, said UNCTAD.

Some countries fare better than others. Slovakia sold, last March, 49 percent of its gas transport company for $2.7 billion. Slovenia will book yet another record year in 2002 due to the long-deferred privatization of its banking sector and to the sale to foreign investors of assets originally privatized to cronies, insiders and communist-era managers. The Slovenian Business Weekly expects the country to have drawn in more than $600 million last year - up 50 percent on 2001.

In the western Balkans, only Croatia stands out as an inviting and modernization-bent prospect. Yugoslavia is reawakening, too. It has privatized cement companies and rationalized the banking sector with a view to becoming a preferred FDI destination. In the first 6 months of 2002, it garnered $100 million in realized deals and another $60 million in commitments.

Romania and Bulgaria are laggards, though intermittent privatization in both countries is counterbalanced by cheap and skilled workforces in their growing and labor-intensive economies. Macedonia is reviewing, with a view to annulling, at least 30 suspect privatization deals. This will not endear it to anyhow reluctant multinationals.

Per capita, FDI stock is highest in the Czech Republic ($3000), Estonia ($2600) and Hungary ($2400). These are followed by Slovenia ($2000), Slovakia ($1800), Croatia ($1700) and Poland ($1200). All, with the curious exception of Croatia, are slated to join the EU next year.

The total realized FDI in 2000-2002 in central Europe amounted to more than $50 billion, with Poland and the much smaller Czech Republic attracting the most ($14 billion each), followed by the Slovak Republic ($7 billion) and Hungary ($5 billion). The regional FDI stock comes to a respectable $100 billion.

Southeastern Europe (the politically correct name for the Balkans), excluding Greece and Turkey, attracted rather less - c. $12 billion in realized FDI since 2000. Croatia tops the list with $3.8 billion, followed by Romania ($3.3 billion), Bulgaria ($2.3 billion), Macedonia ($1.1 billion), Yugoslavia ($0.7 billion) and Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina ($0.5 billion each).

Yet, the Balkans, impoverished and war-scarred as it is, accumulated a surprising $22 billion in FDI stock. According to the 2003 Investment Guide for Southeast Europe, published by the Bulgarian Industrial Forum, the share of FDI per GDP is much higher in the Balkans than it is, for example, in Russia. In 2001, the ratio was c. 5 percent in Bulgaria, 7.5 percent in Croatia and about 12 percent in Macedonia.

The former USSR as a whole enjoyed $57 billion in FDI since 1991. The bulk of it went to Russia ($23 billion) and the Baltic states ($8 billion). In the last 3 years, Ukraine absorbed $1.9 billion in FDI flows - one half the receipts of the puny Baltic trio: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Belarus and Moldova scarcely register, each of them with barely above three fifths the FDI in Albania, or ravaged and precariously balanced Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The weight of FDI in the local economies cannot be overstated. Two fifths of the exports of countries as disparate as the Czech Republic and Romania are produced by foreign affiliates. In some countries - like Romania - 40 percent of all sales are generated by foreign-owned subsidiaries. The banking sectors of many - including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Macedonia - are mostly owned by outside financial institutions.

Foreigners bring access to global markets, knowledge and management skills and techniques. They often transfer technology and train a cadre of local executives to take over once the expats are gone. And, of course, they provide capital - their own, or gleaned from foreign banks and investors, both private and through the capital markets in the west.

Initially, foreign investors provoked paranoid xenophobia almost everywhere in these formerly hermetically sealed polities. Deficient legal and regulatory frameworks, rapacious insiders, venal politicians, militant workers, opaque and politically compromised institutions, disadvantageous tax regimes and a hostile press obstructed their work during the first half of the 1990s.

Yet, gradually, the denizens of these countries came to realize the advantages of FDI. Workers noticed the higher wages paid by foreign-owned plants and offices. The emergent class of shareholders, invariably members of the powerful nomenclature, having sucked their firms dry, sought to pass the carcasses to willing overseas investors. Currently - with a few notable exceptions, such as Belarus and Ukraine - multinationals and money managers are actively courted by eager governments and keen indigenous firms.

Proofs of this grassroots turnaround in sentiment and priorities abound.

FDI is a good proxy for a country's integration with the global economy. It is an important component in A.T. Kearney and Foreign Policy Magazine's Globalization Index. The Czech Republic made it this year to the 15th place (of 62 countries), higher than New Zealand, Germany, Malaysia, Israel and Spain, for instance.

Croatia in 22nd rung and Hungary in the 23rd slot compare to Australia (21) and outflank the likes of Italy (24), Greece (26) and Korea (28). Slovenia is not far behind (25), followed by Slovakia (27), Poland (32) and Romania (40). Even hidebound Ukraine made it to the 42nd place, ahead of Sri Lanka (44), Thailand (47), Argentina (48) and Mexico (49). Russia lags the rest at the 45th location.

A.T. Kearney's Global Business Policy Council - a select group of corporate leaders from the world's largest 1000 corporations - publishes the FDI Confidence Index. It tracks FDI intentions and preferences. Its September 2002 edition ranked 60 countries which, together, account for nine tenths of global FDI flows. The companies interviewed were responsible for $18 trillion in sales and seven out of every ten FDI dollars.

Revealingly, central and east European countries made it to the first 25 places. Poland, right after Australia, preceded Japan, Brazil, India and Hong-Kong, for instance. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Russia - closely grouped together - were found more alluring than Hong-Kong, the Netherlands, Thailand, South Korea, Singapore, Belgium, Taiwan and Austria. Russia - whose economy improved dramatically since 1998 - leaped from beyond the pale (i.e., below the top 25) to 17th place. Hungary moved from 21 to 16.

The report concludes with these incredible projections:

"Russia ... could well be a target for almost as many first-time investments as the United States ... China, Russia, Mexico and Poland combined ... are expected to accumulate about one quarter of all proposed new investment commitments."

This is part of a more comprehensive trend:

"Europe has become the most attractive destination for first time investments. More than one third of global executives are expected to commit investments for the first time in Europe over the next three years (especially in) Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic."

A relatively new phenomenon is cross-border investments by one country in transition in another's economy and enterprises. At four percent of Slovene FDI stock, the Czech Republic has invested in Slovenia as much as the United States, or the United Kingdom. Slovenes and Bulgarians have ploughed capital into the banking, industrial and food processing sectors in Macedonia. Hungarians in Serbia, Czechs in Romania, Croats in Slovenia - are common sights.
Traditional FDI destinations feel threatened by the surging reputation of central and, to a lesser extent, east Europe. In a series of articles he published on radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Breffni O'Rourke summed up Irish anxieties expressed by his interviewees thus:

"There's a certain unease developing in Ireland as the 10 Central and Eastern European candidate countries move toward full membership in the European Union. The Irish are not unaware that the Czechs are heirs to a fine tradition of precision manufacturing; that the Poles are considered quick-thinking and innovative; that Bulgarians have a way with computers; that the Baltic nations have powerful Scandinavian supporters; and that Romania has extraordinarily low costs to offer investors. In fact, rising costs -- in comparison to the Eastern candidate nations -- are one of Ireland's main worries. The question troubling the Irish is: Could incoming Eastern member states prove so attractive for foreign investment that the country would find itself eclipsed?" This article was also published in World in Conflict, Economies in Transition.

The Empire of Manuel I Comnenos, 1143-1180

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

By Paul Magdalino (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

584 pp.

Reviewed by Christopher Deliso

In this magisterial work Professor Magdalino sets the social, economic, religious and military context for the revival of Byzantine fortunes under Emperor Alexios I Comnenos (1081-1118), who began a family dynasty that ruled Byzantium until the murder of his grandson Manuel's successor in 1184. During this time, Byzantium re-established itself as a military power in both East and West, rebuffing the Turks in Asia Minor and fighting the Normans in Greece. Generally this period was one of great change, brought about by increased contact with the West (due to the Crusades, beginning in 1096), and by other, parallel changes in the power dynamic of the Mediterranean.

The Comnenian period also saw changes in Byzantine culture, in regards to art, poetry and literature. Overall, it is one of the most fascinating eras of all Byzantine history, and one that Professor Magdalino does justice to in this work. In The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos
Magdalino relies on a great many sources, including the famous histories of Anna Comnena (daughter of Alexios) and Niketas Choniates, as well as many more obscure sources, including monastic charters, Venetian accounting records, and verse in the Byzantine vernacular. He follows the contours of the history, beginning with Alexios' desperate attempts to revive the empire after years of financial and military mismanagement, through the sound generalship of his son John, to the gaudy splendor of grandson Manuel, who presided over the greatest period for culture (and, unfortunately for Byzantium, for conspicuous consumption).

Throughout the book Magdalino stresses the importance of 'family' in the Comnenian conception for ensuring loyalty in government, and the increased use of strategic marriage alliances encouraged by Comnenian emperors, especially with Western rulers. The author also gives a great deal of attention to the effect Westerners had on the Byzantines, both in terms of the increased hostility and fear between the two cultures during the Crusades, and in terms of the increasingly aggressive economic policies of the Italian maritime states of Venice and Genoa, and the effect this had on Byzantine commerce and hegemony in the Aegean. Magdalino argues that these were the significant trends, gradual yet severe, which brought about the conquest and economic colonization of Byzantium by the Western powers in 1204.

All in all, this is a very important book in the field of Byzantine Studies, for experts and non-experts alike. The author draws upon a wide range of sources and his own immense knowledge to give as full as has yet appeared a picture of life in the fascinating time of the Comneni. This book, by one of today's foremost British Byzantinists, is a must-read for anyone interested in the period.

An Istanbul Sketch

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

At Eminonu, when the dying rays of the Western sun settle over the bridges, and the ferries and tugboats bob, the mercantile past and present of Istanbul stand out. Grizzled rogues from the Caucasus and Kazakhstan tilt the orbit of commerce eastward, while from the bridge amateurs cast their lines for the tiny fish that congregate in the oily depths of the Golden Horn. Galata opposite, once the Italian quarter, shimmers in its dereliction and smog. Behind it, up over the Taksim hill, stands the largest shopping mall in Europe, and the affluent neighborhoods of Etiler and Sariyer. It is a mark of status to live in one of the penthouses on top of the mall; a closer proximity to consumption could not possibly be imagined. Perhaps the stinking fish markets of Karakoy, on Galata’s waterfront, once offered the same enticements for the wealthy Genoese and Venetians who built their mansions nearby.

Somewhere behind and upwards, through the gold stores and the currency traders and the tables of alcohol next to those sporting dusty drills and tools in the open-closed market, the September sun drops on the backs of boys groaning under the weight of mysterious packages. Through the congested streets of Aksaray down to Laleli scramble these human pack animals, negotiating dips in the curb, gesticulating salesmen, and old ladies in heavy overcoats and shawls. Russian lettering, sad underground shoe stores with never-expect-it expensive models from Italy- the whole acrid scene somehow necessary in its randomness.

Far back down, where the tram line droops into the sea, continent-crossers jostle to get through the gates and onto the ferries leading home. The water shines dark, cold with waves and swarming with translucent jellyfish, while the tea-drinking passengers never see these things but look at the worn wood underfoot. Where they're going- to the "new" city- is the equally garrulous Asia side, flush with dolmuses and fish markets. Istanbul continued sprawls under stealthy mountains, in more sedate and manageable neighborhoods where life is uninterrupted by tourists and the drivers are a little less crazy. Disembarking from the ferry at Kadikoy, one finds chestnut vendors, bread-ring vendors and a cozy neighborhood of vegetable markets, remaindered textbooks, even a honey store. Here the sad-eyed owner plucks the strings of the eeb, and proudly showcases the fine Erzurum honey- blended from 22 types of flower, $45 a kilo. Most people settle for the cheaper stuff. He tells me of his flying lessons; he dreams of being a commercial pilot. “You fly with me sometime,” he says. “Only $130 dollars. I take you anywhere- Antalya, Ankara, Bodrum, I even take you to Greece.”Outside, the sun has fled for the west, down past Greece precisely. Huge bloated purple clouds stretch across the darkening sky. People come and go, hastening with their purchases down to the ferry, or the bus, or the minibus back home. The lights are starting to come on now, over rows of peppers and fish and tomatoes in the stalls. After dark, the city begins to make more sense- to become more united- in the fluid light of traffic on the bridges, of ferries, of all the houses and landmarks and bars that teem with life. After dark, Istanbul’s cohesion is restored, becoming one pulsing, shimmering jewel. The demarcations of continents disappear, and the city flows into itself, together, one.

Istanbul is evoked in magical detail by Philip Mansell’s highly recommended Constantinople, city of the world’s desires.

Planning to visit Turkey? You’ll want to bring along Lonely Planet’s guide to Turkey and Tom Brosnahan’s guide to Istanbul!

Simulating Victory in a Simulated War

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Seven short months into the war, and we’ve already seen everything- the weapons of mass destruction, the star-crossed multicultural marriages, the stage-managed toppling of Saddam’s statue and his symbolic, triumphant return, in the form of guerrillas who claim to be revenging both him and an Islam humiliated- while perhaps in reality not serving either.

Even in forgotten Afghanistan- still vexed by “Taliban remnants” and battling warlords- vestigial President Hamid Karzai praises Kabul’s new traffic jams as signs of progress, while Vogue magazine helps Afghan women learn “to be beautiful again.”A related symbol of progress was (quite literally) paraded in front of us last week, in the form of the alluring Miss Afghanistan- never mind the fact that she’s actually a college student from California. And forget about the bunker busters and gunship helicopters- it’s the sight of her majestic carriage that will prove lethal for hardened Taliban fighters.

Extracting the Symbolic

Simulation is addictive. The government pours on heavy does of symbolism when a propaganda value can be extracted from events, or staged events- while simultaneously guarding lest anything unfortunate (i.e., more real) might acquire symbolic value. This fear has now led traditional Pentagon protocol to be reversed, by banning journalists from photographing military funeral ceremonies.

We all remember May Day- when the war in Iraq officially ended. Warrior-emperor Bush descended in full regalia onto an aircraft carrier to announce victory, under a tri-colored banner reading “Mission Accomplished.” Democrats have been gleefully noting the discrepancy between that statement and Iraq’s continuing reality of violence and confusion, 6 months later. Referring to the banner, Senator Tom Daschle opined, “…this latest fabrication is yet another illustration of their (the Republican administration's) unwillingness to except (sic) reality.”

Is it possible that a typo could be fated? Taken at his (reported) word, Daschle is clearly incorrect: the Bush Administration has been in the business of excepting reality from public discourse since Day One.

Simulation Once Removed

The more tenuous the simulation, the greater becomes the need for reinforcements. Shortly after the stunt on the aircraft carrier, KB Toys- already responsible for the sickening Special Forces fun house- came out with a George Bush action figure. This collector’s item (dubbed “George W. Bush, Elite Force Aviator”) depicts the president in strapping military garb, looking stoic and regal and determined, just as he did on that portentous day. According to KB,
“…the realism and exacting attention to detail demanded by today's 12-inch action figure enthusiast are met and exceeded with this action figure.”

Well that’s a relief! At least the action figure (if not its model) can not only meet but also exceed its requirements. A derivative simulation breeds a derivative sense of comfort (in those seeking it), or alienation (in the rest of us).

The statue-toppling affair and the aircraft carrier arrival were both replayed over and over on American television. Could they somehow become more real with each repetition? Actually, they just became more meaningful- which amounts to about the same thing in this age of illusion.

Of course, one could just as easily cling to other images on the screen associated with the war- but no patriot likes to watch re-runs of American helicopters crashing. After all, why would they when the real Black Hawk Down- with its superior cinematography, punchy soundtrack and heavy symbolism- has so much more meaning? As for the raw footage of real events, that is just too fast, too jumbled and regrettably too real to symbolize anything.

Two Options for Working with Reality

Indeed, no humane person likes to watch soldiers getting maimed or screaming Iraqi civilians being vaporized. The real is suppressed, pushed down. Posterity evades it; recapturing it becomes a very tough battle.

Two options exist for fighting this battle, however. First, the simple reporting of ugly facts (ala Robert Fisk). Second, the devious use of the propagandizers’ own weapons against them.
For example: could we not petition KB Toys to make a “Limbless Ali” doll? As with Dubya’s, this toy would be indisputably part of the Iraq war nostalgia. As with “Elite Force Aviator Bush,” it would have to be “…a meticulous 1:6 scale recreation.”

But wait- I forgot. Ali’s gotten his free artificial limbs. That should shut up the little ingrate.
Symbolic Irony


When it comes to America’s creation of jihad spirit in Iraq, the irony is thick- perhaps even thicker than the whipped butter one might find at the National Prayer Breakfasts attended by notables like President Bush and CIA Director George Tenet. Last winter, the latter revealed to the assembled diners his agency’s latest strategy in the war on terror:

"…God teaches us to be resolute in the face of evil, using all of the weapons and armor that the word of God supplies."

This soft spot for religious symbolism in an allegedly dualistic struggle- after all, characters like Gen. William Boykin are taken seriously when talking about demons, principalities and powers- may help explain why the government continues to fall under the spell of fairly insipid simulation strategies, like the CIA’s interactive anti-terrorism video game.

Simulation’s Revenge- Embarrassment

In late September, the CIA announced a very different plan for fighting terror:
“…CIA agents will become make-believe terror chiefs, playing a new video game devised to make them think more like their most wanted enemy, Osama bin Laden, it was revealed yesterday. The CIA's Counter Terrorist Centre (CTC) is developing the computer game which will help agents adopt the mindset of an evil mastermind character, bent on terror and destruction.

With other agents cast as themselves, or law enforcement officials, they will do battle against one another on the multi-million dollar game.

The CIA said the idea was to help its agents "think outside the box."

Well thank God for that! In this wide world there is simply not a box big enough to contain these geniuses. After all, it would take an idiot savant, or a character out of Borges, to painstakingly craft a simulated reality so real that it could almost pass for the real thing. Yet Americans (as the prevalence of fantasy baseball leagues would attest) do have a penchant for this perverse addiction to the unreal. It’s an easy sell.

One of the reasons for creating this game (besides blowing taxpayer money), is that CIA officials feel their agents aren’t naturally evil enough. Straitlaced Americans are so moral, they believe, that it will take virtual, video-game experience to make them embrace the diabolical mindset of the terrorist. One wonders if, once settled into the role, the trainees would be able to pull themselves out of it afterwards. Would they return to reality? Or would Osama win new converts, as glassy-eyed as he and as mentally programmed as his unwired, scruffy Afghan acolytes?

More Practical Hypotheticals

Let’s think about the practical aspects of the CIA’s terrorist Play Station. Would the novice operatives become so engrossed in the game that they might actually mistake it for the real thing? Would they arrange secret, off-line meetings with allies, contacts and informants to help defeat the forces of evil (or good, whichever side they’ve been given)? Conversely, we are left with a sinister, amusing thought: could CIA trainees become so enchanted with fueling and foiling terror in the virtual world that they didn’t notice when all hell started breaking loose in the real world outside?

Of course, video games are good because they create an environment in which mistakes have no consequences. In games, intelligence failures don’t lead to say, airplanes crashing into buildings or coalition hotels getting firebombed. US security officials have become, not unreasonably, quite sensitive to criticism these days. They don’t like to make mistakes. We’re just fortunate that a lack of pressing security concerns in the real world allows agents the luxury of practicing on-line until they’re no longer susceptible to making mistakes.

Big Business Obliges: the Case of Viacom

This amazingly stupid Big Idea was greeted with little comment from the media. Certainly it didn’t get anything near the reception that TIA and the terrors future market embarrassment before it did. Perhaps, in this age of simulation, media deception and stage-managed events, everyone has come to accept such endeavors as part of the territory.

Big business, at least, has embraced it. In this, they’ve clearly taken their cue from the government. Media giant Viacom, one of those anti-regulations lobbyists often rewarded by the Bushies, sucked up to them with a highly flattering rewrite of the September 11th attacks in a cable drama entitled, "DC 9/11: Time of Crisis.” According to one tragicomic recent report,
“…the production includes the cast of Star Trek, a comedian known for his role as "the ripper," and financial subsidies from Canada where this pro-American patriotic epic was actually made to avoid paying union wages.”

The program finally appeared on Showtime on September 7th. This was no accident: airing such propaganda on the eve of the Second Anniversary helped the Bush Administration to benefit from, while simultaneously feeding, the symbolic myth of 9/11. Meanwhile, the same administration is trying its best to keep the reality of that fateful day shrouded in secrecy- even though many nagging questions, such as the precise character of Israeli involvement remain unanswered.

There are many other examples of Big Business’ hearty entrance into the world of government simulation, aside from KB Toys or Viacom, however. A bizarre recent example comes from Boeing. The gargantuan military contractor plans to spend $20 million by next year on a “virtual war simulation center.” A customer showroom with pyrotechnics, the center is meant to show the effectiveness of its products in a real wartime setting- basically, a military theme park.
As if anticipating the need for mounting a self-defense, the report highlights the great benefits Boeing’s new project will have for the greater St. Louis area: the facility would “employ about 75 when completed, and grow to about 150 employees in three to four years.”

The unstated logic is that anything contributing to job creation, no matter how outlandish, is a good thing. But how will it come off? Will we hear someone nonchalantly say, “yeah, I work down at DisneyWar.” A military theme park will do the great service of allowing those armchair generals- who’ve had their fill of seeing “real” war on TV- to get a chance to see it (sort of) really close up.

Finally, “Full Spectrum Warrior”

Although the CIA has “no plans” to release its terrorist simulation game commercially, we can have higher hopes for the Army’s offering- “Full Spectrum Warrior,” an X-Box based interactive game that simulates urban warfare.

Both simulation games were dreamed up by the Institute for Creative Technologies in Marina Del Ray, California, “…a $45 million endeavor” intended to “…connect academics with local entertainment and video game industries.” The ICT perfected “Full Spectrum Warrior” in tandem with Los Angeles-based Pandemic Studios. These producers have the best of both worlds- while their contracts utilize taxpayer dollars, they are crafting their national security training games with an eye to generating “commercial sales:”

“…Pandemic is already busy creating a retail version that will add multiplayer capability, streamline the controls and dispense with such realities as death from a single gunshot wound.
‘The explosions will be bigger. Smoke will develop more quickly. A squad leader could call in an F-16 strike,’ said Jim Korris, creative director for the Institute for Creative Technologies. ‘That doesn't happen in the real world.'”You can say that again.

Don’t try to fight the seduction- just read Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation- and also his indispensable guide to the modern world, The Spirit of Terrorism.

Is Albania Sponsoring ''Freedom Fighters'' Next Door?

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania. There, British and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly armed, supplied and supported the KLA during the war against Milosevic, using the paramilitary group as NATO's ground troops.

A New Question

All of this is fact. Albania's army also directly trained the KLA. After all, if the West said it was OK, then there was nothing to be embarrassed about. However, once the fallout from Kosovo registered and Macedonia was destabilized by the renamed militants of the NLA (National Liberation Army) in 2001, Tirana changed its tune. It officially deplored the violence and denied having anything to do with sponsoring the rebels.However, at the same time "all contact stopped" between the intelligence services of the two countries, according to one informed Macedonian source. Clearly, Albania was not entirely pleased with beleaguered Macedonia's attempts at self-defense.

Since then, the Albanian government has gone to great lengths to boost economic and defense cooperation with Macedonia, under the rubric of NATO enlargement and participations in joint ventures along the east-west Corridor 8, such as prospective railroad lines and oil pipelines. Albania is clearly looking for a new lease on life and deliverance from the economic dark ages that afflict most citizens who aren't super-rich politicos or gangsters.

Nevertheless, despite these increasingly positive developments, a new question has been raised regarding the current involvement of the Albanian government – in whole or in part – in sponsoring paramilitary groups active in neighboring states. This issue is complex; its contemplation only invites further questions. With Albania, do we have state-sponsored attempts at control through disruption (as was the case with Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban?) Or could it be instead just the manipulations of sparring political gangs?

Tirana Cracks Down: One Arrested, Another Indicted

In July, the Albanian government arrested one Gafurr Adili, leader of the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH). This diaspora-based group claims to be the political wing of the AKSH (or ANA, Albanian National Army), active since 2001 in Kosovo and Macedonia. The group's stated goal is to gather all "Albanian lands" into one majestic 19th century nation-state, by waging war with the "Slav colonizers," Greeks, and whoever else gets in their way.

Simultaneously, the Swiss banned Adili from living in their country. Stated the BBC, "…until now he has enjoyed refugee status – though it appears that he is not actually barred from visiting Switzerland where members of his family live." Such ambivalent restrictions are completely characteristic of the West's schizophrenic, lax treatment of Albanian militants since even before 2001.

On 8 October, a second arrest warrant was lodged for the leader of Albania's right-wing Party of National Unity, Idajet Beqiri. A high profile FBKSH leader, Beqiri is accused of "incitement and support for the extremist group."

Since last spring's attack on a bridge near Mitrovica, which proved that Kosovo Protection Corps staff members were moonlighting for the AKSH, the group has been deemed a "terrorist" one by Balkan and Western governments alike. Reports in the Economist and elsewhere described it as being run by increasingly desperate criminals and KLA veterans impatient with UNMIK's rule in Kosovo. This year's more concerted crackdowns by KFOR on smuggling, as well as similar revived efforts by Macedonian authorities, have also angered the militants. Averred the Economist on 12 September:

"…the AKSH represents few ethnic-Albanians. Its core consists of some 50-70 cigarette smugglers drawn from both sides of the border with Kosovo. Their latest violence has been largely prompted by their desire to stop Macedonia's police from shutting down their smuggling routes and putting them behind bars. Hisni Shaqiri, an ethnic-Albanian MP in Skopje who is trying to help keep the peace between Macedonia's Albanians and Slavs, describes Avdil Jakupi, the AKSH's "divisional commander" known as Chakala, as a "mental patient and heroin addict". A British brigadier advising the Macedonian government on defence calls the AKSH "criminals flying a political flag of convenience in the hope of finding legitimacy."

Revelations from the Inside

Until now, little has been revealed about the "highly secretive" AKSH. Who runs it? What are its plans? Does it really exist? Most importantly, perhaps, what is the leadership and extent of support enjoyed by its political wing, the FBKSH?

Recent new information from Idajet Beqiri himself casts considerable light on this issue. In its October 11-17 issue, the Serbian publication NIN ran a lengthy interview with him. Apparently, Beqiri also has a pseudonym – Albana Viosu – and is the secretary of the FBKSH. He founded Albania's Party of National Unity, was elected its president in 1991, and embarked on a volatile political career that saw him imprisoned, empowered and involved with various scandals. He has a law degree from the University of Tirana, served as a judge and claims to now work as a lawyer. Since 1997, he has been stationed in Western Europe, where he has lobbied and raised money for Albanian militant groups.

NIN claims the interview was arranged "…by tracing the news of an Albanian lawyer who organizes gatherings for wealthy Albanians throughout Western Europe." A "smiling" Beqiri then met the interviewers in Brussels.

Taking All the Credit…

Doubtless, we have to take the inevitable boasting with a grain of salt. Such figures tend to exaggerate their popularity and gains. Thus when asked whether the group only exists "on the internet," Beqiri cited "proof" to the contrary, being "…the 33 attacks for which we have assumed responsibility, as well as numerous members that join us daily."

Indeed, there have been around 30 minor bombings, murders and other mishaps since 2001, but it is decidedly unclear as to whether these were all carried out by one unified group under a single banner and command. Beqiri himself states that right now "…seven armed groups that aren't under our control act in Kosovo and Macedonia," each having around 40 members. Given the track record for Albanian gang infighting in Kosovo and Macedonia, it seems more likely that other groups have perpetrated some of these attacks – for reasons other than the Greater Albania.

Indeed, an obscure incident took place in Kumanovo a few weeks ago, when an Albanian from south Serbia opened a new pizza parlor. Apparently he was trespassing on someone else's turf, because his first customer was a drive-by shooter, who fired a hail of bullets into the shop. It is believed that two people were injured. And there have been numerous other incidents of such "cross-border cooperation" between Kosovo and Macedonia.

...Almost

Amazingly enough, Beqiri does not claim responsibility for the worst attacks – like the land mine deaths of Polish soldiers in Macedonia last spring, or the murder of Serbian children in the River Bistrica this summer. In the interview, he doesn't mention the former (they blamed it on the Macedonian army trying to discredit the AKSH), and as for the latter, he makes the rather brazen claim that the Serbs machine-gunned their own children to turn Western opinion against the Albanians. Beqiri carefully restricts his group's stated activities to legitimate military targets (though blowing up railroads and bridges doesn't seem to exactly fit the bill).

In any case, says Beqiri, "…the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH) completely controls all diplomatic and armed ANA forces." This would rather seem to implicate him and his comrades for the effects of their ordained actions. According to the now fugitive secretary, the AKSH "…hasn't performed a single attack without the approval of FBKSH."

An AKSH Chronology

Beqiri's recounting of the group's recent history is particularly interesting. After the Tetovo turf war of spring 2002, and the short-lived Coordinative Council for Albanian unity led by Ali Ahmeti, many of the latter's "disappointed" NLA fighters went over to the AKSH. However, adds Beqiri, "…a large part didn't join anyone and was completely independent. Chaos was created and the need for establishing was urgent."

Here is where the story takes an interesting twist. Beqiri's summary of what happened next casts aspersions on Albania's alleged "neutrality" in Kosovo's ongoing vortex of violence. States Beqiri:

"…in July 2002 we organized a large gathering in the Congress Palace in Tirana, where, apart from all commanders of various fractions from Kosovo and Macedonia, also were present many high intellectuals, military people, as well as representatives of all Albanian political parties. It was established then that all of us share the same desire for resolving the 'Albanian issue' and it is necessary for the sake of it to establish a military and political structure with a clear system of hierarchy. This is how FBKSH was created."

Say What?

If Beqiri can be taken at his word, key players from the whole Albanian establishment – politicians, intellectuals and most importantly of all, military men – are behind the AKSH. This story wildly contradicts every official statement made by Tirana since the war in Macedonia, i.e., that the country is not helping paramilitary forces. The most compelling aspect of all this is the alleged role of the military:

"…the generals played the key role from Albania, who enjoy enormous authority among the fighters and their commanders.

"…The general personnel are mostly from Albania and from Kosovo. The main chief of the GS (General Staff) ANA is General Vigan Gradica. He was honored with three stars and has enormous experience. The supreme council of ANA, that brings all military decisions, is made up of a total of eight generals. The entire general core is educated, mostly in Croatia and Albania, and even in Germany. All of them are professional soldiers."

Albania Implicated – and the Diaspora Too

This rather eye-opening statement calls into question Tirana's publicly stated anti-militant position. Apparently, right up until Gafurr Adili's arrest the FBKSH operated out of Tirana – "…where our base has been from the beginning." After losing their leader, the group went underground – i.e., to Kosovo – where Beqiri claims they work, "…completely openly as a legal political party." Given his present indictment by the Albanian government, and KFOR's uncompromising new attitude, this assertion will be tested.

According to Beqiri, the FBKSH command structure is made up 11 people and focuses on 5 "interest zones" of conquest: south Serbia's Presevo Valley, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ulcinj (in Montenegro) and Greece. Other protagonists in the movement are stated as being professor Femi Kelmendi, the aforementioned General Gradica and Bestar Kosova, "who is in charge of all security affairs."

As with all liberation wars past, funding for weapons comes mostly from the diaspora. Jane's estimated that during a 6 month period in 2001 the NLA raised $60 million from diaspora contributions. As was the case then, says Beqiri, "…most of the aid comes from America, then Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium." Card-carrying members (Beqiri rather bombastically claims to have 20,000) are required to kick down monthly; locals pay 2 euros per month, diaspora members, 20 euros per month. Finally, he adds, "…we are trying to organize as many as possible gatherings in the Diaspora at which we encourage people to help us as much as they can."

It is highly likely that American diaspora funding is being organized by the same congressional lobby groups that funded the last two wars, and which retain strong links with former KLA leaders. The fact that Mr. Beqiri was invited one month ago to advertise his views in front of the International Crisis Group in Brussels cannot be reassuring either.

Antagonisms on the Home Front

What kind of support does the AKSH enjoy in Albania itself, however? It would appear quite a lot. Yet is this a case of official state support (i.e., the Pakistan model), or a side effect of instability? Probably the latter. Rather than categorically blame the Albanian government, we might mention the current political volatility there – a state of affairs which leaves plenty of room for third-party mischief.

For months, unrest has been building with the government of Fatos Nano. Last week his Socialist Party suffered its second setback in 3 months, winning "…only 65 votes for nominees as foreign and interior ministers from 131 members of parliament," reported Reuters on Thursday.
With longstanding rival Ilir Meta calling for early elections in Spring, it is quite possible that Nano's days are numbered. Nano "…accused rivals who voted against him of a 'palace coup' and making common cause with the opposition Democratic Party" of Nano's other archenemy, former president Sali Berisha.

Interestingly enough, from the NIN report we learn that Nano goes way back with FBKSH Secretary Beqiri – all the way back, in fact, to their mutual imprisonment under Berisha's regime. When that regime tanked in 1997, due to the collapse of a colossal pyramid scheme that impoverished thousands overnight, Beqiri won his release, and joined a political coalition with the also-freed Nano. The latter came to power, but was removed a year later. The enmity between the two camps continues even now.

The NIN report mentions the Beqiri-Nano friendship and shared opposition to Berisha. Yet despite their common cause, the report states, Beqiri and Nano have "divergent" political views. Is NIN trying to imply that Nano is not a closet supporter of the AKSH adventure? If this were true, then how was Beqiri able to operate the FBKSH with such impunity and such high-level cooperation in Tirana, as he claims?

Indeed, this connection is being made by Beqiri's enemies in Kosovo, too. Albanian leaders there have recently damned the AKSH as a dangerous monstrosity run by Hoxha-era "Communists" under the implicit control of Nano – in other words, as an unofficial branch of the state.
That said, should we understand current Tirana's crackdown on Adimi and Beqiri as indicative of Nano's dwindling authority? Or is he being forced to sacrifice his friend due to political pressure, either internal or Western?

Hey – What Ever Happened to the Mujahedin?

No article of mine has inspired such a rancorous reaction as my brief history of Islamic terrorist involvement in Albania. While admittedly I may have exaggerated the threat, everything was based on facts and detailed reports. Since 2001, there haven't been many new developments on this front. However, another byproduct of today's political volatility in Tirana may be the subtle penetration of foreign Islamic fighters. The revelation that bin Laden's forces were training the KLA in 1999, just as the US and Britain were, was embarrassing enough for the US; but what if, after so many subsequent anti-terror operations, the Evil One has returned to the Balkans?
In a report dated 19 September, congressional director of the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yossef Bodansky claims that Albania is once again being used as a "springboard" for terrorist activities in Europe:

"…starting in mid-August 2003, there was a discernible increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques throughout Albania. 'They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. They come from many countries,' noted an eyewitness in Tirana. 'They arrive [in Tirana] from Afghanistan,' he added. These expert terrorists are being prepared in Albania for their specific missions in the West.

"This training program is conducted under the cover of the Albanian National Army (ANA or AKSh in Albanian) with most senior trainers and commanders being 'mujahedin who retreated from Bosnia' and are affiliated with al-Qaida.

"In return for the Albanian support of this endeavor, the Islamists assist the local terrorists in preparing for launching spectacular terrorism into the major cities of Serbia and Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis believed to be the top targets. As well, Islamist cadres, mainly veterans of Bosnia, are providing advance training to thousands of Albanian terrorists in camps in Kosovo-Metohija, near Prizren, on the slopes of Mt. Sara, in the Kosovo Morava River valley, in the Albanian towns of Kukes and Tropoje, and around Tetovo in western Macedonia."

A Mess of Contradictions

This tantalizing testimony directly contradicts Beqiri's statement of policy to NIN, namely, that the AKSH desires no help from the mujahedin and has no interest in attacking Belgrade. Beqiri claims that all attacks are to be carried out only within the specified "zones of operation" (i.e., Albanian-populated areas).

However, he also admits that other, apparently unaffiliated militant groups presently prowl the hills and forests of Macedonia and Kosovo. Could some of these have struck with the Islamists? Indeed, a well-informed Western security official in Kosovo told me earlier this year that the AKSH had broken up into three groups, precisely because of cooperation with the mujahedin – unsavory for some, expedient for others.

Yet as Beqiri maintains, the main AKSH body is probably content to exist solely as a magnificent fighting force of secular-enough Albanian nationalists. Especially since they seem to have such a well-oiled and experienced diaspora machine, this bunch has no interest in winding up on the wrong side of the war on terror. However, this does not mean that Islamist-associated fringe groups don't exist in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia.

In the end, Bodansky's enigmatic evidence leaves one very curious as to his sources. Had the Bush Administration not been so disingenuous with the evidence on Iraq, there would be no doubting these Balkan revelations. Now we have to be a bit more critical. One hopes that an American congressional investigator would be better-informed than a lowly freelance reporter. However, the mystery may remain unresolved, barring further violence or other inside revelations.

However, even if we never get an answer on mujahedin in the Balkans, Albania is not off the hook. Should the authorities there actually arrest Mr. Beqiri (or other of his cohorts), a clearer picture will no doubt emerge of the precise connection between Tirana and the neighborhood's most notorious paramilitary group.

To End A War

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

By Richard Holbrooke

(Random House, 1998)

432 pp.

Reviewed by Nebosja Malic

(NOTE: all page numbers refer to the hardcover edition)

Today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina is not so much a functioning country as a living testimony to the modern America policy of nation-building, and the man who brought it about in the Balkans, one Richard Holbrooke. Forthright to the point of unbearable arrogance, Holbrooke was heavily involved in the final phase of the Bosnian War (1992-95) and the escalation of the Kosovo crisis in 1998. While he has not offered an account of the latter, his Bosnian experiences are detailed in a 1998 memoir, To End a War. It is a somewhat self-serving, pompous, ignorant, crass and in places painfully trite book, without a trace of modesty – false or otherwise – which nonetheless captures Holbrooke’s perspective perfectly and offers invaluable insights into America’s role in modern Balkans affairs. Nor should his influence on US policy in the region be underestimated. Consider this statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, reflecting his confusion during the 1995 Dayton talks:

“I’m not always sure what you are doing, or why… but you always seem to have a reason, and it seems to work.” (Chapter 16, p.239)Choosing Sides

Holbrooke’s sympathies are apparent from the very beginning. In 1992, he contacted the Bosnian Muslim envoy to the UN, Muhamed Sacirbey, “introduced myself as an admirer of his cause, and offered my support.” (Chapter 3, p. 34) Writing to candidate Clinton that same year, he recommended him to “follow a more vigorous policy against Serb aggression” (Chapter 3, p.42) He cites with admiration Alija Izetbegovic’s statement from February 7, 1991: “I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina… but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty.” (Chapter 2, p. 32) At one point, when a British colleague warns him that ignoring Serb grievances was not wise, Holbrooke replied that, “The Serb view of history was their problem… ours was to end a war.” (Chapter 7, p. 110) His opinion of the Serbs is spelled out later:

“The Western mistake over the previous four years had been to treat the Serbs as rational people with whom one could argue, negotiate, compromise and agree. In fact, they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it.” (Chapter 10, p. 152)

“Bombs for Peace”

With that in mind, and wanting to end the war, Holbrooke set out to orchestrate a NATO bombing of Serb positions, and encourage a Muslim and Croat offensive. In the spring of 1995, Croatian forces had violated the UN mandate in Western Slavonia and seized a pocket of Serb territory there within three days. During one meeting with Croatian officials in the spring of 1995, Robert Frasure – a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter died on the road to Sarajevo – handed Holbrooke a note:

“Dick: We ‘hired’ these guys to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. We need to try to ‘control’ them. But it is no time to get squeamish about things. (Chapter 6, p. 73)
Soon afterwards, Croats struck again in south-western Bosnia, and in August, launched an all-out assault on Serb-held Krajina. Hundreds of Serbs were killed, hundreds of thousands expelled in the largest episode of “ethnic cleansing” in the war.

After an explosion at a Sarajevo marketplace in August that killed a dozen civilians, Izetbegovic’s government demanded NATO air strikes. Holbrooke pushed to oblige him; one of the reasons the bombing started, he claims, was “the strong recommendation of our negotiating team that bombing should take place regardless of the effect o the negotiations.” (Chapter 7, p.103)

Bosnian Serbs and Belgrade offered immediate concessions to stop the bombing and end the war. Holbrooke refused to even consider the proposals, insisting on a platform he had previously negotiated with Izetbegovic (Chapter 9, p.134). In talks with Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, Holbrooke “readily agreed [with Milosevic’s accusation] – in fact, with a certain pleasure – that the bombing…had the effect of helping the Muslims and Croats.” (Chapter 10, p. 147-8)

At one point in early September, however, NATO had run out of pre-selected targets, and the bombing was paused to Holbrooke’s great displeasure. He made impassioned phone calls and pleas to his superiors and NATO, calling for the resumption of the bombing. “It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was fighting hard for something he desperately wanted...” (Chapter 8, p. 131)
In the end, Holbrooke’s determined calls to “Give us bombs for peace.” (Chapter 8, p. 132), were heeded, and a strategy was born.Dayton

The Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio was chosen for the peace talks because it was remote, contained and because Holbrooke “thought that reminders of American airpower could not hurt” (Chapter 14, p. 204).

In Dayton, Holbrooke and his associates worked literally day and night to formulate a political and territorial settlement that would satisfy the Bosnian Muslims. Muslims themselves, led by Izetbegovic, were called only to approve or – more often – reject the proposals, generally refusing to talk to either Croats or Serbs. The Americans drove a hard bargain with Milosevic, at one point getting more territorial concessions from him than the plan proposed:

“Reviewing the charts before we showed them to the Bosnians, Christopher laughed and said, ‘Well, I’m impressed, even if Izetbegovic is not.’ … 55 percent of Bosnia was now conceded to the Federation. The opportunity was obvious: a chance to gain more territory for the Federation.” (Chapter 18, p. 294)

Serbian president Milosevic, representing the Bosnian Serbs at Holbrooke’s insistence, was more than willing to make sweeping concessions. But once he saw the charts Holbrooke used to persuade the Muslims, he stormed back to Holbrooke’s room:

“‘You tricked me,’ he said angrily. ‘You didn’t tell me that the percentage was no longer 51-49. I asked you but you didn’t reply. I saw your charts. How can I trust you?’” (p. 295)
Izetbegovic’s foreign minister, Haris Silajdzic, then tried to hammer out a compromise with Milosevic – by “conceding” territories controlled by Croatians! Holbrooke had hardly calmed down the foaming Croatian defense minister, when Izetbegovic shuffled in, wearing a night robe and slippers, and rejected the compromise outright. Holbrooke, Christopher and others were frustrated:

“At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my room to ask how we were doing. ‘We are deeply concerned,’ I said, ‘that even if Milosevic makes more concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.’

‘Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?’ Carl asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had also been asking. ‘I’m never quite sure,’ I replied. ‘Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than peace – but he can’t have both.’

Chris Hill, normally highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in momentary anger and frustration. ‘These people are impossible to help,’ he said. It was a telling statement from a man who had devoted years of his life to the search for ways to help create a Bosnian state.” (Chapter 18, p. 302)

Peace?

In the end, it was Milosevic who saved Dayton by offering so much that even Izetbegovic dared not refuse. Holbrooke confesses: "It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49." (Chapter 18, p. 299)

Holbrooke’s memoir clearly dispels the alleged altruism and humanitarianism of American policies. For all their public commitments to multi-ethnicity and human rights, Holbrooke and Co. acted quite differently in practice:

"[Milosevic] sought political equality among ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb obstructionism." (Chapter 16, p. 259)

From Bosnia to Iraq – and beyond

But to think the US intervention in Bosnia was motivated solely by a desire to help the Muslims would be a mistake. Holbrooke openly argues that intervention in the Balkans was part of a strategy to reassert US leadership (i.e. dominance) in European affairs:

“…even those who chafed at the reassertion of American power conceded, at least implicitly, its necessity. […]After Dayton, American foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular. This may have been as much perception as reality, but the perception mattered.” (Chapter 21, p. 359)

This reasserted ‘leadership’ in Bosnia was to manifest itself in half a dozen other places hence, from Kosovo to Iraq. That was as obvious to Holbrooke as it should have been to those reading his conclusions in 1998:

“There will be other Bosnias in our lives – areas where early outside involvement can be decisive, and American leadership will be required. The world’s richest nation, one that presumes to great moral authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric the next time we face a challenge to peace.” (Chapter 21, p. 369)

To End A War was not just a reminiscence of one peacemaking effort, but in some respects a template for such endeavors in the future. Richard Holbrooke may have faded into near-oblivion after his relative failure in Kosovo, but his conclusions are shared by many powerful people in Washington, Democrats and Republicans alike. That is why reading this book, while in many places neither easy nor pleasant, may be a good idea for all who wish to understand what is driving American foreign policy.

Thank God for Jayson Blair- and Argo Riistan too!

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Until recently, the Jayson Blair “scandal” seemed certain to be the most uplifting media event of the year. But who could have anticipated that this sublime manifestation of the “Disneyworld Principle” would be upstaged by the textual trickery of an unknown journalist from little Estonia?

It must have been especially hilarious for master of simulation Jean Baudrillard (if not for his lawyers) to learn that he had been interviewed by a conniving 21 year-old, it seems by telepathy.Eulogizing Argo Riistan as a “cut-and-paste conman,” Reuters spoke of the “…impressive list of published interviews,” allegedly conducted by the Estonian, which apparently included, “…writers Milan Kundera, Martin Amis, Alex Garland, Ian McEwan and Tom Stoppard, as well as star academics Jean Baudrillard and Richard Rorty, film director Milos Forman and others.”

Apparently, Riistan’s fatal Icarus moment came when he offered a Tallinn magazine an interview with George Soros. While dialogues with cultural figures had somehow seemed within the youngster’s reach, landing a chat with this king of capital somehow provoked more suspicion. The subsequent investigation revealed that the journalist had never contacted Soros in the first place. We can only marvel at what the financier and champion of an “open society” would have told us, had the simulation been allowed to unfold. We might just have enjoyed it.

The embarrassed editor of one duped Tallinn weekly issued a revealing apology: “…Tiina Kaalep said her paper had been ‘naпve’ and that, ‘the written word had been devalued’ by Riistan's actions.”

Fascinating stuff! But was there ever any value to the written word to begin with? No, this- as well as all other “scandals” of “journalistic ethics”- have the tremendous social value of restoring public faith in the inherently good and moral mission of the media community. Not so much because the people believe in it anyway, but because they know they should believe in it, if in fact they are really the kind of people who can knowingly and unblinkingly participate in perpetuating the simulations upon which the globalized world depends.

Dangerously for them, some of my pious colleagues within the media also took solace from these scandals. Under scrutiny for feeding the massive Iraq deception, such scandals reassure them- by contrast- of their own inner sanctity. “Not us!” they cry in righteous indignation, certain that their own journalistic moral compass will steer them through these troubling times of deception and simulation.

Sadly, Jayson Blair has let us down. But could there have been any other way? After resigning from the New York Times on May 1st, and taking two top editors with him, Blair spent that month planning the strategy for his resurrected media future, and upcoming book (announced finally on September 10th, set to be released next spring). On June 6th, the media hungrily consumed the image and words of a man whose chief story was that he’d made no stories.

In fact, the only reason this “non-story” became so celebrated was in its application to ethics- since Americans think themselves so moral and righteous. It was therefore sadly predictable that Blair would seize on the traditional victimology strategy, adopting the weepy, penitent persona so beloved by American talk shows, therapists and Hollywood. Such stories offer endless opportunity for self-denigration and negative escapism, followed triumphantly by forgiveness, self-transformation and inner peace- typical American excess of reality. Seducing the cameras, Blair bemoaned his life and career as a “…complicated, human tragedy.” CNN incestuously lapped up the self-indulgence on the 6th of June:

“…It has to do with my own human demons, my own weaknesses and it ranges from, you know, my struggles with substance abuse to my own struggles with mental illness, to the fact that since I was in college or high school, I deferred my own desires and my own wants for ... what others wanted and somehow, when you add race and when you add other elements to that, I lost my compass.”

Indeed! When a story in itself has absolutely no significance, the protagonist must seek to provide a rationale for it. Accolades on simulating not once but twice! We know it, we recognize it and we love it all the more for that. If the photogenic young journalist has really lost his compass, the American people will certainly help him find it. They will even gladly pay for the search. They are duty-bound, after all, and grateful for the invitation. Jayson Blair will be welcomed back into the fold not so much because his deed was terrible, or because his explanation may be true, but because there was no other explanation he could have given to restore value (read: material value) to his “devalued” words. In short, we are satisfied, and we approve; he has chosen reality. Recall Baudrillard’s lament:

“Say: I am real, this is real, the world is real, and nobody laughs. But say: this is a simulacrum, you are only a simulacrum, this war is a simulacrum and everybody bursts out laughing.”

Were Jayson Blair not to apologize but to openly exult in his mischief- for whatever reason- that would not be tolerated. Worse, were he to invoke philosophical principles questioning the reality of today’s media- that would be the worst crime, the unthinkable. And the people might not even laugh, or get the joke. After all, everyone already is already seriously indulging in the incestuous game of “objectivity”- and willfully so, wrote The Guardian’s Matthew Perry in January:

“…most Washington reports consist of stories emanating from inside the government: these may (rarely) be genuine leaks; they may come from officials anxious to brief against rival officials, but that too is rare in this disciplined and corporately-run administration. Most of these stories, which look like impressive scoops at first glimpse, actually come from officials using the press to perform on-message spin. Whatever the category, the papers lap this up, even when it is obvious nonsense, a practice that reached its apogee last year when palpably absurd plans for the invasion of Iraq emerged, allegedly from inside the Pentagon, on to the New York Times front page.”

However, the American media, always fastidious and self-assured, is the product not only of government interest but of enlightened journalistic graduate schools bent on objectivity, factuality, and murky notions of finding “the truth.” Off you go then, young writers! But first, are you armed? Or, are you honest enough to say how impossible it is to tell the truth?

We know that they’re not honest enough to say it- there is interest, after all, mostly financial but also personal, in claiming to perpetuate the illusion by defending and seeking the truth. Yet they are themselves its main assailants. After all, flagrant violations of the truth only serve to reinforce it. Crackdowns on media freedom in totalitarian regimes, for example, remind us of how free and true Western media must be, somehow. It’s only us who endanger it by purporting to uphold it.

But more than that: are they honest enough to even think so negatively? One hopes so. Without detachment, without cynicism, without malevolence- we are left with the despairing thought that maybe they really do believe in the truth before seeking to defile it, that maybe things so human and as pathetic as Jayson Blair refers to (substance abuse, mental health problems, ambition) could really precipitate one’s participation in the magical world of simulation. Blair claimed that mental health and substance abuse problems led him down the snaking path to plagiarism. Can this testimony be trusted, or- as it would seem from his subsequent media appearances and upcoming book- is it just part of a greater, more masterful simulation?

We must hope. After all, how boring, how all-too-human the first motive would be! It would merely reinforce the belief in reality that allows the apology of a Jayson Blair to resonate with us so deeply that we practically ignore the frequent “apologies” of the US Army, when it incinerates Iraqi schoolchildren or Afghan wedding guests “by mistake.” After all, they were simply human, whereas Blair is not only that, but also a “complicated, human tragedy.”

Anyway, forget about Jayson Blair. He might not turn out to be very interesting, and (if he really believes his own stated rationale for his “unethical” actions), even monstrous. A lost soul crying in the wilderness. But the Estonian hasn’t apologized to us yet (or at least a potential apology has not reached us yet, which is the same difference), and seems perhaps more clever. In any case, we can use his non-story about not making stories to make a nice story about the ecological benefits of recycling. And this is an internet lesson, too.

What does it mean for a journalist to be a “cut-and-paste conman?” As a colleague recently told me, with the modest, composed dignity of someone on death row, “I am a content aggregator.” He could have said, “I am a farmer,” or “I shine shoes,” or something equally humble. We writers have no pride anymore, really. Why?

All journalists are aware of it: the internet’s marvelous propensity for recycling of content that enables us all to work. There is no use keeping up with the events, much less the information. It takes all of our energy just to grasp hold of the information we can find and try not to lose it, so we can repackage it and send it out again under a new name and hopefully make a living.

Indeed, who has time to think now? Even in Biblical times, there was already nothing new under the sun. Today, all that nothing has simply been condensed onto one place. The internet has thus made it so much easier to observe the proverb- while the truth-lovers never cease from trying to violate it.

So three cheers for Argo Riistan! We should praise all attempts to cut down on the clutter afflicting us today. Maybe all of our stories should be recycled from now on. After all, why should they be wasted, when they can so easily be reused? Recycling is good for the mental environment!

In the end, the fact that a Jayson Blair or an Argo Riistan could pull off their nefarious schemes for so long without being detected- this indicates that no one is really paying attention, anyway. The editors are asleep at the wheel, the readers, at their desks. Scandals of media fraud and plagiarism are only really of interest to the media, for its own self-replication and reproduction. We the people are prodded to make our indignant protest on cue, when our allotted moment for reaction comes. And that’s that. Everyone is happy with the story and their part in it.

Maybe plagiarism used to be the sincerest form of flattery. Now it is the sincerest apology to reality.

One could imagine a new periodical- “Plagiarism Today.” Would it be up-to-the-minute, or would it easily become outdated? And what would it contain? Would anyone take credit for its contents- or everyone? And what kind of strategies could we arm ourselves with from it?

Or perhaps this protection is not even necessary. After all, this is the age of asymmetric threats, dangerous forces cut loose from any central command or control. Who knows how many Blairs and Riistans are currently lurking right now in media offices around the world? And, could we become such perpetrators with force of will and a greedy, inquisitive computer mouse alone? Is it a vocation, an addiction, or simply a hobby for dabblers and would be terrorists of the written word?

Maybe, I will test it out, when I sit down to “provide content” one of these days. Start with cutting and pasting one paragraph. Then two. Then- a whole article. Then combine parts of two articles, or three.

But- of course- make it my own. Change a word here or there. Eliminate an offensive comma or semi-colon. Give some suicidal dangling preposition a hearty push into the abyss. Persuade two truncated sentences to come together as one. And then dissuade Microsoft’s grammar check from irrevocably damning that sentence as a “fragment.”

No, the morally shocked and easily outraged realize not how much work it takes today just to steal! It is an editing process, selective and methodical, as was performed by the Alexandrine scholars in the old days of the library. Say what you like, but it appears young Riistan was quite culturally aware. What imagination! And good taste! If the accusers only understood, they’d see that the time and effort spent certainly have a monetary value, at least according to Western capitalistic values.

Indeed, would I be denied an honest day’s pay for an honest day’s work? Would I have to be content with a spiritual reward only, while all around my brethren writers were being rewarded for their (conscious or unconscious) intellectual dishonesty? Could I at least seduce Borges into rising from the tomb?

We should forgive Mssrs. Blair and Riistan- especially if they know not what they’ve done. Whether they know it or not, they’re doing God’s work. Why not join them?Entranced by the existential import of media simulation? Read Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation- and also his indispensable guide to the modern world, The Spirit of Terrorism

NATO’s Transformation: the Benefits and Headaches of Expansion

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)


9/11 was a lifesaver for NATO. At the time catastrophe struck, the unraveling fiasco in Kosovo was already bringing increased attention on the alliance’s essential role and value. Having been unconvincingly transformed from an alliance of mutual self-defense into one of humanitarian intervention, NATO might have been put back on life support- especially considering that newly-elected president George W. Bush was at the time calling for a more “humble” foreign policy.

However, the events of 9/11 ended that plan and unleashed endless imperialistic fantasies and military intervention. NATO was given its second reprieve in just over 2 years. It was suddenly transformed into a fighting force of extraordinary magnitude for the war on terror, a mandate which it appears to be fulfilling rather ambivalently.

While its foundational fears are long dead, Cold War dinosaurs in the Bush Administration survive and continue to push NATO expansion in countries bordering on Russia. This sends mixed signals not only to the Russians but to the wider Western public, which might like to know exactly what its tax dollars are subsidizing the alliance to do. Indeed, does NATO exist to fight (Islamic) terror, or to contain Russia?Helping to keep the good times rolling for military contractors, however, is beginning to strain the credibility of NATO itself. The US government wants it to be ready for quick deployment anywhere in the world. However, by soliciting members in the Caucasus and beyond, how can NATO in any way be deemed the “North-Atlantic” alliance? Should they not just put the organization out of its misery and rename it as the “US World Auxiliary Army,” or something similar?

Growing Pains

However, not just the name but also the operating procedures of this monstrosity will have to be revised, should its continued existence be guaranteed. The policy of consensual agreement proved hard enough with Kosovo in 1999. Then, there were only 19 member states; next year there will be 26. Although NATO is now trumpeting its new “rapid reaction force,” the speed of deployment is fundamentally dependent on the speed of diplomatic agreement- something which can’t be very fast when so many governments need be consulted first.

Second, the issue of having too many chefs in the kitchen has emerged with recent controversies over the trustworthiness of certain officials in key positions in countries like Slovakia and Bulgaria. The threats were judged serious enough in these cases to force NATO leaders to consider limiting these incoming members’ security clearances. While these particular cases have been resolved, the potential for similar headaches remains, hypothetically with any of the former Soviet new members.

Also, the danger of redundancy is becoming greater. American taxpayers, already saddled with ever-increasing costs for Iraq and Afghanistan, don’t necessarily want to pay for Europe’s defense when the EU is perfectly capable of doing so for itself. In the end, the only true supporters of NATO are the big military contractors and their cronies in the Bush Administration. However, the world is not infinite and neither are military needs. There will come a day when the NATO market will no longer be so lucrative. The question is not if these companies will experience a loss in profits, but when.

A Grand New Purpose

This possibility is well understood by the powers-that-be. NATO Supreme Commander General James E. Jones summed it up the other week when he said, “…there should be no time in which we talk about operations without talking about transformation.”

How does this pan out in reality? With NATO’s brand new “elite rapid reaction force.” The 9,000-strong troop will expand to 20,000 soldiers within 3 years. The force is intended to be “…able to deploy within five to 30 days to deal with operations ranging from evacuations and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or high-intensity combat.” Its geographical remit was left undefined. The bulk of the troops and equipment is to be provided by the Spanish, French and Germans, with the US contributing a token force of 300 soldiers. The command structure is to be similarly multi-cultural, led by a British knight, a Spanish sea-captain, and an Ottoman cavalry commander. Ah, empire!

It is abundantly clear that this new “rapid reaction force” is geared to provide non-American troops for American wars in a way that avoids traditional UN mechanism. This is the best of both worlds, allowing American arms dealers to profit while protecting American political leaders from fallout over the bodybag syndrome.

Old Europe Remains on Top

Despite the vocal opposition of countries like France and Germany, trans-Atlantic relations have in effect not changed because of the Iraq war. NATO remains a Western-controlled alliance, and quietly the anti-war countries supported the war. As General Jones reminded, “…50 percent of all of the cargo that went to prosecute the Iraqi campaign went through Europe; 80 percent of the passengers went through Europe to get there.” According to Jones, NATO has no plans of relocating from Germany’s Ramstein Air Force Base, despite Donald Rumsfeld’s frequent threats to pull out US troops from the country last spring. Cooperation has continued, if less overtly, and Western European countries remain in charge.

Indeed, we shouldn’t think that NATO allies in Fortress Europe are being given nothing except fresh bodybags. In a revealing admission, General Jones outlined what NATO is doing to benefit the greater Western economy and security. He mentions the NATO naval forces, who:
“…have had, for the past six or seven months, the assignment of making sure that transit through the Straits of Gibraltar, and actually, through the Mediterranean itself, are done in accordance with the wishes of the international community.

And having said that, we've seen about a 50 percent decrease in illegal immigration in the Western Mediterranean. And because of the security that is afforded by this wonderfully capable maritime force, it's been reflected in about a 20 percent decrease in the rates for commercial insurance for maritime shipping.”

A Call to Arms- Dealers

As a specific part of this “transformation,” NATO member defense members have agreed to go on a spending spree. An agreement last year will see the purchasing of air-to-air refueling tankers, transport planes, equipment to guard against radiation and WMD’s, secure communications, surveillance and jamming gear, as well as precision defensive missiles and special forces training. Fortunately, American companies sell many of these items.

If not on top, where, then, do the “new” European countries come in? While General Jones admitted that the alliance is headed inexorably eastward, he reaffirmed that its heart will remain in Western Europe. However, the East has great untapped value:
“…if you look at the landscape of Eastern Europe and the presence of former Warsaw Pact countries, you see literally a number of airfields and bases that are not being used, that are just out there. …we're talking about develop(ing) relationships with particularly our emerging Eastern European friends and allies who want a very close association with the United States from the standpoint of developing their own militaries as they transition from the Warsaw Pact to a Western-type army.”

Indeed, the US seems to be taking the lead in the transformation process, for interests at least as pecuniary as pragmatic:
“…we are really consumed with trying to define once and for all, in a way that makes understandable sense, NATO's true military requirement for the 21st century. And we believe that if we can define that, then we can help nations in the alliance decide what, in addition to that, they might wish to have in their own capabilities, quite above what is dedicated to NATO.”

Economies of Scale

Basically, what the US wants with this NATO re-organization is for European client-states to develop higher defense budgets and start firing personnel to set aside more cash for buying American goodies. The US is starting off by pushing new members to reach a defense budget of at least 2 percent of GDP- and to do this, if necessary, by cutting down on uniformed “human resources.” After all, the desired new hardware all has “a high-end price tag associated with it,” reminds General Jones. Small European countries can buy in to the system, however, by firing soldiers and beefing up military spending- or, as General Jones euphemized, by making “…economies of scale by internal reform.”

Budget Requirements

While that little drama seems to be over, the alliance’s “transformed” policy on defense spending is still in the air. It was recently reported that US Ambassador Ronald Weiser is “curious” about Slovakia’s planned 2004 defense budget- which is set to represent 1.9 percent of GDP. Indeed, some Slovaks were too. Former defense minister Ivan Simko, who lost his job amidst the recent Slovak security controversy, warned that
“…if the defense sector does not receive 2 percent of the national GDP in the 2004 state budget, Slovakia may become a second rank NATO member.”

Nobody wants to end up on the B list. Although General Jones hastened to add that he didn’t want to tell “sovereign nations” what to do with their money, the implications are there. And not only that- as a companion report also euphemizes, nations must “streamline political procedures” in order to expedite the deployment of the new rapid reaction force:

“…(NATO leaders) are particularly concerned by rules in Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Turkey, which need parliamentary approval for sending troops into action. Speaking to reporters, Jones said nations that were not politically ready to deploy troops quickly could be excluded from the new force.”

It is clear that NATO must transform itself in order to survive. In the future, however, expansion may be judged as having happened too fast, if the notable growing pains that accompany it turn out to have limited the alliance’s promised new operational capacities. It is a sensitive time indeed for NATO’s policy chiefs.

Should NATO share its secrets with the East? Get some background with Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania "

DPA machinations endanger an already unlikely weapons collection

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

On Saturday, after a fanfare of media, peace concerts, and even an anti-weapons march that attracted a few hundred stragglers (some governmental) and succeeded mostly in angering Skopje’s idled motorists, the long awaited weapons collections began. After all the controversies, mockery and doubt surrounding this epochal event, the government is just lucky that Charlton Heston hasn’t found about this flagrant breach of the Second Amendment. It’s also a good thing that he’s too old to be swayed by the siren charms of Skopje’s anti-gun girls.“What!” the reader may protest. “Macedonia is ruled neither by foreign pressure groups nor by the constitution of another country!”

Of course, this would be to deny the entire discursive history of the weapons collection itself. The train that started in Ohrid in 2001 is nearing its final destination- right? Peace, stability and all that are soon on the way- right?

At least the West knows how to cover its bases. It happened with the equally symbolic and equally useless operation “Essential Harvest” that helped “decommission” the NLA in 2001, and it’s happening again now- the relativization of victory.

The formula is simple: stipulate that success will be attained when a specific (but arbitrary) number of weapons are collected. In 2001, it was 3,000; today, it is 25,000. Although such figures have neither a connection with reality (i.e., how many weapons actually exist) nor with altering motive (i.e., why someone would want to use such a weapon in the first place), at least they provide a quantifiable goal- like the big red thermometer at a blood drive or some public television fundraiser. Hit it and you win.

Yet even if the magic number is hit, will the operation have proven a success. However, it is extremely unlikely that this will happen, if one looks at the recent example of Kosovo.

Nevertheless, despite its reprisal the golden carrot formula used in Kosovo in September, Macedonia’s disarmament drive is unlikely to be a success- relatively or otherwise.

Whereas the Kosovo administration promised municipal infrastructure aid, Macedonia is offering compliers a chance to win a car, or a sewing machine, or a washer. The great Macedonian lottery of 2003 seems to be rewarding violators and brigands- as such, a logical extension of the Ohrid Accord’s ramifications.

The ludicrousness of this scheme has appeared often in the press. Many have stated that they should go out and buy a gun now just so that they can turn it in for a car or a washing machine. Why not? After all, if more people in Macedonia didn’t have to rely on public transportation or hand-washing, the chances of war breaking out would sag considerably.

The EU and OSCE offered the usual encouragements last week, making the highly interesting comment that success “…lies in the hands of people who have such weapons.” One would have thought that success would lie in the mouths of those who made the press releases.

While the flimsy government coalition has rallied in support of the weapons collection, the fact that it is run by a former NLA commander (Gzim Ostreni) hasn’t built much confidence in the Macedonian population. As in Kosovo, mutual mistrust and an endemic pro-gun Balkan mindset will prove more obstinate than any offers the itinerant “confidence builders” can make.

Aside from that, some parties have been openly opposed to the disarmament scheme. Most notable in this regard is Arben Xhaferi’s DPA, which nevertheless pledged not to obstruct it.
However, new information suggests that DPA has not only disagreed with the arms drive on a policy level. Menduh Thaci and other top leaders have been making the rounds of Albanian villages near Tetovo and Skopje, telling the people to hold onto their guns- cause “it ain’t over yet.”

Whether it is just trying to spread fear, bolster nationalism, or actually has some plan for later destabilization, the DPA is actively working against the weapons collections. It is counting on the failure of the operation to weaken DUI’s credibility in the government, and propel more nationalistic, extremist forces to the fore.

The West gambled that Ostreni’s record would help win over suspicious Albanian villagers. However, now that the DUI is perceived as Skopje “sell-outs” by the rank-and-file, Xhaferi’s bunch hopes to eliminate the DUI’s “moderate” Albanian influence in the government (even if that “moderate” influence comes from people who were once called terrorists.) While the success or failure of the weapons failure is not enough to topple the government (recent ministerial changes have other, internal motivating factors), it is sufficient to present an embarrassment. Mostly, one hopes, to the architects of the Ohrid Agreement who after all created it in the first place as a concession to the Macedonian side.

Of course, as with all the other “concessions,” this is proving to be a largely simulated, ceremonial one that whether it “succeeds” or not will have no effect on Macedonia’s collective confidence or safety.

In terms of large-scale conflict, the number of guns in a country has little part to play in determining risk value. Even were the Albanians in the hills to give up every gun in their possession, the whole arsenal could be replenished several times over the very next day, just by dipping into the limitless funds available from the diaspora and organized crime.

On the other hand, even if they were to clutch tight onto every firearm in their possession, the risk of war would depend only on whether they perceived a need to use them. In the end, the rationale for voluntarily surrendering weapons becomes most effective in one capacity: that it allows less chance for a child to be killed in a household accident. Which is exactly what gun control advocates in the US have been arguing.

That said, the best solution may be to import the American anti-gun lobbyists while simultaneously deporting the militias to America. Everyone would be happy: the former extremists would enjoy an environment where people didn’t call them un-Constitutional, and the latter extremists would get to join Mr. Heston and Co. in celebrating the Second Amendment in a (politically) safe environment. Everyone would win- with the only catch being the retention of hand-washing and public transportation in Macedonia.

Diary of an Uncivil War: the Violent Aftermath of the Kosovo Conflict

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

By Scott Taylor

(Esprit de Corps Books, 2002)

208 pp.

Reviewed by Christopher Deliso

Although Macedonia’s 2001 mini-war attracted great attention from the international media, real independent reporting was rare. Most the Western journalists were informed by other Western officials, spent a disproportionate amount of time at Skopje’s luxurious Alexandar Palace Hotel, or mysteriously turned up in various rebel-held villages. Before the war even began, in fact, British reporters were filing stories from border villages where uniformed Albanians were gathering- at a time when they allegedly had no uniforms or clear leadership.

And then there was Scott Taylor. Ever dropping in unannounced, deadpanning his way through security checkpoints, hotel lobbies, armed insurrectionists and officials who don’t speak English, Taylor draws on his military background and fearlessness to get a good view of some of the most interesting places of the war- most of them otherwise unreported.

Diary of an Uncivil War is thus not only a good read- brisk, straight-up and comic in places- but also a real contribution to the primary source material on the Macedonian War, and as such it will become only more valuable with the passage of time for historians interested in researching the events of 2001. For those interested in the subject of Islamic terrorism in the Balkans, Taylor also provides an extremely detailed epilogue of sorts, chronicling terrorist presences in Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania.

The book has a few flaws, of course. Primarily, the reader is occasionally frustrated to not hear more details when it seems that the author could provide them. Also, there are certain factual errors- for example, when Taylor says there are no internet cafйs in Kumanovo (there are at least 5). These seem to be due to the whirlwind nature of Taylor’s trips, stopping only briefly wherever he goes in the search for war mayhem. One also gets the impression that his initial briefing and contacts supplied from Canada were insufficient for getting a truly comprehensive view of the situation (however, this same criticism goes for most journalists).

This sort of color is undoubtedly good for piquing the interest of general readers, but it’s somewhat superfluous for serious investigators. The author clearly did not have the time to see all that was to be seen or talk with everyone of importance, and these drawbacks were not helped by the inclusion of many terse journalistic reports of his adventures.

However, merely by virtue of his unorthodox method, Taylor stumbles across some very revealing tidbits. The Canadian is at his best when describing, in a very cut-and-dried way, extraordinary events that in themselves are highly indicative of another “truth” than the one presented by the mass media, which generally toed the line of the Albanian lobby (that they were the poor victims of a repressive “Slav” state).

The best example, perhaps, is Taylor’s visit to the mountain village of Sipkovica, where he speaks with Albanian commanders who gladly point to the material assistance of the US. (This was in direct contrast to American policy, and confirmed angry Macedonian charges of hypocrisy and deception).

Then we have the now famous story where Taylor evades the police during a highly dangerous operation, scrambles through woods that were probably heavily mined, and
rushes by bicycle to an Albanian village where he is lavished with praise and assistance- just for being Canadian. Not only is he then given a mobile phone to make the (very) long distance call to his editor back home, Taylor also gets to dine on a “tough old bird,” a rooster from the garden supplied by his hosts. Then, he is treated to a ceremonial washing of the feet and presented with the pitiful site of simulated tears from the assembled womenfolk of the house- who claim the Macedonian government bombing campaign has forced them to hide in the cellar.

The comic moments paint an unforgettable picture of the characters involved. Take this report from Tetovo, about tough-talking US monitor Carl Underwood (p. 144):
“…Around 2:00 p.m., Carl Underwood and his team of OSCE monitors arrived at the Electra for a midday meal. They were the only patrons in the restaurant and I gladly accepted their offer to join them. With classical music playing on the sound system and the heavy thud of artillery fire nearby, lunch seemed surreal.

Underwood boasted that, as an ex-U.S. Special Forces soldier, he had no intention of evacuating Tetovo. He had heard that the UCK was about to launch a big push to capture the city before the peace deal was signed. "I have no doubt in my mind who's going to win this fight," said Underwood. "That's why I rented an apartment in the Albanian sector of town."

His bravado was short-lived. When a heavy machinegun opened fire erupted just a few blocks away he rose from the table and said to his colleagues, "That's it boys. Let's get the hell out of here. From here on in, we can report from the German camp." As their white jeep pulled out of the parking lot, I suddenly realized I was the last foreigner left in Tetovo.”

In conclusion, while it has certain minor flaws and is not a comprehensive history, Diary of an Uncivil War is sufficiently entertaining and provocative to be an exciting read, as well as an important supplement to the complete body of literature on the Macedonian conflict of 2001.

The return of the Hague Tribunal and the West’s Dilemma in Kosovo

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

Over the past couple weeks, the Hague Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has shown acute renewed interest in alleged Serbian war criminals. On 20 October, four ranking officers- Army Chief of Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic, former Pristina Corps Commander Vladimir Lazarevic, current Chief of Public Security Sreten Lukic and his predecessor, Vlastimir Djordjevic- have all been indicted over the Kosovo war in 1999.
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic criticized the new indictments as “a blow to reform in Serbia” and posed the following intriguing question:
“…why (the indictments) today- seven days after the meeting in Vienna with the Kosovo Albanians and the international community, during a campaign for presidential elections in Serbia and when we are just about to start a debate on confidence in the government?”Western pro-intervention forces are growing increasingly frustrated with the Hague- at best, a weak tribunal, and at worst a joke. Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s failure to win a total victory over Slobodan Milosevic- the inquisition’s big prize- remains a sore spot. Del Ponte has never won a big case in her career and is said to be increasingly obsessed with defeating Milosevic, and also netted other desirable undesirables like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. These men continue to elude captivity, and are thought to be hiding in the Republika Srpska or in Serbia proper. Over the past two years, NATO has mounted several high-profile operations against them, though these have been mostly for show. The two former commanders may never be caught.
There are two major reasons for the Hague’s renewed interest in Serbia. First of all, it comes just as Belgrade and Pristina are sitting down for the first round of talks since NATO’s bombing campaign of 1999 made the Serbian province into a protectorate. Resolving Kosovo’s final status is a process with immense ramifications for the entire Balkan region, but also for the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which has been running the province since 1999.
After originally boycotting the Vienna-based talks, Kosovo Serb leaders are participating- after frantic shuttle diplomacy from the West. Above all, UNMIK and Western governments are trying to avoid a perceived failure in Kosovo. The widely-criticized mission has allowed the elimination of non-Albanian minorities by vengeful militias, the destruction of priceless cultural relics (for example, over 110 Serbian Orthodox churches), and the explosive increase in the drugs, weapons and cigarette business, as well as in human trafficking and prostitution. With Iraq and Afghanistan now draining Western budgets, Kosovo is perceived as an old nuisance to be cast aside as soon as possible.
As usual, stubborn Serbia is perceived as the obstacle to a deal. But in trying to be sensitive to the wishes of both Serbs and Albanians, it is clear that the West can please neither. The former believe it to be an integral part of Serbia, and argue that the few remaining Serbs will be driven out or killed once the province becomes independent- making a farce out of whatever power-sharing agreement the West might try to broker. For the Serbs, return of Serbian police forces is the dream whereas partition of the province is the pragmatic solution. Neither of these is acceptable to the Albanian side, which is confident it can eventually take everything in the negotiations.
The Albanians believe (as the Serbs do) that Kosovo is historically theirs. Never known for their patience, the Albanians are becoming increasingly frustrated with what they believe to be a simulated government in which UNMIK always has the final say. Vital issues like property ownership, privatization and investment laws remain unresolved. Several times the resolves of President Bajram Rexhepi and the Kosovo Parliament have been overturned by UNMIK. While the Albanians are always quick to thank the West for freeing them from “oppressive” Serb rule, they increasingly believe that the UN is part of the problem. Now, the unthinkable is occurring- open street protests in Pristina, as London’s “Guardian” documented last week. Albanians young and old alike gathered and demanded that UNMIK “go home” and had over full power to them. Now, the West fears Kosovo is becoming like Iraq- albeit much more slowly.
UNMIK, much-beloved at first, is starting to get a bad reputation. Western officials drive sleek new cars, work in air-conditioned modern offices and enjoy conspicuous consumption with their bloated Western salaries- while more than 45 percent of Kosovars remain unemployed. Rexhepi last week blamed Western officials for directly stealing money from his budget, while also accused the internationals of fueling the growth in prostitution, and therefore strengthening mafia rule. UN civil and police officials have often bemoaned the powerful effect that militant mafia clans have over Kosovo.
For both of these reasons, the urgency of finding a solution and avoiding recrimination- the West is once again using the Hague Tribunal as a way of taking the pressure off. It hopes to use it both to direct attention elsewhere and to pressure the Serbs into quicker concessions. It is no secret that UNMIK lives in fear of the Kosovo Albanians. When Slovenia this week arrested notorious Kosovo warlord (and commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps police force) Agim Ceku, on an Interpol warrant issued by Serbia, he was almost immediately released and brought back to Kosovo. UNMIK announced that it was “working with” Slovenia to make sure such a thing would not happen again.
The message was clear- UNMIK will continue to protect Kosovo’s own. Extraditing Ceku to Serbia would have caused an immediate- and violent- backlash against UNMIK. The position of the colonial regime, precarious enough as it is, cannot be allowed to be endangered by Serbian extradition desires. This is also why the Hague has not indicted Albanians for atrocities carried out against Serbs- only those against other Albanians. By any standards of parity, the Hague has proven itself to be a joke, acting only to protect the UNMIK forces on the ground from Albanian reprisals.
It is to these factors of urgency that we can ascribe the Hague Tribunal’s revived interest in prosecuting Serbs. By hanging indictments over the head of Serbia’s government, Western negotiators hope they can extract more concessions from Belgrade with regards to Kosovo. Additionally, NATO officials- already having trouble with Communist-era holdovers in incoming countries like Bulgaria and Romania- would like to “cleanse” Serbia’s security forces of any holdovers from the Milosevic administration, as a pre-condition for Serbia’s someday joining the alliance.
On the other hand, Serbia has gone to great lengths this year to build good relations with the Americans. Troops were offered for Iraq and Afghanistan, and PM Zoran Zifkovic even visited Washington this summer. Serbia still faces tough economic times. However, recent high-profile takeovers of steel and tobacco interests by American companies, and German acquisitions of Serbian newspapers, indicate a significant resurgence of interest in Serbia as an FDI destination. Apparently, business has realized what the politicians have not- that the Serbs are not inherently evil.
This is telling. It proves that the Hague is being used to exert pressure primarily to save the UN’s skin in Kosovo from mounting Albanian protests and the urgency of changing an untenable status quo. UNMIK is praying for a painless solution in Kosovo. However, this will simply not happen.
The fallout is likely to be far-reaching. Macedonia’s civil war of 2001 was sustained and led by Albanian KLA veterans in Kosovo. Kosovo-based extremists from the Albanian National Army (ANA) have committed several deadly terrorist attacks this year, and have explicitly announced their desire to cleanse northern and western Macedonia of its “Slav colonizers,” as they call Macedonians.
In the end, while granting Kosovo independence might cause future regional upheaval and mafia rule in an economically unviable territory, the West views this as the least dangerous outcome.
This is not the result of some grand and sagacious strategy. Rather, UNMIK is primarily looking out for its own safety. While Serbian and Macedonian concerns can be and have been ignored safely, the Albanians are different. Only the unexpected can be expected from them. Their long memories and long history of militancy are clearly intimidating the Western colonial government. Appeasing them is thus essential for the safety of the current local administration- but also for those Western leaders who believed that the NATO bombing campaign was a wise enterprise. Securing the legacies of Clinton, Albright, Blair etc. remains a fundamental (though understated) concern.
Satisfying everyone in Kosovo is impossible. Realizing this, the West has chosen to appease those whom it believes would cause the most problems if left unsatisfied- the Albanians. Independence will happen, but not overnight. The Western gamble now is how long it can continue to keep the negotiating process going- thereby maintaining the greatest simulation of fair treatment all parties- while also avoiding protests and violence against the UNMIK staff. This balancing act will likely prove awkward, dangerous and in the long run, unsustainable.How did those whole mess get started? Michael Parenti offers a controversial interpretation in To Kill a Nation, while Noel Malcolm toes the party line in Kosovo: a Short History.
Note: This article was originally published on 1 November 2003 by PINR.

Hawala, or the bank that never was

(This article is from the Balkanalysis.com archive)

A classic analysis of the intricacies of Islamic banking from guest author Dr. Sam Vaknin.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, attention was drawn to the age-old, secretive, and globe-spanning banking system developed in Asia and known as "Hawala" (to change, in Arabic). It is based on a short term, discountable, negotiable, promissory note (or bill of exchange) called "Hundi". While not limited to Moslems, it has come to be identified with "Islamic Banking".

Islamic Law (Sharia'a) regulates commerce and finance in the Fiqh Al Mua'malat, (transactions amongst people). Modern Islamic banks are overseen by the Shari'a Supervisory Board of Islamic Banks and Institutions ("The Shari'a Committee").

The Shi'a "Islamic Laws according to the Fatawa of Ayatullah al Uzama Syed Ali al-Husaini Seestani" has this to say about Hawala banking:

"2298. If a debtor directs his creditor to collect his debt from the third person, and the creditor accepts the arrangement, the third person will, on completion of all the conditions to be explained later, become the debtor. Thereafter, the creditor cannot demand his debt from the first debtor."The prophet Muhammad (a cross border trader of goods and commodities by profession) encouraged the free movement of goods and the development of markets.

Numerous Moslem scholars railed against hoarding and harmful speculation (market cornering and manipulation known as "Gharar"). Moslems were the first to use promissory notes and assignment, or transfer of debts via bills of exchange ("Hawala"). Among modern banking instruments, only floating and, therefore, uncertain, interest payments ("Riba" and "Jahala"), futures contracts, and forfeiting are frowned upon. But agile Moslem traders easily and often circumvent these religious restrictions by creating "synthetic Murabaha (contracts)" identical to Western forward and futures contracts. Actually, the only allowed transfer or trading of debts (as distinct from the underlying commodities or goods) is under the Hawala.

"Hawala" consists of transferring money (usually across borders and in order to avoid taxes or the need to bribe officials) without physical or electronic transfer of funds. Money changers ("Hawaladar") receive cash in one country, no questions asked. Correspondent hawaladars in another country dispense an identical amount (minus minimal fees and commissions) to a recipient or, less often, to a bank account. E-mail, or letter ("Hundi") carrying couriers are used to convey the necessary information (the amount of money, the date it has to be paid on) between Hawaladars. The sender provides the recipient with code words (or numbers, for instance the serial numbers of currency notes), a digital encrypted message, or agreed signals (like handshakes), to be used to retrieve the money. Big Hawaladars use a chain of middlemen in cities around the globe.

But most Hawaladars are small businesses. Their Hawala activity is a sideline or moonlighting operation. "Chits" (verbal agreements) substitute for certain written records. In bigger operations there are human "memorizers" who serve as arbiters in case of dispute. The Hawala system requires unbounded trust. Hawaladars are often members of the same family, village, clan, or ethnic group. It is a system older than the West. The ancient Chinese had their own "Hawala" - "fei qian" (or "flying money"). Arab traders used it to avoid being robbed on the Silk Road. Cheating is punished by effective ex-communication and "loss of honour" - the equivalent of an economic death sentence. Physical violence is rarer but not unheard of. Violence sometimes also erupts between money recipients and robbers who are after the huge quantities of physical cash sloshing about the system. But these, too, are rare events, as rare as bank robberies. One result of this effective social regulation is that commodity traders in Asia shift hundreds of millions of US dollars per trade based solely on trust and the verbal commitment of their counterparts.

Hawala arrangements are used to avoid customs duties, consumption taxes, and other trade-related levies. Suppliers provide importers with lower prices on their invoices, and get paid the difference via Hawala. Legitimate transactions and tax evasion constitute the bulk of Hawala operations. Modern Hawala networks emerged in the 1960's and 1970's to circumvent official bans on gold imports in Southeast Asia and to facilitate the transfer of hard earned wages of expatriates to their families ("home remittances") and their conversion at rates more favourable (often double) than the government's. Hawala provides a cheap (it costs c. 1% of the amount transferred), efficient, and frictionless alternative to morbid and corrupt domestic financial institutions. It is Western Union without the hi-tech gear and the exorbitant transfer fees.

Unfortunately, these networks have been hijacked and compromised by drug traffickers (mainly in Afganistan and Pakistan), corrupt officials, secret services, money launderers, organized crime, and terrorists. Pakistani Hawala networks alone move up to 5 billion US dollars annually according to estimates by Pakistan's Minister of Finance, Shaukut Aziz. In 1999, Institutional Investor Magazine identified 1100 money brokers in Pakistan and transactions that ran as high as 10 million US dollars apiece. As opposed to stereotypes, most Hawala networks are not controlled by Arabs, but by Indian and Pakistani expatriates and immigrants in the Gulf. The Hawala network in India has been brutally and ruthlessly demolished by Indira Ghandi (during the emergency regime imposed in 1975), but Indian nationals still play a big part in international Hawala networks. Similar networks in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Bangladesh have also been eradicated.

The OECD's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) says that:

"Hawala remains a significant method for large numbers of businesses of all sizes and individuals to repatriate funds and purchase gold.... It is favoured because it usually costs less than moving funds through the banking system, it operates 24 hours per day and every day of the year, it is virtually completely reliable, and there is minimal paperwork required."

(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), "Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999-2000," Financial Action Task Force, FATF-XI, February 3, 2000, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/TY2000_en.pdf )

Hawala networks closely feed into Islamic banks throughout the world and to commodity trading in South Asia. There are more than 200 Islamic banks in the USA alone and many thousands in Europe, North and South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states (especially in the free zone of Dubai and in Bahrain), Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other South East Asian countries. By the end of 1998, the overt (read: tip of the iceberg) liabilities of these financial institutions amounted to 148 billion US dollars. They dabbled in equipment leasing, real estate leasing and development, corporate equity, and trade/structured trade and commodities financing (usually in consortia called "Mudaraba").

While previously confined to the Arab peninsula and to south and east Asia, this mode of traditional banking became truly international in the 1970's, following the unprecedented flow of wealth to many Moslem nations due to the oil shocks and the emergence of the Asian tigers.
Islamic banks joined forces with corporations, multinationals, and banks in the West to finance oil exploration and drilling, mining, and agribusiness. Many leading law firms in the West (such as Norton Rose, Freshfields, Clyde and Co. and Clifford Chance) have "Islamic Finance" teams which are familiar with Islam-compatible commercial contracts.

II. HAWALA AND TERRORISM

Recent anti-terrorist legislation in the US and the UK allows government agencies to regularly supervise and inspect businesses that are suspected of being a front for the ''Hawala'' banking system, makes it a crime to smuggle more than $10,000 in cash across USA borders, and empowers the Treasury secretary (and its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - FinCEN) to tighten record-keeping and reporting rules for banks and financial institutions based in the USA.

A new inter-agency Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT) was set up. A 1993 moribund proposed law requiring US-based Halawadar to register and to report suspicious transactions may be revived. These relatively radical measures reflect the belief that the al-Qaida network of Osama bin Laden uses the Hawala system to raise and move funds across national borders. A Hawaladar in Pakistan (Dihab Shill) was identified as the financier in the attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

But the USA is not the only country to face terrorism financed by Hawala networks.
A few months ago, the Delhi police, the Indian government's Enforcement Directorate (ED), and the Military Intelligence (MI) arrested six Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) terrorists. The arrests led to the exposure of an enormous web of Hawala institutions in Delhi, aided and abetted, some say, by the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan's security services). The Hawala network was used to funnel money to terrorist groups in the disputed Kashmir Valley.

Luckily, the common perception that Hawala financing is paperless is wrong. The transfer of information regarding the funds often leaves digital (though heavily encrypted) trails. Couriers and "contract memorizers", gold dealers, commodity merchants, transporters, and moneylenders can be apprehended and interrogated. Written, physical, letters are still the favourite mode of communication among small and medium Hawaladars, who also invariably resort to extremely detailed single entry bookkeeping. And the sudden appearance and disappearance of funds in bank accounts still have to be explained. Moreover, the sheer scale of the amounts involved entails the collaboration of off shore banks and more established financial institutions in the West. Such flows of funds affect the local money markets in Asia and are instantaneously reflected in interest rates charged to frequent borrowers, such as wholesalers.

Spending and consumption patterns change discernibly after such influxes. Most of the money ends up in prime world banks behind flimsy business facades. Hackers in Germany claimed (without providing proof) to have infiltrated Hawala-related bank accounts.

The problem is that banks and financial institutions - and not only in dodgy offshore havens ("black holes" in the lingo) - clam up and refuse to divulge information about their clients. Banking is largely a matter of fragile trust between bank and customer and tight secrecy.

Bankers are reluctant to undermine either. Banks use mainframe computers which can rarely be hacked through cyberspace and can be compromised only physically in close co-operation with insiders. The shadier the bank - the more formidable its digital defenses. The use of numbered accounts (outlawed in Austria, for instance, only recently) and pseudonyms (still possible in Lichtenstein) complicates matters. Bin Laden's accounts are unlikely to bear his name. He has collaborators.

Hawala networks are often used to launder money, or to evade taxes. Even when employed for legitimate purposes, to diversify the risk involved in the transfer of large sums, Hawaladars apply techniques borrowed from money laundering. Deposits are fragmented and wired to hundreds of banks the world over ("starburst"). Sometimes, the money ends up in the account of origin ("boomerang").

Hence the focus on payment clearing and settlement systems. Most countries have only one such system, the repository of data regarding all banking (and most non-banking) transactions in the country. Yet, even this is a partial solution. Most national systems maintain records for 6-12 months, private settlement and clearing systems for even less.

Yet, the crux of the problem is not the Hawala or the Hawaladars. The corrupt and inept governments of Asia are to blame for not regulating their banking systems, for over-regulating everything else, for not fostering competition, for throwing public money at bad debts and at worse borrowers, for over-taxing, for robbing people of their life savings through capital controls, for tearing at the delicate fabric of trust between customer and bank (Pakistan, for instance, froze all foreign exchange accounts two years ago). Perhaps if Asia had reasonably expedient, reasonably priced, reasonably regulated, user-friendly banks - Osama bin Laden would have found it impossible to finance his mischief so invisibly.

This article was also published in World in Conflict, Economies in Transition.